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A New Look at the Impeachment of Andrew Johnson
MICHAEL LES BENEDICT

Moral Values and International Politics
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Arthur H. Vandenberg, Internationalism, and the United Nations
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What Makes A Classic in Political Theory?
MICHAEL LEVIN

Book Reviews

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# Political Science Quarterly

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## *From the Managing Editor:*

### *In This Issue . . .*

MICHAEL LES BENEDICT's interpretation of the impeachment of President Andrew Johnson destroys the conventional textbook wisdom which portrays Johnson as a martyred president unjustifiably pilloried by a vindictive Congress. Benedict shows that the decision to impeach was made reluctantly after a series of presidential actions over the years convinced even the most conservative members of Congress that impeachment was the only means left for defending their constitutional prerogatives.

KENNETH THOMPSON reminds us that political conflicts are typically between groups with different values rather than between one that is morally pure and the other morally vacuous. Recognizing that our opponents may also be acting on their conception of moral principle can keep us from turning our own values into absolutes that must be pursued by any means.

JAMES GAZELL explores the contributions of Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg in developing bipartisan support for America's joining the United Nations. Gazell explains Vandenberg's transformation from an extreme isolationist who opposed United States membership in the League of Nations to a major force in shaping an internationalist foreign policy.

FRANK DINKA and MAX SKIDMORE argue that elections in one-party Communist nations are more than empty rituals. Their detailed analysis of the Czechoslovak elections of 1971 describes the Communist leadership's elaborate efforts to assure a big turnout that would be considered a popular endorsement of the new regime.

DAVID COLBURN illuminates a little known aspect of Alfred E. Smith's public career. During the height of the Red Scare of 1919-20, the governor of New York took a strong civil-libertarian and social-reformist position, helping to dampen public fears about a Bolshevik revolution in America.

LEONARD STAVISKY calls attention to the emergence of firms that sell term papers on a large scale. He analyzes the attitudes of students and college officials toward this new form of plagiarism and documents how one state government has dealt with the problem.

MICHAEL LEVIN discusses why certain books in political theory have become "classics" while others are forgotten. Examining John Locke's *Two Treatises of Government*, Levin concludes that, ironically, lack of originality and ambiguity may help a theorist's work to become a "classic."

### *An Invitation . . .*

An invitation is extended to our readers to send comments on articles and book reviews appearing in the journal. A selected number of letters will be published beginning in the March, 1974, issue.

DEMETRIOS CARALEY

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# A New Look at the Impeachment of Andrew Johnson

MICHAEL LES BENEDICT

With the suddenly reawakened interest in presidential impeachment, many Americans naturally have turned for insight to the case of President Andrew Johnson. Johnson, Lincoln's successor, was the only president ever charged by the House of Representatives with "high crimes and misdemeanors." But the version of the Johnson impeachment that Americans have found in textbooks, studies of the presidency, and histories of the Reconstruction Era is hardly one to reassure them of the efficacy of impeachment proceedings—the only constitutional method outside of defeat for reelection to remove a president from office.

Traditionally, the Johnson impeachment has been portrayed as "the most insidious assault on constitutional government in the nation's history," "the culmination of a sustained effort to make [the president] . . . subservient to Congress, to alter the place of a coordinate branch in the constitutional scheme."[1] Recent studies of Re-

[1] Irving Brant, *Impeachment: Trials and Errors* (New York, 1972), 4; Raoul Berger, *Impeachment: The Constitutional Problems* (Cambridge, Mass., 1973), 295. For similar assessments, see Claude Bowers, *The Tragic Era: The Revolution*

MICHAEL LES BENEDICT is assistant professor of history at Ohio State University. He is the author of *The Impeachment and Trial of Andrew Johnson* and has a new book in press, tentatively entitled, *A Compromise of Principle: Republicans and Reconstruction.*



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construction, less sympathetic to Johnson's policies and more sympathetic to the congressional Republicans, suggest the impeachment "was a great act of ill-directed passion." The leading book-length study of the Johnson impeachment has been David Miller DeWitt's *Impeachment and Trial of Andrew Johnson*, and it paralleled the pro-Johnson, anti-Republican historical orthodoxy of the times.

But all these interpretations do injustice to history and—more important—have impelled Americans to fear the great Anglo-Saxon "remedy" for official wrongdoing more than the wrongdoing itself. If we are to comprehend the real nature of that remedy, a better understanding of the origins and causes of the Johnson impeachment is necessary. Because of limited space, this article will deal only with the events leading to the Johnson impeachment. In my book, *The Impeachment and Trial of Andrew Johnson*, I argue that the long-held conviction that the trial itself was a travesty of justice—most recently articulated in Berger's book on *Impeachment*—has also been exaggerated.[2]

Most Americans are at least somewhat familiar with the background of the single impeachment of a president of the United States: Andrew Johnson became president after Lincoln's assassination in April, 1865, and immediately faced the intimidating task of restoring the shattered Union. Like Lincoln, he assumed complete authority over the question himself, and denied Congress's power to participate even more firmly than his predecessor. Johnson embarked on a policy designed to restore the former Confederate states to civil government with maximum speed and a minimum disturbance of Southern institutions beyond the abolition of slavery itself. But his policy placed former rebels in political control of nearly every Southern state and left Southern blacks to the mercies of the men

*After Lincoln* (Boston, 1929); Lloyd Paul Stryker, *Andrew Johnson: Profile in Courage* (New York, 1929); John Fort Milton, *The Age of Hate: Andrew Johnson and the Radicals* (New York, 1930); Milton Lomask, *Andrew Johnson: President on Trial* (New York, 1960).

[2] Eric L. McKitrick, *Andrew Johnson and Reconstruction* (Chicago, 1960), 506; David Donald, "Why They Impeached Andrew Johnson," *American Heritage*, VIII (December, 1956), 21-25, 102-103; Hans L. Trefousse, *The Radical Republicans: Lincoln's Vanguard for Racial Justice* (New York, 1969); David Miller DeWitt, *Impeachment and Trial of Andrew Johnson, Seventeenth President of the United States: A History* (New York and London, 1903); Michael Les Benedict, *The Impeachment and Trial of Andrew Johnson* (New York, 1973); Berger, *Impeachment*.

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who had fought so desperately to keep them in bondage.

Faced with returning Southern congressmen-elect, who so recently had tried to rend the nation, and with state "black codes" which reduced the freedmen to virtual peonage, Republicans in Congress felt the fruits of victory slipping from their grasp. They reacted by refusing to recognize the finality of Johnson's policy of Reconstruction and by legislating to protect the civil rights of the former slaves. Unsympathetic—if not antipathetic—to black aspirations, Johnson broke with his party and began a bitter conflict with its congressional majority, the so-called "Radical Republicans."

This account of the genesis of the confrontation between the president and Congress after the Civil War may be new to those unfamiliar with the conclusions of historians who have restudied the Reconstruction Era during the past decade and a half, but it has been generally accepted by the profession.[3] The Johnson impeachment was engendered by the partisan passions the conflict over Johnson's Reconstruction policies kindled among the Radical Republicans, Americans have been told. Still, Republicans approached impeachment reluctantly, unwillingly, and only voted for impeachment after they were convinced that the president had violated the law and intended to abort congressional authority over Reconstruction by any means necessary. Impeachment was, thus, the defensive response of a Congress faced by an aggressive executive using his presidential powers in a way that appeared to subvert the Constitution of the United States.

## I

For almost a year after Johnson's final break with the party that elected him to vice-presidential office, many of the more conservative Republicans hoped for reconciliation. As late as February, 1867, when Congress fashioned the Military Reconstruction bill, these conservative Republican congressmen were still trying to negotiate a compromise with their powerful adversary, President Andrew

[3] See W. R. Brock, *An American Crisis: Congress and Reconstruction, 1865-1867* (New York, 1963); La Wanda and John H. Cox, *Politics, Principle, and Prejudice, 1865-1866: Dilemma of Reconstruction America* (New York, 1963); McKitrick, *Andrew Johnson and Reconstruction;* Kenneth M. Stampp, *The Era of Reconstruction, 1865-1877* (New York, 1965); and Hans L. Trefousse, *The Radical Republicans.*

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Johnson.[4] When, at the same time, more radical Republicans announced their intentions to propose impeachment in the House, the Republican caucus, led by the influential John A. Bingham—author of the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment—and Elihu B. Washburne, forbade any Republican from bringing impeachment resolutions to the floor without first getting caucus approval. Moreover, the caucus required that any actual impeachment have the sanction of the House Judiciary Committee.[5] The radicals refused to obey the caucus dictate and proposed impeachment resolutions anyway, but the Republican majority, trying to stifle debate, hurriedly referred them to various committees.[6] To conform to one of these impeachment resolutions, the House Judiciary Committee began slowly to investigate the president's conduct. In March, 1867, dismayed by the committee's slow progress and evident coolness to their project, radicals tried to bypass it and win caucus approval for impeachment. Again Bingham, now aided by Judiciary Committee Chairman James F. Wilson, thwarted his restive Republican colleagues.[7]

Defeated in their attempts to institute impeachment proceedings against Johnson, radicals, led by Representatives Thaddeus Stevens, Benjamin F. Butler, and George S. Boutwell, and Senators Charles Sumner and Charles Drake, hoped to keep Congress in session over

[4] *New York Tribune*, Feb. 15, 1867, p. 1; Feb. 17, 1867, p. 1; Feb. 18, 1867, p. 1. Unpublished testimony before the Select Committee . . . on a Corrupt Bargain with the President, Papers of that committee, 39 Congress, Record Group 233, National Archives, Washington, D.C.

[5] *New York Times*, Jan. 6, 1867, p. 1; Jan. 7, 1867, p. 5. Bingham was the second-ranking House Republican member of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction and author of the civil rights section of the Fourteenth Amendment; Washburne was the senior Republican in the House and also a member of the Reconstruction Committee.

[6] *Congressional Globe*, 39 Congress, 2 session, 319-21 (Jan. 7, 1867), 443-46 (Jan. 14, 1867), 807-808 (Jan. 28, 1867), 991 (Feb. 4, 1867).

[7] *New York Times*, Mar. 7, 1867, p. 4; Boston *Evening Journal*, Mar. 6, 1867, p. 4; Mar. 7, 1867, p. 4; Senator James W. Grimes to Mrs. Grimes, Mar. 12, 1867, quoted in William Salter, *The Life of James W. Grimes, Governor of Iowa, 1854-1858; Senator of the United States, 1859-1869* (New York, 1876), 323; Senator John Sherman to William T. Sherman, Mar. 7, 1867, quoted in Rachel S. Thorndike (ed.), *The Sherman Letters: Correspondence Between General Sherman and Senator Sherman from 1837 to 1891* (New York, 1894), 289-90; Francis Fessenden, *Life and Public Service of William Pitt Fessenden*, 2 vols. (Boston & New York, 1907), II, 128.

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the summer of 1867, both to guard against presidential intrigue and to maintain pressure for Johnson's removal. But here again more conservative Republicans, led by Bingham and James G. Blaine in the House, and Lyman Trumbull and William Pitt Fessenden in the Senate, checked the enthusiasm of their more radical colleagues.[8] When Johnson's provocative activities forced the 1867 summer meeting that conservative Republicans had sought to avoid, they limited business to amendments to the Reconstruction act and then squelched a radical effort to call an October session to deal with impeachment.[9] So the majority of Republican congressmen hardly displayed that eagerness for revenge upon the president that subsequent generations of Americans ascribed to them.

## II

That reluctance to impeach President Johnson becomes even more apparent when one analyzes the dispute between radical and nonradical Republicans over the nature of impeachable offenses—a controversy still of importance. This controversy turned upon opposing interpretations of the terms "high crimes and misdemeanors," which provide, along with outright treason and bribery, the sole grounds for impeachment under the Constitution.[10] Conservatives, fearful of

[8] After a hard-fought struggle, Congress adjourned over the summer of 1867 with a provision allowing it to reconvene if a quorum was present on the first Wednesday in July. Behind the scenes, Representative Robert C. Schenck, generally allied with the more radical Republicans, and Senator Edmund D. Morgan, a conservative Republican, cochairmen of the Republican Congressional Campaign Committee, were delegated the responsibility of deciding whether Congress need meet. All had agreed that a July meeting was unlikely. *Cong. Globe*, 40 Cong., 1 Sess., 16 (Mar. 7, 1867), 303-308, 315-20 (Mar. 23, 1867), 321-22, 331, 334 (Mar. 25, 1867), 352-60 (Mar. 26, 1867), 387-91 (Mar. 27, 1867), 401-408, 419-20, 425-27 (Mar. 28, 1967), 438-41, 446-54 (Mar. 29, 1867); Zachariah Chandler, speaking at Ashtabula, Ohio, in McPherson scrapbook: Campaign of 1867, II, 135-36, in the Edward McPherson Mss., Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

[9] Boston *Daily Advertiser*, July 4, 1867, p. 1; *Cong. Globe*, 40 Cong., 1 Sess., 480 (July 3, 1867), 481-99 (July 5, 1867), 565-67 (July 10, 1867), 587-90 (July 11, 1867), 732-35 (July 19, 1867).

[10] These differing concepts were developed in three major exchanges during the critical year preceding the great trial. The first was an indirect exchange in the *American Law Register* in March and September, 1867, between Professor Theodore W. Dwight of Columbia College Law School and Representative (for-

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the institutional and political effects of impeachment on the stability of the country, turned to the theory propounded by the defense in several earlier nonpresidential impeachments, i.e., that government officers could be impeached only for indictable violations of criminal statute or common law. Many historians studying impeachment have accepted this position, accusing the more radical Republicans, who insisted on a broader interpretation of "high crimes and misdemeanors," of perverting the impeachment process in a purely political vendetta. But those who espoused the narrow view had a very difficult task in sustaining it against the weight of precedent and authority that contravened it, and it has been rejected by modern scholars who have investigated the question.

There had been innumerable English impeachments based on nonindictable offenses on the part of royal officials before the framing of the American Constitution. Every impeachment brought by the House before the Senate in 1868 had similarly alleged nonindictable but wrongful conduct, and in two cases the Senate convicted the defendants and removed them from office. Brant, who tries valiantly to limit the impeachment power which he feels is so liable to abuse, concedes that liability for criminal conduct alone would restrict the power too narrowly. He adds as grounds for removal "violations of the oath of office," a rather nebulous term in light of the vagueness of such oaths.[11]

merly Judge) William Lawrence of Ohio, a member of the House Judiciary Committee; the second clash came in the Judiciary Committee's majority and minority reports on the impeachment resolution of November-December 1867; and the third was embodied in the speeches that Representative George S. Boutwell and Judiciary Committee Chairman Wilson, as ranking signers respectively of the majority and minority reports, delivered on the floor of the House in defense of their positions. Dwight, "Trial by Impeachment," *American Law Register*, XV, old series (Mar., 1867), 257-83; Lawrence, "The Law of Impeachment," ibid. (Sept., 1867), 641-80; *House Report No. 7*, 40 Cong., 1 Sess., 1-59 (Majority), 59-105 (Republican minority), 105-11 (Democratic minority); *Cong. Globe*, 40 Cong., 2 Sess., appendix 54-62 (Dec. 5, 6, 1867; Boutwell), 62-65 (Dec. 6, 1867; Wilson). Charles Mayo Ellis wrote a less influential article, endorsing what would become the radical position, "The Causes for Which a President Can Be Impeached," *Atlantic Monthly*, XIX (Jan. 1867), 88-92. The arguments echoed those forwarded in earlier impeachments, precedents upon which participants on both sides drew, described in Brant, *Impeachment*, 46-83, 122-32; Lynn W. Turner, "The Impeachment of John Pickering," *American Historical Review*, LIV (Apr., 1949), 485-507; and Richard B. Lillich, "The Chase Impeachment," *American Journal of Legal History*, IV (Jan., 1960), 49-72.

[11] See Benedict, *Impeachment and Trial*, 26-36; Berger, *Impeachment*, 53-102,

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As has been noted, radicals endorsed a much broader interpretation of impeachable offenses. Turning to the English precedents, examples of earlier American impeachments, and the almost unanimous agreement of the great American constitutional commentators of the early nineteenth century, the radicals argued that "our forefathers adopted a Constitution under which official malfeasance and nonfeasance, and, in some cases, misfeasance, may be the subject of impeachment."[12] They repeated the logic which preeminent legal scholars of the early Republic—Joseph Story, William Duer, James Kent, William Rawle, and the authors of the *Federalist*—felt compelled a broad construction of the impeachment power. The radicals recognized that the framers of the Constitution had defined the roles of the president, Congress, and the judiciary so loosely that in practice the maintainance of proper governmental checks and balances, which they believed guaranteed liberty, depended upon the good faith and mutual self-restraint of those entrusted with power. They felt that the danger lay not so much in the possibility that the president or lesser executive officers might abuse powers which the Constitution *had* delegated to them by acting in violation of explicit provisions of law. Although earlier constitutional analysts had arrived at the same conclusion, this consideration was stated most succinctly by the great nationalist legal scholar John Norton Pomeroy, writing at the very time the Johnson impeachment became a topic of popular discussion:

> The importance of the impeaching power consists . . . in the check which it places upon the President and the judges. They must be clothed with ample discretion; the danger to be apprehended is from an abuse of this discretion. But at this very point where the danger exists, and where the protection should be certain, the President and the judiciary are beyond the reach of Congressional legislation. Congress cannot . . . inter-

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and especially 305-306, where Berger challenges the citations of Theodore Dwight, the leading legal spokesman for the conservative position; David Y. Thomas, "The Law of Impeachment in the United States," *American Political Science Review*, II (May, 1908), 378-95; Alexander Simpson, Jr., *A Treatise of Federal Impeachments* (Philadelphia, 1916), 30-50; C. X. Potts, "Impeachment as a Remedy," *St. Louis Law Review*, XII (1927), 23-25; Andrew C. McLaughlin, *A Constitutional History of the United States* (New York, 1935), 320-24; Samuel P. Weaver, *Constitutional Law and Its Administration* (Chicago, 1946), 167; Edward S. Corwin, *The Constitution of the United States of America: Analysis and Interpretation* (Washington, 1952), 502-504; Brant, *Impeachment*, 23.

[12] Lawrence, "The Law of Impeachment," 647.

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> fere with the exercise of a discretion conferred by the Constitution . . . If the offence for which the proceeding may be instituted must be made indictable by statute, impeachment thus becomes absolutely nugatory . . . in those cases where it is most needed as a restraint upon violations of public duty.[13]

For that reason, this school of analysts agreed, impeachment should be "of a liberal and comprehensive character, confined as little as possible to strict forms."[14]

Radicals complained of precisely the type of offenses these legal authorities believed were impeachable. There can be little doubt that Johnson had provided ample grounds for impeachment under this doctrine, by exercising his discretionary power in a manner that was strongly opposed by Congress. It was through this discretionary power under the Constitution that he had pardoned nearly all those who had rebelled, specifically requiring the return to them of all of their previously abandoned land. Thus President Johnson foreclosed the possibility of land reform in the South based on confiscation, in effect nullifying Congress's cautious legislative approach in that area.

The congressionally inspired Freedmen's Bureau act of 1865 had altered fundamentally the concept of confiscation. Under its terms, Southern lands abandoned by owners, which were subject to confiscation, were put under the administration of the bureau to be used to aid black men in the transition from slavery to freedom. The commissioner of the bureau was empowered, under the direction of the president, to set aside for the use of the freedmen and refugees the abandoned land and land to which the government had acquired title

[13] Pomeroy, *An Introduction to the Constitution of the United States* (New York, 1870), 491-92. Although first published in 1870, Pomeroy had completed the text by 1868, when he had it copyrighted.

[14] William Rawle, *A View of the Constitution of the United States of America*, 2nd ed. (Philadelphia, 1829), 211-12; Alexander Hamilton, *The Federalist, No. 81*, in Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, *The Federalist on the New Constitution, Written in the Year 1788* . . . (Washington, D.C., 1818), 501-11, especially 505; Wlliam Alexander Duer, *Outlines of Constitutional Jurisprudence of the United States* (New York, 1833), 89-91, and *A Course of Lectures on Constitutional Jurisprudence*, 76-78; Joseph Story, *Commentaries on the Constitution*, 2 vols. (Boston, 1851), I, 553-58; James Kent, *Commentaries on American Law*, ed. George F. Comstock, 11th ed., 3 vols. (Boston, 1867), I, 302, 367n; Timothy Farrar, *The Manual of the Constitution of the United States* (Boston, 1867), 436-37.

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through confiscation proceedings. The land was to be divided into forty-acre plots or less and rented to individual freedmen and refugees for three years. At the end of the three years, or any time earlier, the occupants could purchase the land they were working, receiving from the government "such title thereto as the United States can convey."

The peculiar wording of the Freedmen's Bureau act referred to the provision of the Confiscation act which limited confiscation of Southern property to the lifetime of the rebel owner. This provision had been added at the insistence of President Lincoln in 1862, but in 1865 congressional Republicans evidenced their intentions to proceed with land reform when each house passed a bill which repealed the lifetime limitation. However, since no single bill passed both houses, the repeal did not go into effect. A large literature accumulated indicating how close Republicans came during the war to inaugurating a real land reform in the South.[15]

The president's land-return policy wreaked havoc upon the newly created Freedmen's Bureau, annuling its congressional mandate to rent land to freedmen at low rates or to rent to lessees who would deal fairly with black laborers. Within a year of the close of Civil War hostilities, the bureau had been forced by Johnson's policy to return to Southern white owners over one-half of the land that it had held at war's end.[16]

[15] *United States Statutes at Large*, XIII, 507-509; LaWanda Cox, "The Promise of Land to the Freedmen," *Mississippi Vally Historical Review*, XLV (Dec., 1958), 413-40; Paul W. Gates, "Federal Land Policy in the South, 1866-1888," *Journal of Southern History*, VI (Aug., 1940), 303-30; John A. Carpenter, *The Sword and the Olive Branch: Oliver Otis Howard* (Pittsburgh, 1964), 106-107. For experimental land reforms and the pressure leading to creation of the Freedmen's Bureau with its land-reform potential, see John G. Sproat, "Blueprint for Radical Reconstruction," *Journal of Southern History*, XXIII (Feb., 1957), 25-44; Willie Lee Rose, *Rehearsal for Reconstruction: The Port Royal Experiment* (New York, 1964); George R. Bentley, *A History of the Freedmen's Bureau* (Philadelphia, 1955), 16-49; William S. McFeely, *Yankee Stepfather: General O. O. Howard and the Freedmen* (New Haven, 1968), 45-64.

[16] Message from the President Relative to Pardons and Abandoned Property, *House Executive Document No. 99*, 39 Cong., 1 Sess.; *House Report No. 30*, 40 Cong., 2 Sess.; William S. McFeely, *Yankee Stepfather*, 111-17; Oliver Otis Howard, *Autobiography of Oliver Otis Howard*, 2 vols. (New York, 1908), II, 234-36; Jonathan T. Dorris, *Pardon and Amnesty Under Lincoln and Johnson: The Restoration of the Confederates to Their Right and Privileges* (Chapel Hill, 1953), 227-33; Carpenter, *The Sword and the Olive Branch*, 106-109.

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Moreover, when Johnson proceeded, without congressional authority, to begin the process of Reconstruction in the South, he ignored the Test Oath law in appointing certain provisional governors. The law required federal appointees to swear that they had never aided the rebellion. If strictly enforced, it would have effectively barred former Confederate military or civic officers from receiving appointments. Johnson also permitted the secretary of the treasury to ignore it in the appointment of Southern treasury officials, thereby placing control of an immense patronage system in the hands of men Congress clearly had proscribed.[17] By his encouragement of former Confederates, his blatant antipathy toward racial equality before the law, his inflammatory speeches—none of which violated law—Johnson succeeded in creating a spirit of determined resistance in the South to concessions on great war issues of importance to Northerners. The consequences for Southern loyalists, especially blacks, were disastrous.

## III

Of course, Johnson had perpetrated these "offenses" (in the eyes of the radicals) before Congress had clearly manifested its hostility to his lenient Reconstruction policy. Congress overrode his program with the Reconstruction act of March, 1867, which, while not dispersing outright the governments created under Johnson's authority, made these governments provisional only. That law placed them under the ultimate control of five military commanders until each state framed a constitution guaranteeing equal legal and political rights to its citizens. Throughout 1867, Johnson used his discretionary powers as chief executive and commander-in-chief of the armed

[17] Hugh McCulloch, *Men and Measures of Half a Century* (New York, 1888), 227, 386; Gideon Welles, *Diary of Gideon Welles—Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson*, 3 vols., (Boston and New York, 1911), II, 318-19 (June 20, 1865), 357-58 (Aug. 11, 1865); *Senate Executive Document No. 3*, 39 Cong., 1 Sess. (Dec. 18, 1865); Testimony on Impeachment, *House Report No. 7*, 40 Cong., 1 Sess., appendix, 604-11, 661-63; Message from the President Relative to the Oath of Office, *House Executive Document No. 81*, 39 Cong., 1 Sess. (Apr. 6, 1866); Letter of the Secretary of the Treasury, *Senate Executive Document No. 38*, 39 Cong., 1 Sess. (Apr. 6, 1866). Of the seven provisional governors Johnson appointed, only two clearly could have taken the test oath had he required it of them.

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forces in a systematic effort to defeat the Republican legislative program. Within four months of the passage of the Reconstruction act and the first supplement to it, Johnson's attorney general, Henry Stanbery, appeared with a formal opinion which virtually emasculated Congress's program, forcing Republicans to return to Washington to patch the torn netting of the law. Stanbery's interpretation minimized the power of the military authorities to which Congress had entrusted administration of the unreconstructed states. According to the attorney general, the military could not remove recalcitrant officials of the Johnsonian provisional governments, enforce national laws in military courts, take cognizance of crimes committed before Congress passed the Reconstruction act, or prohibit activities not in violation of state or national statute law. His interpretation also provided that registration boards authorized under the Reconstruction law had to accept Southerners' oaths that they were not disqualified from voting and denied the boards power to investigate whether the oath-taker had perjured himself.

General Daniel Sickles, whose acts as military commander in the Carolinas Stanbery had specifically denounced as illegal, angrily requested to be relieved from duty so he could defend his conduct before a court of inquiry. "[T]he declaration of the Attorney General that Military authority has not superceded [the provisional governments] . . . prevents the execution of the Reconstruction acts, disarms me of means to protect life, property, or the rights of citizens and menaces all interests in these States with ruin."[18]

When Congress again adjourned, Johnson acted to gain more direct control of the military authorities to which Congress had entrusted enforcement of the Reconstruction law. In August, 1867, he suspended Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton and he followed this act by ordering the removal of one of the five commanders in the South, General Philip Sheridan, who had come into conflict with the former rebels in Louisiana's provisional government. On August 27, the president removed a second commander, Daniel E. Sickles, again because of differences between the military authorities and the John-

[18] United States Department of Justice, *Opinions of the Attorneys General of the United States*, XII, 182-206; Sickles to the Adjutant General, June 19, 1867, Edwin M. Stanton Mss., Library of Congress.

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sonian officials in Georgia.[19]

In none of these actions had Johnson violated a law and he had ample formal constitutional authority for each of his acts. But taken as a whole, it was plain by winter, 1867-68, that the president of the United States was consciously and determinedly following a program designed to nullify congressional legislation through the power of executive implementation. Yet in the last week of November, 1867, when the House Judiciary Committee finally reported its conclusion that Johnson's conduct justified impeachment, only five of the seven Republican members signed its statement. Chairman Wilson and another congressman on the committee joined the two Democratic members in opposition. With their colleagues on the committee divided, with their chairman in opposition, the majority of Republicans on December 7, 1867, influenced by Bingham, Wilson, Blaine, and Washburne, voted with Democrats to table the impeachment resolution on the floor of the House.[20] Naturally, the radical minority was outraged. "If the great culprit had robbed a till; if he fired a barn; if he had forged a check; he would have been indicted, prosecuted, condemned, sentences, and punished," the radical editor of the New York *Independent*, Theodore Tilton, fumed. "But the evidence shows that he only oppressed the Negro; that he only conspired with the rebel; that he only betrayed the Union party; that he only attempted to overthrow the Republic—of course, he goes unwhipped of justice."[21]

Radical anger was so great at this final failure that an outright party schism threatened. Voicing the feelings of the defeated Republicans, Tilton mourned, "[A] Republican majority of cowards gagged a Republican minority of statesmen." Two days after the

[19] General Ulysses S. Grant to Pope, Sept. 9, 1867. Headquarters of the Army, letters sent, Record Group 108, National Archives, Washington, D.C.

[20] *Congressional Globe*, 40 Cong., 1 Sess., 791-92 (Nov. 25, 1867), 2 Sess., 61-62 (Dec. 5, 1867), 65-67 (Dec. 6, 1867), 67-69 (Dec. 7, 1867), appendix, 54-56 (Dec. 5-6, 1867); James A. Garfield to Burke A. Hinsdale, Dec. 5, 1867, quoted in Mary L. Hinsdale (ed.), *Garfield-Hinsdale Letters: Correspondence Between James Abram Garfield and Burke Aaron Hinsdale* (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1949), 117-18; Fessenden to Francis Fessenden, Dec. 1, 1867. William P. Fessenden Mss., Bowdoin College Library, Brunswick, Maine; New York *National Anti-Slavery Standard*, Dec. 14, 1867, p. 2.

[21] New York *Independent*, Dec. 12, 1867, p. 4.

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vote, radicals met at Thaddeus Stevens' residence to discuss the prospects for creating a separate radical congressional party organization.[22]

## IV

But Johnson, freed, he thought, from the threat of impeachment, embarked on an even more aggressive course. On December 28, 1867, he removed General John Pope from his command over Georgia and Alabama, and General Edward O. C. Ord from his command over Arkansas and Mississippi. He replaced them with the more conservative George Meade and the archconservative Alvan C. Gillem. At the same time President Johnson replaced Meade's subordinate, General Wager Swayne, who had been delegated immediate authority over Alabama. With these shifts of military personnel by the president, control of the military in every reconstructed state passed to officers more sympathetic to former rebels than to Southern loyalists.[23]

As Johnson continued his offensive, Freedmen's Bureau Commissioner Oliver Otis Howard expressed deep concern to one of his friends that "The President . . . musters out all my officers. . . . Measures are on foot . . . which are doubtless intended to utterly defeat reconstruction."[24] With the military "influence" in the hands of conservatives, Southern loyalists despaired of winning their states' compliance with the Reconstruction acts. From throughout the

[22] *New York Times* quoting the New York *National Anti-Slavery Standard*, Dec. 13, 1867, p. 8; New York *Independent*, Dec. 12, 1867, p. 4. Blaine recalled that the failure of the impeachment resolution "led to no little recrimination inside the ranks of the party" in his *Twenty Years of Congress . . .* 2 vols. (Norwich, Conn., 1884-86), II, 347; likewise, radical George W. Julian in *Political Recollections, 1840-1872* (Chicago, 1884), 312-13, and his report in the Centreville *Indiana True Republican*, Dec. 19, 1867, p. 93, published by his brother, Issac.

[23] General John Schofield, commander of the district embracing Virginia, remained in place. He had little sympathy for Republican policy, executing it, he later wrote, in such a way as to "save that State from the great evils suffered by sister States." Schofield, *Forty-Six Years in the Army* (New York, 1897), 397. See also James L. McDonough, "John Schofield as Military Dictator of Reconstruction in Virginia," *Civil War History*, XV (Sept., 1969), 237-56.

[24] Howard to Edgar Ketchum, Dec. 30, 1867. Howard Mss., Bowdoin College Library, Brunswick, Maine.

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South came warnings of the disastrous effects on Congressional reconstruction policies of Johnson's offensive.[25] ". . . Johnson defeats Congress at every point," the Boston *Commonwealth* lamented. "The work of reconstruction, at very short intervals, receives from him a staggering blow. . . . While Congress is passing acts to reconstruct the South, the President is driving a carriage and six through them."[26]

The success of the president's policy was made manifest when pro-Reconstruction forces were defeated in the first state to vote on its new constitution, framed under the terms of the Reconstruction act. In fact, Republican forces would prove unable to bring about compliance with the Reconstruction law in four of the ten states that it covered.[27]

Johnson's course appeared to congressional Republicans to be fraught with danger. It seemed, at a minimum, that the president hoped to delay Reconstruction until an anti-Republican reaction developed in the North, born of frustration and weariness with constant crises. Of course, if voters in the states which had not left the Union elected a Democratic Congress before Southern states were reconstructed along Republican lines, it would be a simple matter to repeal the Reconstruction act and recognize the Johnsonian civil

[25] Foster Blodgett to John Sherman, Dec. 30, 1867. Sherman Mss., Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. (This was a circular letter sent to many congressmen.) John C. Underwood to Elihu B. Washburne, Dec. 9, 16, 1868; George Ely to Washburne, Feb. 9, 1868; W. H. Gibbs to Washburne, Jan. 18, 1868. Washburne Mss., L. C.; B. W. Norris to [the Republican congressional Campaign Committee], Jan. 4, 1868; Ed. I. Costello to T. L. Tullock, Jan. 17, 1868, files of the Select Committee on Reconstruction, 40-41 Congresses, R. G. 233, National Archives, Washington, D.C. (file 40A-F29.8 and 40A-F29.23, respectively). *House Miscellaneous Documents Numbers 43, 54,* and *57,* 40 Cong., 2 Sess. McKitrick cites several of these letters in his *Johnson and Reconstruction,* 500n. I cannot explain why they carry so little weight in his analysis.

[26] Boston *Commonwealth,* Jan. 4, 1867, p. 2. See also *Chicago Tribune,* Dec. 30, 1867, p. 2; Horace White to Elihu B. Washburne, Jan. 16, 1868. Washburne Mss.

[27] The four were Alabama, Virginia, Mississippi, and Texas, although Republicans repealed part of the Reconstruction law to facilitate Alabama's restoration. Moreover, in the second state to vote upon a new constitution, Arkansas, pro-Reconstruction forces won by a margin of only 1400 out of 55,000 votes. Not until impeachment discouraged white Southerners and forced Johnson to cease interference did Republican margins of victory become comfortable in those states which finally complied with the law. Edward McPherson (ed.), *The Political History of the United States of America During the Period of Reconstruction* . . . 2nd ed. (Washington, D.C., 1875).

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governments as legitimate, admitting, then, their representatives to Congress. But this was extremely unlikely. The real danger was that a Democratic presidential candidate might win enough Northern and border-state electoral votes in 1868 to win a majority of the whole, if Democratic votes from unreconstructed Southern states were counted.[28] A second anticipated peril was that Johnson might use the military to interfere with presidential balloting in those states which were yet to comply with the Reconstruction law and be restored by Congress. "Do you not suppose that next November a single soldier at each polling place in the southern country, aided by the whites, could prevent the entire negro [sic] population from voting?" the radical Boutwell asked. Again there was the danger that Democratic electoral votes from Northern and border-states combined with Southern votes won through such illicit tactics might constitute a majority. If the Republican-controlled Congress refused to count Southern votes in either case, as they undoubtedly would, President Johnson might view the refusal as a denial of the democratic process. As Boutwell grimly prophesized: "[T]he next inauguration of a President . . . [would] be the occasion of renewal of fratricidal strife."[29]

Many Republicans believed the president capable of such audacity. During the summer and fall of 1866, Johnson supporters had hinted darkly that if enough Democrats were elected to Congress from the North, they might withdraw from the Capitol and join Southern congressmen-elect in a counter-Congress, arguing that it represented more congressional districts than its Republican-dominated counterpart. Many Republicans believed the scheme had been abandoned only because Northerners had returned an overwhelming Republican majority.[30] Again, in the fall of 1867, rumors of a John-

[28] See Boutwell's prophecy, *Cong. Globe*, 40 Cong., 2 Sess., 595 (Jan. 17, 1868).

[29] *Ibid.*

[30] Justin S. Morrill to Jewett, May 4, 1866, quoted in William B. Parker, *The Life and Public Services of Justin Smith Morrill* (Boston and New York, 1924), 229-30; George S. Boutwell, *Reminiscences of Sixty Years in Public Affairs*, 2 vols. (New York, 1902), II, 79, 107-12; Charles Sumner to John Bright, Sept. 3, 1866, quoted in Edward L. Pierce, *Memoir and Letters of Charles Sumner*, 4 vols. (Boston, 1893), IV, 298-99; Samuel F. Miller to David Davis, Oct. 12, 1866. Davis Mss., L.C.; Testimony on impeachment, *House Report No. 7*, 40 Cong., 1 Sess., appendix, 45-51, 833-34; Adam Badeau, *Grant in Peace: From Appomattox to Mount McGregor—A Personal Memoir* (Hartford, Conn., 1887), 51; John

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sonian *coup d'état* swept the country.[31] By 1868, Carl Schurz recalled, "The air . . . throughout the country was buzzing with rumors of iniquities which Johnson was meditating and would surely attempt if he were not disarmed. . . . There was a widespread feeling among well-meaning and sober people that the country was really *in some sort of peril*. . . ."[32]

## V

Republicans knew that the success of such schemes depended upon control of the army, and it was Johnson's apparent efforts to gain control of the military in February, 1868, which convinced even the doubters that a real danger existed. On January 11, the Senate refused to acquiesce in President Johnson's suspension of Secretary of War Stanton as appeared to be required by terms of the Tenure of Office Act, and the next day Stanton resumed his place at the War Office. When General William T. Sherman, who sympathized with the president's position, suggested that Republican conservatives

A. Krout (ed.), "Henry J. Raymond on the Republican Caucuses of July, 1866," *American Historical Review*, XXXIII (July, 1928), 835-42; *New York Times*, July 16, 1866, pp. 4-5; *Chicago Tribune*, July 16, 1866, p. 1; July 17, 1866, p. 2; Aug. 28, 1866, p. 2; Sept. 1, 1866, p. 2; Sept. 14, 1866, p. 2; Sept. 15, 1866, p. 2; Oct. 10, 1866, p. 2; Oct. 11, 1866, p. 2; *New York Tribune*, Sept. 12, 1866, p. 4; Sept. 13, 1866, p. 4; Sept. 18, 1866, p. 4; Sept. 20, 1866, p. 4; Boston *Right Way*, Aug. 18, 1866, p. 1; Sept. 22, 1866, p. 1; New York *Independent*, Oct. 25, 1866, p. 4.

[31] John Sherman, speech at Cincinnati, quoted in Ms. of Edward McPherson scrapbook, *Elections of 1867*, II, 111. McPherson Mss., L.C.; Carl Schurz to Mrs. Margarethe Meyer Schu-z, Aug. 31, Nov. 9, 1867, quoted in Joseph Schafer (ed.), *Intimate Letters of Carl Schurz, 1841-1869* (Madison, Wis., 1928), 392-93, 412-416; John Binny to William P. Fessenden, Sept. 10, 1867. Fessenden Ms., L.C.; Boston *Daily Advertiser*, Aug. 29, 1867, p. 2; Sept. 2, 1867, p. 2; *New York Times*, Sept. 17, 1867, p. 4; Oct. 1, 1867, p. 4; *Chicago Tribune*, Sept. 27, 1867, p. 2; Oct. 1, 1867, p. 1; Oct. 3, 1867, p. 1; Oct. 11, 1867, p. 2; Boston *Evening Traveller*, Oct. 5, 1867, p. 1; New York *National Anti-Slavery Standard*, Oct. 27, 1866, p. 2; "The Conspiracy at Washington," *Atlantic Monthly*, XX (Nov., 1867), 633-38. William A. Russ, Jr., indicates that these rumors were produced by Republicans for political effect, although he himself points out that the "statements of rebel and Copperhead papers which called upon the President to use force are legion"; Russ, "Was There Danger of a Second Civil War During Reconstruction?" *American Historical Review*, XXV (June, 1938), 39-58 (quoted at 43). The entire subject needs restudying.

[32] Schurz, *Reminiscences of Carl Schurz*, 3 vols. (New York, 1908), III, 252. It is clear by Schurz' bemused tone that by the time he wrote of these fears he no longer remembered how real they then appeared.

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and moderates would be willing to dump Stanton in favor of the archconservative, but independent-minded, Jacob D. Cox, he found Johnson uninterested in compromise. Johnson wanted his own man in the office. Sherman abandoned his efforts, realizing, as he wrote home, that "there must be something behind the scenes."[33] Instead of compromising, Johnson determined to take the ominous step—at least to Republicans—of creating a new army department, the Army of the Atlantic, with headquarters in Washington. The sympathetic Sherman would be placed in command. Sherman resisted the appointment, but nonetheless on February 6, 1868, Johnson ordered General Grant to promulgate an order creating the department and giving command to Sherman. At the same time he acted to promote Sherman to General of the Army—Grant's rank—sending the nomination to the Senate on February 13, 1868. Johnson himself knew the effect his action would have on congressional Republicans: "This would set some of them thinking," his secretary quoted the president as saying.[34]

Sherman refused the command and telegraphed his brother, Senator John Sherman of Ohio, to oppose confirmation of his new rank in the Senate. "The President would make use of me to beget violence. . . ." he wrote, "He has no right to use us for such purposes, though he is Commander-in-Chief." On February 19, Johnson acceded to Sherman's pleas and rescinded his transfer to the new command.[35]

Two days later Johnson again removed Stanton, this time without complying with the provision of the Tenure of Office law. To

[33] W. T. Sherman to Ellen Ewing Sherman, Jan. 13, 1868. W. T. Sherman Mss., Notre Dame Archives, South Bend, Ind. The letter is excerpted in M. A. deWolfe Howe (ed.), *Home Letters of General Sherman* (New York, 1909), 364-65.

[34] Notes of Col. William G. Moore, Feb. 17, 1868, in the Andrew Johnson Mss., L.C.

[35] W. T. Sherman to Johnson, Jan. 31, Feb. 14, 1868, quoted in Rachel Sherman Thorndike (ed.), *The Sherman Letters: Correspondence Between General and Senator Sherman from 1837 to 1891* (New York 1894), 300-304; W. T. Sherman Mss., Notre Dame Archives (excerpts quoted in Howe [ed.], *Home Letters of General Sherman*, 369-70); Sherman to Thomas Ewing, Sr., Feb. 13, 1868, quoted *ibid.*, 370-74; Johnson to Grant, Feb. 6, 1868; Johnson to Sherman, Feb. 19, 1868. Headquarters of the Army, Letters Received, Record Group 108, N.A.; W. T. Sherman to John Sherman (letter), Feb. 14, 1868; W. T. Sherman to Grant, Feb. 14, 1868; W. T. Sherman to John Sherman (telegram), Feb. 14, 1868, quoted in Thorndike (ed.), *The Sherman Letters*, 305-306.

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Republicans it appeared to be another step in a course which threatened incalculable disaster to their program and to the country. But this time all Republicans agreed that Johnson had crossed the bounds of legality, that he had, as even Bingham conceded, "deliberately . . . violated . . . the laws of the country."[36] Conservative Republicans, sadly and bitterly but feeling they were left no choice, joined the radicals in presenting articles of impeachment to the Senate.[37]

So the impeachment of President Andrew Johnson was no hasty, passionate decision by vindictive Radicals. That long-time opponent of impeachment, Judiciary Committee Chairman Wilson, perhaps best expressed the spirit of his nonradical colleagues when he explained: "Guided by a sincere desire to pass this cup from our lips, determined to drink it if escape were not cut off by the presence of a palpable duty, we at last find ourselves compelled to take its very dregs."[38] The Johnson impeachment was the reluctant decision of men who felt that they had been pushed to the wall and forced to

[36] *Congressional Globe*, 40 Cong., 2 Sess., 1340 (Feb. 22, 1868).

[37] During the trial, Johnson's counsel argued that Stanton was not protected under the general provisions of the Tenure of Office act. The House and Senate had originally disagreed over whether the tenure of department heads should be protected under the bill—the House insisting upon protection, the Senate insisting that the president's power to replace Cabinet members should remain untrammeled. As often happens in such cases, the conference committee on the bill decided to obfuscate rather than compromise the issue, providing that the terms of department heads would run one month beyond the term of the president who appointed them, during which time they could be removed only with the consent of the Senate. The House conferees confidently announced that this language was "in fact an acceptance by the Senate of the position of the House." *Congressional Globe*, 39 Cong., 2 Sess., 1340 (Feb. 19, 1867). Representatives did not know that the Senate conferees had told their colleagues the opposite. *Ibid.*, 1514-18 (Feb. 18, 1867). Moreover, the president appeared to acknowledge the necessity for Senatorial approval of a removal when he suspended Stanton in August, 1867, naming Grant, his replacement, secretary of war *ad interim*, as the act required. In December, Johnson had sent a message to the Senate, once more as the law required, offering justifications for Stanton's removal. When the Senate rejected Johnson's presentation, Stanton retook possession of the War office, again in conformity with the law. All this seemed to have settled the question of whether Stanton was covered by the act.

[38] *Congressional Globe*, 40 Cong., 2 Sess., 1386 (Feb. 24, 1868). See also the remarks of Representatives Rufus P. Spalding, *ibid.*, 1340 (Feb. 22, 1868); Ebon C. Ingersoll, *ibid.*, 1358 (Feb. 22); Austin Blair, *ibid.*, 1367-68 (Feb. 22); James K. Moorhead, *ibid.*, appendix, 157 (Feb. 24); Frederick E. Woodbridge, *ibid.*, 1387-88; and Luke P. Poland, *ibid.*, 1394 (Feb. 24).

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take a stand defending the constitutional prerogatives of Congress against presidential aggression. For as even the most conservative of Republicans (in this case Representative Austin Blair of Michigan) finally saw it, President Johnson had "thrown the gauntlet to Congress, and says to us as plainly as words can speak it: 'Try this issue now betwixt me and you; either you go to the wall or I do.' "[39]

[39] *Ibid.*, 1368 (Feb. 22, 1868).

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# Moral Values and International Politics

KENNETH W. THOMPSON

It is illusory to think that politics can be free of values. Those spokesmen of *realpolitik* whom we read long after the passing of their historical era called not for the repudiation but the reinterpretation of values. Machiavelli wrote of "virtu," Rousseau of "the noble savage," and the nationalists of "national glory." The debate over values, despite the claims of so-called value-free social science, has never been between one school of thought espousing values and another rejecting all values. Rather, almost always, it involves two groups with different sets and concepts of values—different perspectives on the nature and content of values. No one who lives in a human community can be wholly amoral, if he would work with and deserve the trust and response of others. We recall the reference by Harold Nicolson to the classic definition of the diplomat as "a man sent abroad to lie and deceive in the interest in his country." Yes, said Nicolson, but also he must return to negotiate another day.

Part of our problem in gaining clarity on values in international politics is that most of us are endlessly tempted either to inflate or to disparage the role of morality in politics and thus fall prey at opposite extremes to moralism or cynicism in our views.

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### 1. *Moralism and Cynicism*

The moralist inflates the place of values by sanctifying every short-term and parochial interest, absolutizing higher goals into rigid principles that obstruct the political process and raising moral formulations to the level of irrelevance. No moral disease is more commonplace than to impute final virtue to immediate and practical measures. While every act in statecraft, as in life, has its worth, the moralist errs by elevating the routine to the same level as objective truth. Thus, in statecraft, there are countless procedures and acts, such as issuing visas or preparing protocols, that are a vital part of the diplomatic process. Yet, what is to be gained by pretending that these important measures, which are part of the day's work, are sacred to the point of being beyond criticism and change? If it is wrong to deny the dignity and worth of the workaday world, it is also an error to equate it with all truth and justice and place it beyond the possibilities of change. There is too much arrogance in maintaining that every pragmatic move we make is endowed with some kind of ultimate virtue.

A more serious failing of the moralist, particularly in the United States, is to absolutize particular ends and values, thus placing them outside the political process. Whenever political goals are cast in the language of absolute right and wrong, implementing them through the democratic process becomes difficult, if not impossible. The most fateful example of this was the breakdown of democracy at the time of the American Civil War. Once each side had framed the issue in terms of its total righteousness and the complete depravity of the other, the workings of democracy, with the necessary play of compromise and adjustment, became impossible. The Wars of Religion are an earlier example of absolutizing particularistic ends, and history attests that man is never so cruel and intractable as when he becomes a crusader for moral and religious goals. If liberals are more prone to sanctify certain immediate political and social interests, the religious and moralistic historically have been prime offenders in absolutizing values and goals.

If the doctrines of moralists can lead to rigidity and brutality, their habits and style can lead to irrelevance. For moralists are wont to raise ends and values to such towering heights as to give them a quality of irrelevance as respects all those practical and press-

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ing choices that confound men in daily life. Thus, it was noble to talk, following World War I, about a new and better world, but, for those who sought to hammer out the peace in Paris, the towering doctrines of Woodrow Wilson bore little if any relationship to the harsh issues they struggled to resolve.

Yet, cynics are as misguided and destructive as the moralists when they approach issues of values. They are misled by the discovery that men are never as virtuous as they claim to be and interpret this as proof that in man there is no virtue. Sociologists, such as Weber, identified the taint of deception in every virtuous act. We cover our self-interest with a tissue of ideological rationalization. We never do anything as individuals or nations for our own good but for the good of others, or as part of history's unfolding process. There are some blatant examples of this: Stalin's liquidating of the kulaks as a necessary and inevitable step in the history-fulfilling design of communism; Hitler's cremation of so-called inferior races as a necessary hygienic measure to assure continued Teutonic superiority; and some of the actions taken in China during the Cultural Revolution.

However, the less blatant examples may be more significant and all-pervasive. Whenever men and nations act, their claims of morality are larger than their actions warrant. If this is deception, it is apparently an almost inevitable form of self-deception since nations, no less than individuals, must persuade themselves that their deeds are legitimate because consistent with some larger frame of value. The parent never disciplines the child except for its own good. The powerful nation never goes to war except in the interests of peace and justice. The problem about these actions is not that they are all devoid of some residual justice nor that the claims of goodness never serve to lift men and groups above the selfish and the mundane. It is rather that we are seldom as moral as we claim to be, whether as self-righteous individuals or when we speak for the nation as a whole.

The irony of our self-righteousness is that there is virtue in our very self-deception about our righteousness. Hypocrisy is the tribute that vice pays to virtue and, by claiming some form of virtue for himself or his acts, the selfish man reaches up, at least a little, toward a goal that is higher than his selfishness. Thus, the cynic who finds total depravity in man's self-righteousness is as deluded

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as the moralist who sees only shining virtue and goodness in man. The *reductio ad absurdum* of cynicism is the response of a diplomatist who, on learning of the death of a fellow diplomatist, asked, "What can have been his motive?"

## 2. *The Moral Problem*

The difficulty we have in talking about values arises from the fact that there is not one morality but many. Morals and values, at every level, cluster, compete and are in conflict. Most debates about values are not debates between right and wrong but between rights and rights—and this makes their resolution endlessly complicated. Thus, we believe in freedom of speech, but what about crying fire in a crowded theatre? We have faith in the freedom of inquiry and science, but does this extend to a graduate student building an atomic bomb in his kitchen? We strive for social justice and equality, but what do we do when systems of order and social stability crumble? In developing societies, how do we reconcile the goal of the civil society with the need, temporarily, it is said, for a military regime? The moralist may take satisfaction from proclaiming to the hard-pressed citizen leader that there are obvious and clear-cut moral answers to such choices. The cynic, in turn, may find an opposite way out by boasting that he knows there are no moral answers. Caught up in the problem and the need for policy not rhetoric, the rest of mankind can indulge neither of these luxuries. They must find the best possible answers knowing, with Meinecke, that, "Every authentic tragedy is a shattering demonstration that moral life cannot be regulated like clockwork and that even the purest strivings for good can be forced into the most painful choices."

Indeed, the facile optimism of political and social scientists that models can be found for resolving problems at every social level is nearly as mischievous as that of the moralist or the cynic. We are involved in human endeavor in which the tragic element of life plays a part. The human mind is at best a fragile guide. For all the power of systematic disciplined scientific studies, we are dealing with stages in the historical process and individual acts that involve *hubris*. There are fatal flaws in our ability to choose; our best wisdom falls short of what is required. Raymond Aron

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quoted Montesquieu in a recent commentary on Henry Kissinger. Montesquieu wrote, "Even wisdom has its excesses." Aron applied this to Kissinger's valiant efforts to open up United States foreign policy to contacts with China. Aron asked Kissinger if he didn't feel that, in reaching out to his enemies, he was forgetting his friends; and according to Aron, Kissinger admitted there was that risk.

Yet, even the fact of tragedy will not excuse us from acting. Perhaps the first step on the thousand-mile journey toward grappling with moral problems is understanding that violence is most often born out of a single value orientation. This form of seduction is a constant companion of all those who face moral choices. Whenever complexity exists, we seek to reduce it by focusing sharply on a single value. In the 1930's, following the most painful economic depression in our history, reformers proposed that economic security would assure happiness and well-being for all the people. Intellectuals and scholars were urged to concentrate on business cycles and the needs of economic man, and "the best and the brightest" of that day assumed that progress on this front would be sufficient. The problems of the 1960's dramatize clearly that economic advancement has not been sufficient.

In the same spirit, we turned in the 1950's to programs of national security and defense, long absent from national policy of a nation isolating itself from the struggles for Europe until the eleventh hour. Yet, national defense and international security systems cut adrift from cultural and political moorings are bound to flounder. We discovered in Vietnam that neither collective security nor military defense is sufficient if we fail to tie them to knowledge of political movements or the cultural context.

The lesson for international politics is that, even for security policies, cultural factors may be more important than raw power. What is vital in international politics is our perception of ourselves and our interests as a people and a nation, of the interests and commitments of others and of our common interests. And these perceptions are determined not by interests alone but by the cultural and value context of ourselves and others. For big countries, this is no less important than small countries. There is danger in war gaming—both academically and in international politics. All too often, it can give false assurance and false security; and we must

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be on guard against it. The best way to be prepared is to keep our eye on values and the cultural context as we think about the moral problem.

### 3. *Moral Dimensions*

This pattern of thought leads to my final word. There are levels and dimensions at which the moral problem can be brought into focus. One is the level of a certain minimum concern for moral discrimination—failing here, we destroy ourselves and the society. Positively, responses to the needs of blacks and other minorities long victims of discrimination illustrate what a nation must do. Negatively, there are certain things a civilized people—whatever the ambiguities and pressures—must not do: Watergate may become the tragic symbol for this. If doubts arise that we have not measured up to this minimum standard, we destroy all trust and confidence, the cement that holds us together. The international equivalent is a decent respect for the opinions of mankind—and, we must add, the rights of mankind.

A second level of focusing on the problem is to seek common interests even in areas where values inevitably differ and conflict. This is the moral problem in foreign affairs. The values of individuals and groups are subject to different constraints. In the words of Cavour, "If we had done for ourselves what we did for the state, what scoundrels we would have been." The triumph of the Marshall Plan was that, for a brief historical moment, both moral and political interests drew Western Europe and the United States together. Today we hear talk of a wider European community, of trilateralism (Europe. Japan and the United States) and, I would hope, more and more talk of North/South interests in helping and learning from each other. What goes on at this level suggests that, where interests converge and problems loom large, there are possibilities for peoples of very divergent systems and ideologies to come together—in their needs.

A final level of the moral dimension is that of more intimate communities where both values and interests converge. The family is the classic example, but so is the human community at large. We need one another, yet we fear one another—and in fearing, we hurt one another. If the years before and after World War II were

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filled with moralistic illusions about our similarities to other people, we have become far too cynical about the consequences of our differences. As was said in the report entitled *Reconstituting the Human Community:*

> Recognizing all mankind's differences, there are still unities from which we derive strength, as does the world community. This unity is a different sort than that which was talked about in too simple terms twenty-five years ago. It is a unity which assumes and takes advantage of lesser unities, such as constructive regionalism and the struggle for recognition by smaller groups within societies. They are unities which those outside a particular unity or unifying tradition have to learn to respect and to esteem, without envy, whether included or not. There will be unities within local communities which strengthen the larger community within a country. And the West, particularly the affluent West, must learn to recognize and welcome, as a sign of true progress, worthy of support, the growth of self-confidence and self-reliance in nations and societies elsewhere in the world and their search for new directions. This, after all, is one aspect, varying in time and place, of the growing fabric of the desired human community.[1]

[1] *Reconstituting the Human Community* (a report of Colloquium III, held at Bellagio, Italy, July 17–23, 1972, for the program of inquiries, Cultural Relations for the Future, sponsored by the Hazen Foundation), p. 50.

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# Arthur H. Vandenberg, Internationalism, and the United Nations

JAMES A. GAZELL

On or shortly after July 28, 1945, Arthur H. Vandenberg, a Republican Senator from Michigan, sent an undated letter to his wife. In that letter he wrote:

> Well—the battle is over—89 to 2! only [Senators Henrik] Shipstead [a Republican from Minnesota] and [William] Langer [a Republican from North Dakota] in opposition. Hi[ram] Johnson [a Republican Senator from California] couldn't vote because he is in the Naval Hospital again . . . . It really was an amazing outcome. . . . Everybody now seems to agree that I could have beaten the United Nations Charter if I had taken the opposition tack. I must confess, now that it's all over, that I am very proud to have been at least one of its fathers. It has stood up amazingly under every possible scrutiny. The things we did at Frisco [sic.] to remove potential Senate opposition have paid rich dividends.[1]

Vandenberg's letter had at least two implications. First, he recognized his pivotal position in securing Senate ratification of the

[1] Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr. (ed.) *The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg* (Boston, 1952), 218. (Hereafter, *The Private Papers.*)

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proposed United Nations Charter. Since the Charter was submitted to the Senate as a treaty, it required a two-thirds margin for passage. As the *de facto* leader of the Republican minority in the Senate in foreign policy matters, Vandenberg probably could have garnered the thirty-three votes required (the Senate then had ninety-six members) to block ratification if the Charter had displeased him. He could have accomplished this objective solely by mustering the support within his own party, which, during that year, held forty Senate seats. Second, his pride in helping to formulate the Charter symbolized the culmination of his gradual shift from isolationism to internationalism between 1940 and 1945, and which he revealed in work at the San Francisco Conference and in his efforts to achieve overwhelming Senate ratification of the Charter.

More than a quarter of a century has passed since the establishment of the United Nations and the anchoring of the United States into an internationalist foreign policy. In view of difficulties in the United Nations, the end of direct American participation in the Vietnam conflict, a lesser degree of bipartisanship in the formulation and conduct of this country's foreign affairs, and scattered apprehension about a partial American return to isolationism, it may be timely to recount how and why this highly influential senator favored and helped to achieve an internationalist and United Nations-oriented foreign policy for the United States. Moreover, it may be desirable to recall the extent to which the attainment of this internationalist goal was so heavily dependent on the attitudes and efforts of this one public official—a fact perhaps not well-enough known. Finally, one may analyze Vandenberg's contributions in a logical sequence: Vandenberg's isolationism; his slow conversion to internationalism; his work at the San Francisco Conference; and his role in the Senate ratification of the United Nations Charter.

## *Vandenberg's Isolationism*

Political scientists have noted some salient tenets of isolationist thought between World Wars I and II. During this period its exponents argued that the United States could continue to augment its international trade without embroilment in conflicts and that this nation could safely remain free of alliances with European

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and Asian countries. Dating from Washington's administration, this perspective gained widespread acceptance within America for a variety of interlocking reasons: geographical barriers (two oceans and an absence of powerful nearby enemies), economic factors (such as a tendency of many people to associate wars with the efforts of corporations to open new markets, a disgust with the repudiation of European indebtedness to this country after World War I), xenophobia, a belief in the depravity of European and Asian nations, as well as a concomitant faith in the moral superiority of this land, and internal conditions (long periods of domestic peace and the resulting proclivity to perceive wars as aberrations to be rectified quickly).

Isolationalism displayed three other features during this interlude. First, this outlook—already strong during the 1920's—became more powerful during the next decade as the prospect of American involvement in war increased. Second, this model permeated the thinking especially of senators and congressmen from the Midwest, partly because their states were separated by a considerable distance, not only from European and Asian nations, but also from the coastal states. Finally, this credo attracted supporters with vastly different ideological perspectives.

Vandenberg had publicly disclosed isolationist sentiment long before he came to the Senate in 1928. For example, when he published the *Grand Rapids [Michigan] Herald* during the World War I period, his newspaper editorials condemned the proposed League of Nations Covenant in 1919 and urged the Senate to reject it.[2] During the 1920's his isolationism persisted; in 1925 he wrote *The Trail of a Tradition* which expressed fear that internationalism would lead the United States into "foreign entanglements" and which lauded isolationism as serving "civilization by serving 'America First.' "[3]

Vandenberg's foreign-policy stances reflected interwar isolationist thought.[4] When he was appointed to the Senate in 1928 upon

[2] "Vandenberg, Arthur H(endrick)," *Current Biography 1948* (New York, 1949), 638.

[3] Charles A. and Mary R. Beard, *America in Midpassage* (New York, 1939), 442–443; Selig Adler, *The Isolationist Impulse* (London and New York, 1957) 43–45, 170–171, 240–243.

[4] Arthur H. Vandenberg, *The Trail of a Tradition* (New York, 1926), v.

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the death of Senator Woodbridge N. Ferris, a Democrat, the Michigan Republican gained a national platform from which he could espouse and try to implement his isolationism. In 1935 he helped to effect Senate passage of a neutrality act, which placed an embargo on the shipment of American-made weapons to nations at war and to neutral powers who might sell such arms to belligerents. However, the President still retained considerable discretion in deciding what constituted war or unacceptable neutrality.[5] In 1936 he made at least two notable comments on United States foreign policy. He announced his opposition to any possibility of U.S. membership in the League of Nations; in his view, this organization was established to handle European problems.[6] And he insisted that Congress make U.S. neutrality mandatory.[7] In 1937 he helped to secure the passage of a neutrality act, which placed an embargo on the shipment of U.S.-made weapons to belligerents. In 1939, shortly after the outbreak of World War II, he vigorously opposed any change in this law which would repeal the embargo provisions and permit the cash sale of armaments to nations at war.[8] However, Vandenberg's protests failed; for, on October 27, 1939, the Senate made this alteration in the Neutrality Act of 1937 by a vote of sixty-three to thirty.[9] In 1940, he opposed the U.S. Lend-Lease program to Great Britain and mentioned his fear that American embroilment in World War II might destroy the country's liberty.[10]

### *Vandenberg's Slow Conversion into an Internationalist*

On December 7, 1941, the Japanese air force and submarines attacked Pearl Harbor, and the next day the United States entered World War II. There are at least three pieces of evidence that Vandenberg's drift from isolationism to internationalism predated the

[5] "Vandenberg, Arthur H(endrick)," *Current Biography 1948*, 638; Beard and Beard, 475–476.

[6] Arthur H. Vandenberg, "Neutrality Controversy," *Congressional Digest*, XV (January, 1936), 20.

[7] *Ibid.*, 21.

[8] Arthur H. Vandenberg, "Arguments Opposing Any Change in the Neutrality Law," *Congressional Digest*, XVIII (October, 1939), 252–253.

[9] *The Private Papers*, 3.

[10] Arthur H. Vandenberg, "America at the Crossroads," *Vital Speeches*, VI (March 15, 1940), 340.

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U.S. entrance into this war. In a diary entry dated February 2, 1940, he wrote:

> It is probably impossible that there should be such a thing as old-fashioned isolation in this present foreshortened world when one can cross the Atlantic Ocean in 36 hours. We still want all the isolation we can get—despite the triumphs of modern science . . . but probably the best we can hope for from now on is 'insulation' rather than isolation. I should say that an 'insulationist' is one who wants to preserve all of the isolation which modern circumstances will permit.[11]

A second piece of evidence is that Arthur Vandenberg, Jr., in commenting on his father's diary, contended that, by the spring of 1941, the Senator believed that direct U.S. involvement in World War II was inevitable and that domestic unity would, therefore, be necessary for winning the war. Vandenberg, Jr., stated that in his father's beliefs "lay the seeds of what was to become the nebulous idea of a bipartisan or nonpartisan foreign policy."[12] A third piece of evidence is a letter which, according to Vandenberg, Jr., his father wrote in November 1941. In this letter the Senator stated:

> It is dangerous to attempt to lump all of us (who oppose intervention in the war) into one standard isolationist bracket. . . . If I had to choose between being an isolationist or an interventionist, I should unhesitatingly proclaim myself to be the former. But the path of wisdom and prudence lay somewhere between.[13]

According to his son, this statement typified the Senator's attitude toward foreign affairs at the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor.[14] After this attack, Vandenberg felt compelled to explain to the Senate why he and other isolationists intended to vote for a declaration of war. In a diary entry dated December 8, 1941, he cited two reasons for this intention. One reason was that, in his view, Japan had forced a war upon the United States. The second reason was that he wanted to "better swing the vast anti-war party in the country into unity with this unavoidable decision."[15]

[11] *The Private Papers*, 3–4.
[12] *Ibid.*, 12
[13] *Ibid.* 15.
[14] *Ibid.*
[15] *Ibid.*, 16.

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Shortly after America's entry into the conflict, Vandenberg began to espouse the desirability of postwar cooperation among nations in order to preserve peace. For example, in a diary entry dated April 21, 1942, he wrote:

> The Republican National Committee 'resolved' today not only to fight the war to unqualified victory, but also that the nation has an obligation 'to assist in the bringing about of understanding, comity and cooperation among the nations of the world in order that our liberty may be preserved and that the . . . destructive processes of war may not again be forced upon us and upon the free and peace-loving peoples of the world. . . . I agree with this general statement.[16]

Early in 1943 the Senator grew more sympathetic to internationalism. His tentative modifications of his isolationism became more explicit statements in favor of greater internationalism. A diary entry of March 24, 1943, records, for example, that "*the United States obviously must be a far greater international cooperator after this war than ever before. . . .*"[17] On July 2, 1943, Vandenberg—along with Senator Wallace H. White, a Republican from Maine—announced the first all-Republican foreign policy resolution, which provided, in part, for postwar cooperation among sovereign nations.[18]

During that month Vandenberg had been preparing for a conference to be held at Mackinac Island in September, 1943. The principal purpose of this conference was to consider what foreign policy platform the 1944 Republican National Convention might adopt. The Mackinac Conference included twenty-four Republican governors, fifteen members of the Senate and the House of Representatives appointed by the Republican party minority leaders in Congress, and ten members of the Republican National Committee. Vandenberg was one of the members appointed from the Senate and was entrusted with the task of formulating a statement on U.S. postwar objectives.[19] During preparations for this conference, he remarked in a diary entry of August 4, 1943:

> I am hunting for the middle ground between those extremists at one

[16] *Ibid.*, 30.
[17] *Ibid.*, 41.
[18] *Ibid.*, 54.
[19] *Ibid.*, 55.

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> end of the line who would cheerfully give America away and those extremists at the other end of the line who would attempt a total isolation which has come to be an impossibility.[20]

At this conference Vandenberg served as a conciliator; he managed to accommodate those members who sought a specific Republican commitment for postwar international collaboration and those representatives who sought to avoid any limitation on U.S. freedom of action in postwar foreign policy.[21] On September 7, 1943, the Mackinac Conference endorsed U.S. participation in a postwar international organization.[22] The endorsement was similar to the earlier Vandenberg-White resolution.

On November 5, 1943, Vandenberg voted for a resolution (introduced by Democratic Senator Tom Connally of Texas, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee) that placed the Senate on record in favor of U.S. participation in a postwar international organization. The Connally resolution passed the Senate by a vote of eighty-five to five.[23]

Yet, that year Vandenberg had expressed opposition to the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration agreement, an attempt by the United States and its allies to alleviate the hardships endured by people living in territory which the Allied powers had recaptured from their enemies. However, his objection was not to the agreement itself but to the manner in which the Roosevelt administration had tried to consummate it.

The administration sought to treat this pact as an executive agreement rather than as a treaty, because the former would not require Senate ratification and would not encounter the possibility of rejection. Because substantial funds had to be authorized in order to carry out this pact, Congressional cooperation was necessary. Vandenberg helped force Roosevelt to submit the pact as an appropriations measure, which had to originate in the House of Representatives and which required the majority of both houses of Congress.[24]

[20] *Ibid.*
[21] *Ibid.*, 64
[22] Harley Notter, *Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, 1939–1945* (Washington, D.C., 1949), 196–197.
[23] *The Private Papers*, 63–64.
[24] *Ibid.*, 72.

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In the spring of 1944, the State Department began extensive preparations for what was to become the United Nations. Although 1944 was a Presidential election year, Vandenberg spent considerable time in consultation with the State Department on a postwar international organization. According to Cordell Hull, secretary of state at that time, and Harley Notter, a State Department official, a central purpose of consultations between the administration and members of Congress was to avoid a repetition of the divided attitude between the executive branch and Congress which had helped to keep the United States from participating in the League of Nations after World War I. Hull reported that he began top-secret consultations with the leadership of both parties in the two houses of Congress, especially with members of the Senate and House foreign relations committees.[25] The secrecy of the consultations resulted largely from the fear that disclosure might augment isolationist opposition to a proposed international organization. Notter stated that on March 22, 1944, Hull invited the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Connally, to appoint a nonpartisan group of Senators to consider, with the State Department, a tentative plan for a general international organization. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee selected a group of senators consisting of four Democrats (Connally, Walter F. George of Georgia, Alben W. Barkley of Kentucky, and Guy M. Gillette of Iowa), three Republicans (Vandenberg, White, and Warren R. Austin of Vermont), and one Progressive, Robert M. LaFollette, Jr., of Wisconsin. All eight Senators (including La Follette) had been active in steering the Connally Resolution through the Senate.[26] Although this group was officially called the Special Senate Committee on Postwar Plans, the more frequently used name was the Committee of Eight.[27]

According to Vandenberg, Jr., these consultations (along with his father's work at the 1944 Republican National Convention) occupied so much of the senator's time that he declined an opportunity to attend the United Nations Monetary Conference at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, in the summer of 1944. Attended by dele-

[25] Cordell Hull, *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull* (New York, 1948), II, 1956; Notter, 258–259.

[26] Notter, 259.

[27] *The Private Papers*, 25.

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gates representing forty-four nations, the conference initiated the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. On June 9, 1944, Vandenberg declined the invitation to attend this conference, and Senator Charles W. Tobey of New Hampshire eventually represented Senate Republicans at Bretton Woods.[28]

As *de facto* leader of Senate Republicans in foreign affairs and as a member of the Committee of Eight, Vandenberg participated in numerous top-secret consultations with the State Department, which continued from the spring of 1944 to at least the completion of the San Francisco Conference on June 26, 1945. Although there is considerable information about the dates and lengths of these consultations and the general topics of discussion, one encounters difficulty in ascertaining the views of each participant. However, Vandenberg's diary furnishes considerable information about these meetings. According to the senator, the first session of consultations were held on April 25, 1944, in Hull's office. Hull reportedly told the Committee of Eight that the conferences would be informal and that no committee member would be pressured into giving an advance endorsement of tentative State Department drafts of a postwar international organization. Vandenberg related that Hull gave the committee members a secret copy of the U.S. draft for a United Nations organization, a proposal which he intended to submit to the British and Soviet governments if the committee approved.[29] In a diary entry of May 11, 1944, the senator stated that the organization proposed in this draft closely resembled "a four-power alliance" because, although all nations were represented with one vote in an assembly, the real power rested with a council of eight nations. Four of these nations (the U.S., Great Britain, the U.S.S.R., and China) were to be permanent members of this council and could exercise a veto over council action. According to Vandenberg, Hull stressed to the committee that the maintenance of the coming peace depended on the continued cooperation among these great powers.[30]

In the same diary entry Vandenberg noted that the first main difference that arose between the committee and the administration centered on the timing of formation of a new international

[28] *Ibid.*, 108–109.
[29] *Ibid.*, 95.
[30] Ibid., 95–96.

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organization. The Michigan senator argued that the State Department should have been focusing its attention primarily on the terms of the coming peace because, in his view, the success of the new international organization depended on the kind of peace that the organization would attempt to enforce. In this entry he wrote:

> We are all disturbed by Russia's unilateral announcements from time to time as to what she intends to do, for example, with Poland and the other Baltic States; and by Churchill's constant reiteration of restoring the British Empire intact.[31]

However, the senator reported that Hull and his subordinates in the State Department feared that if the United States waited until the peace before devoting its attention to a new international organization, American opposition to the proposed organization would probably increase and jeopardize the future of the organization and the new peace.[32]

In a diary entry dated May 19, 1944, Vandenberg stated that this dispute reached its climax and was resolved through compromise. Hull told the committee that he wanted to take the administration's plan for an international organization to Churchill and Stalin immediately. He also wanted the committee to give him a statement endorsing the plan so that his negotiating position *vis-à-vis* these allies would be strengthened. Vandenberg objected to this request for at least four reasons: The request contradicted Hull's earlier pledge not to pressure the committee for an advance endorsement; the nature of the peace and the nature of the new organization were inseparable; Vandenberg did not want to be drawn into the position of committing the next Republican president if there should be one; and Vandenberg did not believe that the State Department plan had been adequately studied.[33] In another diary entry of May 29, 1944, the senator related that the dispute was settled when the committee urged Hull to proceed with his proposed negotiations but withheld its endorsement.[34] It was Vandenberg's deep embroilment in these consultations, which continued through the remainder of 1944 and the first half of 1945, that

[31] *Ibid.*, 96.
[32] *Ibid.*
[33] *Ibid.*, 99.
[34] *Ibid.*, 105.

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deepened his commitment to internationalism.

By January 1945, Vandenberg had slowly drifted so far from isolationism that he saw no point in abstaining from a forthright announcement of his conversion to internationalism. On January 10, 1945, Vandenberg made an announcement to the Senate; in a central passage he said:

> I want maximum American cooperation, consistent with legitimate American self-interest, with Constitutional process and with collateral events which warrant it, to make the basic idea of Dumbarton Oaks succeed.[35]

Moreover, he called "for joint military action in behalf of collective security" if Germany and Japan showed signs of rearming.[36] In this speech he cited two reasons for his conversion: first, the rise of military technology which, in his view, had outmoded the natural defenses of the United States (the two oceans) and, second, the need to prevent the rearming of Germany and Japan.[37]

However, Vandenberg's published comments on foreign policy suggest deeper reasons for his change of position. They emanate from two levels. At an emotional level two forces probably jarred him: The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and a subsequent fear of appearing unpatriotic by remaining an isolationist. At an intellectual level these experiences punctured the isolationist stereotype so deeply that he was forced to grope for a different foreign-policy model. His adoption of internationalism emerged from his acceptance of several philosophical and political assumptions. Among the philosophical premises were the ideas that 1.) technology, especially in the development of weapons, exerted its own momentum on international events; 2.) countries may influence the rate but not the direction of technological change; 3.) this force was eliminating natural defenses of the United States as well as other nations; and 4.) this thrust was accelerating the interdependence of nations for their continued survival. Among the political tenets were beliefs that a.) future prosperity of the Republican party de-

[35] *The Congressional Record. Proceedings and Debates of the 79th Congress. First Session* (Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1945), XIC, 166.

[36] *Ibid.*

[37] *Ibid.*

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pended extensively on the support of collective-security arrangements; b.) a collective approach to foreign policy tends to create a vested interest for all the participants (regardless of party affiliation or prior ideological outlooks); and c.) isolationism failed to keep America out of a major war.

Editorial comment on Vandenberg's speech was generally favorable. The *New York Times*, the *New York Herald-Tribune*, the *Washington Post*, the *Christian Science Monitor*, and the *Louisville Courier-Journal* were among the newspapers which editorially lauded his speech. Two reasons for this praise were cited in these editorials. One reason was that this speech broke what these newspapers considered to be a vicious circle in U.S. foreign policy: U.S. reluctance to engage in international cooperation because it feared a revival of spheres of influence, and the tendency of U.S. allies to seek unilateral security through spheres of influence reacting to U.S. reluctance to engage in international cooperation. The second reason was that this speech strengthened the President's bargaining position for the approaching Dumbarton Oaks Conference and for later negotiations with allies and enemies. The possibility of a partisan revolt at home against the president for espousing U.S. membership in a postwar international organization was greatly reduced.[38]

### *Vandenberg's Work at the San Francisco Conference*

The political implications of Vandenberg's conversion to internationalism led President Roosevelt to offer him an appointment as a U.S. delegate to the coming United Nations Conference on International Organization, scheduled to assemble in San Francisco in April, 1945. On February 13, 1945, while still at the Yalta Conference, Roosevelt announced the composition of the U.S. delegation to the forthcoming conference. *Congressional Quarterly* commented that the composition of the "delegation reflected the hope

[38] "Mr. Vandenberg's Proposal," the *New York Times*, January 12, 1945, 14; "Getting Somewhere," *New York Herald-Tribune*, January 12, 1945, 12; "Committing America," the *Washington Post*, January 12, 1945, 12; "A Constructive Proposal," the *Christian Science Monitor*, January 11, 1945, 18; and "Momentous Triumph over Partisanism," the *Louisville Courier-Journal*, January 12, 1945, 6.

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of the Roosevelt Administration to keep foreign relations on a bipartisan plane and to avoid any complications in obtaining Senate ratification of the established organization.[39] The invited delegation consisted of Edward R. Stettinius (secretary of state, a Republican enjoying good relations with Congress); Cordell Hull (former secretary of state, a Democrat); Senator Tom Connally of Texas (chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, a Democrat); Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg of Michigan (the de facto leader of Senate Republicans in foreign affairs); Representative Sol Bloom of New York (chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, a Democrat); Representative Charles A. Eaton (the highest ranking minority–Republican member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee); Harold E. Stassen (former Republican governor of Minnesota, possible presidential candidate, and member of the Naval Reserve on active duty, who, according to Notter, "represented the public and particularly the veterans' interest in the maintenance of future peace and security"); and Virginia C. Gildersleeve (dean of Barnard College, representing the interest of women in peace).[40]

Vandenberg was suspicious of this invitation, for he viewed it as an attempt by Roosevelt to commit him and the Republican party to whatever charter was devised at the San Francisco Conference. The senator believed that a precommitment to accepting such a charter would deny him leverage in molding that result. Through his influential position in the Senate, he sought a form of veto power over the conference's work which the president was reluctant to grant. On February 17, 1945, he recorded in his diary that he would accept the invitation only if he were "assured untrammeled freedom to render my own independent judgment upon the final results at San Francisco . . ."[41] On March 3, 1945, President Roosevelt assented to the senator's demand; and on the sixth of March, Vandenberg publicly announced his conditional acceptance of the president's invitation.[42]

The United Nations Conference on International Organization met in San Francisco to draft the charter of what was to become the

[39] *Congressional Quarterly 1945* (Washington, D.C., 1945), 471.
[40] Notter, 416.
[41] *The Private Papers* 151–152.
[42] *Ibid.*, 153–154; *The Congressional Record*, 1831.

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United Nations. The conference lasted from April 25 to June 26, 1945, during which time Vandenberg kept an extensive diary of his work.[43] The plenary sessions of the conference met in the opera house, although many critical meetings among the delegates were held in Stettinius' luxurious penthouse atop the Fairmont Hotel, headquarters of the American delegation. On the fourth floor Vandenberg occupied an office and a suite. On the fifth floor the American delegates met almost every day. Among the great powers (the U.S., the U.S.S.R., Great Britain, China, and France), there were penthouse sessions at all hours of the day and night. The Fairmont Hotel was about a ten-minute drive from the opera house; the senator frequently traveled back and forth to attend meetings of the two committees he served on: the General Assembly Committee and the Regional Arrangements Committee.[44]

Vandenberg's diary for this two-month period indicates that he concentrated most of his efforts on four principal tasks. Let us consider them chronologically. His first major consideration was to have the word *justice* inserted into the proposed United Nations Charter; this addition was to symbolize the fundamental idea that the new organization was the basis for world peace with justice. (The Dumbarton Oaks proposals describing the purposes and principles of the proposed international organization omitted the word *justice*.) Vandenberg helped place this word three times in the Charter—first, in the preamble relative to the establishment of "conditions under which justice and respect" for international obligations would be maintained; second, in Article I, Section I, relative to maintenance of peace and security in consonance with the "principles of justice and international law"; and, third, in Article II, Section III, relating to the settlement of disputes "in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, [*sic*] are not endangered." Vandenberg, Jr., doubted the value of these inclusions *per se*; he wrote:

> The insertion of the word "justice" proved comparatively easy but then there arose the question of whether the United Nations Charter would provide not merely pious words but the working machinery to correct injustices.[45]

[43] *The Private Papers*, 175.
[44] *Ibid.*
[45] *Ibid.*, 173.

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The second duty which Vandenberg focused on was his struggle to enable the General Assembly to examine any problem concerning maintenance of international peace and security, although General Assembly action was to be precluded while the Security Council considered the same matter. In a diary entry dated May 9, 1945, he commented:

> . . . the Conference Committee (of which I am also a member) dealing with the General Assembly met this afternoon and the first major action of the Conference was Committee approval of my Amendment to keep the Assembly wide open for the exploration of any subject 'regardless of origin'—thus to make it truly the town meeting of tomorrow's world. . . . The final vote was 23 to 3 with 2 not voting. The argument chiefly revolved around the clause prohibiting the Assembly from acting if and while the Council might be dealing with the same subject. My amendment included this provision. . . . .[46]

A third task on which Vandenberg worked at the Conference was regional arrangements, for he was a member of the Conference Committee on Regional Arrangements. In a diary entry dated May 5, 1945, he defined what he considered to be the paramount problem facing this committee:

> The grave problem is to find a formula which will reasonably protect legitimate regional arrangements without destroying the over-all responsibility of united action through the United Nations and without inviting the formation of a lot of dangerous new 'regional spheres of influence.' . . .[47]

On May 4, 1945, according to the senator, the committee had adopted an amendment which contained language allowing enforcement action (without reference to the Security Council) under agreements such as the Soviet bilateral defense treaties with France and Great Britain " 'against enemy States' or 'inregional arrangements directed against renewal of aggressive policy on the part of such states.' "[48] Vandenberg said that he acquiesced to this amendment because, in his view, it was consistent with the proposal in his January 10 speech for the allied powers to form a permanent military alliance to keep Germany and Japan disarmed. The senator deplored the failure of the committee to extend this

[46] *Ibid.*, 190.
[47] *Ibid.*, 187.
[48] *Ibid.*

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amendment to the Western Hemisphere; a veto by any permanent member of the proposed Security Council would render the United States powerless to intervene legitimately in Latin America if the United States deemed intervention necessary. Moreover, under the Chapultepec Agreement between the United States and twenty-one Latin American republics, there was no provision for U.S. military intervention in Latin America.[49] Vandenberg proposed to extend the committee amendment to Latin America. However, this proposal encountered opposition not only from the other great powers but also from some members of the United States delegation and State Department—particularly Dr. Leo Pasvolsky, special assistant to the secretary of state, who feared that the United Nations would be fatally weakened if various regional groups were empowered to act without prior clearance of the Security Council.[50] Vandenberg implies in his diary (May 7, 1945) that he took advantage of his free-agent status within the American delegation to help force a settlement of the regional arrangements problem:

> I served notice in the U.S. Delegation . . . that if this question is not specifically cleared up on the United Nations Charter, I shall expect to see a Reservation [sic.?] on the subject in the Senate and . . . I shall support it.[51]

In another entry dated May 15, 1945, Vandenberg stated that the regional arrangements problem was nearing solution. At a meeting with Latin American delegates at Stettinius' penthouse suite, Vandenberg and the secretary of state informed them of three U.S. proposals for resolving the dilemma:

> The U.S. intended (1) to propose an Amendment [sic.] reserving the right of self-defense *including* regional self-defense if and when the Security Council fails to act; (2) to propose an amendment including resort to *regional* facilities among the peaceful mechanisms to be embraced; (3) to agree to call a new Pan-American Conference (after the Frisco [sic.] Conference) to implement the Act of Chapultepec (as required by the Act) within the Framework [sic.] of the Peace League. The Latins took it.[52]

[49] *Ibid.*, 189.
[50] *Ibid.*, 187–188.
[51] *Ibid.*, 189.
[52] *Ibid.*, 193.

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Shortly thereafter, Vandenberg announced this third proposal to the committee. The proposals were accepted by Great Britain and the U.S.S.R. when the U.S. delegation agreed to the omission of any direct reference to the Chapultepec Agreement. According to Vandenberg Jr., the senator's son, Great Britain and the U.S.S.R. refused to accept this kind of reference because it allegedly invited group domination. The compromise was to become Article LI of the U.N. Charter; Vandenberg is widely credited with authorship of this Article.[53]

The fourth task which claimed Vandenberg's attention was the veto issue. The Yalta agreements of February, 1945 provided that the permanent members of the Security Council in the proposed international organization were to have veto power over proposed actions by the council. According to Vandenberg, the U.S.S.R. sought the right to veto even discussions of international disputes (regardless of their threat to world peace) in addition to the veto on actions proposed by the council. Vandenberg approved that latter use of the veto so that the proposed United Nations could not embroil the United States in any actions against its will.[54] However, he regarded the former proposed use of the veto as an infringement on freedom of speech. Vandenberg contended that the United States could not join an international organization in which no freedom of speech on international disputes was permitted. Furthermore, he urged the Truman administration and the U.S. delegation to remain firm on this point despite Soviet insistence that it would not join the organization without this extension of the veto.[55] On June 7, 1945, the veto dispute was settled when the U.S.S.R. withdrew its demand for this extension. In a diary entry bearing that date, the senator attributed settlement of the veto problem to the "blunt, unconditional message which Stettinius sent to Moscow on [June 2.]"[56]

Although Vandenberg accepted President Roosevelt's invitation conditionally, the senator differed with the rest of the U. S. delegation only on two occasions. Unlike his fellow delegates, he voted against the admission of Byelorussia and the Ukraine to the San

[53] *Ibid.*, 192.
[54] *Ibid.*, 200.
[55] *Ibid.*, 204.
[56] *Ibid.*, 208.

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Francisco Conference and for a withdrawal clause.[57] Even though Vandenberg had attended the conference as a delegate who reserved the right to oppose the final result, his satisfaction with the proposed charter became apparent soon after settlement of the veto crisis. On June 14, he stated publicly that he did not expect much senate opposition to the ratification of the proposed U. N. Charter[58] On June 25, he announced his decision to "sign the San Francisco Charter and . . . make every effort to secure its ratification with reasonable speed."[59] The last day of the conference (June 26, 1945), he signed the charter and returned to Washington, D. C.

### *Vandenberg's Role in the Senate Ratification of the United Nations Charter*

Vandenberg's endorsement of the proposed United Nations Charter on June 25, 1945, made Senate ratification a formality. The only question was the margin of ratification. The Senate in 1945 was composed of fifty-five Democrats, forty Republicans, and one Progressive; Vandenberg's support of the document virtually assured Senate approval by a wide margin. On June 29, he reported to the Senate on the San Francisco Conference and summarized the reasons for his decision to support charter ratification:

> I shall support ratification of this charter with all the resources at my command. I shall do this in the deep conviction that the alternative is physical and moral chaos in many weary places of the earth. I shall do it because there must be no default in our oft-pledged purpose to outlaw aggression so far as lies within our human power. I shall do it because this plan, regardless of infirmities, holds great promise that the United Nations may collaborate for peace as effectively as they have made common cause for war. I shall do it because peace must not be cheated out of its only collective chance.[60]

If there had been any significant opposition to charter approval before the senator's speech, there was, in his view, practically none afterwards. He told his wife that he expected even Senators Robert

[57] *Ibid.*, 178–194.
[58] "Vandenberg Doubts Senate Battle," *The New York Times*, June 15, 1945, 9.
[59] "Vandenberg Says He Will Sign Charter for Ratification 'with Reasonable Speed,' " *The New York Times*, June 26, 1945, p. 10.
[60] *The Congressional Record*, 6981.

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M. La Follette, Jr., a Progressive from Wisconsin, and Burton K. Wheeler, a Democrat from Montana, to vote for the proposal, although they still remained sympathetic to isolationism. He said that he intended " 'to drive ahead to ratification with the least possible delay.' "[61]

On July 2, President Truman submitted the charter to the Senate for ratification and requested quick approval.[62] The charter was referred to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee which held public hearings on it from July 9 to 13. Vandenberg's recorded participation in the committee hearings was marginal. Most witnesses urged ratification of the document without reservations.[63] The one-sidedness of the testimony was reflected in the committee vote favorable to the charter: 21 to 1, with Hiram W. Johnson of California, officially the top-ranking Republican minority member of the committee, the lone dissenter.[64] The Senate debate on the charter, which began on July 23 and lasted for five days, was one-sided; for, during that period, fifty-six Senators inserted statements in *The Congressional Record* favoring ratification.[65] Between July 24 and 28, Vandenberg urged approval.[66] On July 28, 1945, the Senate ratified the charter by the overwhelming vote of 89 to 2.[67]

While the charter was before the Senate for ratification or rejection, there is no evidence that Vandenberg kept a record which might illuminate his tactics to achieve almost unanimous Republican support. Public documents are also silent regarding the senator's techniques and strategies. In retrospect, his pivotal position in the Senate made his role in ratification important, mainly in effecting overwhelming approval of the charter. His participation in the San Francisco Conference, although conditioned by his right of opposition to the final draft, practically assured his approval; senators seldom vote against documents whose contents they help

[61] *The Private Papers*, 218.

[62] *The Congressional Record*, 7119.

[63] *Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Seventy-Ninth Congress. First Session on the Charter of the United Nations for the Maintenance of International Peace and Security* (Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1945), 712–713.

[64] *Congressional Quarterly 1945*, 472.

[65] *Ibid.*, 473.

[66] *The Congressional Record*, 7991-7992, 8000, 8011-8013, 8027, 8033, 8063-8064, 8107, and 8163-8165.

[67] *Ibid.*, 8190.

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determine. While one may doubt whether he could have defeated ratification, there is little question that he could have caused the margin of passage to have been narrow. Such a margin would have cast doubt among U. S. allies about the degree and duration of American interest in the U. N. and the world at large, especially if a Republican administration came to power. Undoubtedly, Vandenberg's slow conversion to internationalism, his work at the San Francisco Conference, and his efforts to achieve Senate ratification of the charter strengthened the positions of Presidents Roosevelt and Truman in their global negotiations with allies and adversaries. No nation could reasonably question the U. S. commitment to the U. N. and to a preeminent U. S. role in the postwar world; the presidents spoke affirmatively on foreign affairs for most of the country. Much credit for this erasure of doubt belonged to Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg.

With reduced effectiveness of the United Nations, termination of direct American involvement in the Vietnam war, sharp national debate and re-evaluation of foreign policy, it might be enlightening and salutary to consider Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg's reasons for favoring an internationalist foreign policy and active American participation in the United Nations.

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# The Functions of Communist One-Party Elections: The Case of Czechoslovakia, 1971

FRANK DINKA and MAX J. SKIDMORE

Although there have been a few serious and worthwhile studies of elections in Communist countries, the tendency among Western scholars has been to ignore them or dismiss them lightly as being virtually meaningless. A random glance at some texts published during the last decade dealing with Eastern Europe, for example, is sufficient to verify this lack of concern.[1] The major explanation of why Communist elections are dismissed as a subject worthy of scholarly effort is no doubt that they differ so greatly from elections in the Western liberal democracies. The one factor

[1] J. F. Brown's *The New Eastern Europe; The Khrushchev Era and After* (New York, 1966), ignores elections; Joseph Rothschild's *Communist Eastern Europe* (New York, 1964), also fails to deal with elections; H. Gordon Skilling in his *The Governments of Communist East Europe* (New York, 1966), does describe electoral procedures, and concedes that in Poland after 1956 the election process did take on a "greater reality" (p. 133), but he devotes less than four pages to the subject. *Eastern European Government and Politics* (New York, 1966), by Vaclav Benes, Andrew Gyorgy and George Stambuk, refers to elections in each of the countries covered, but dismisses them all as essen-

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that appears most to make it difficult for those of the West to accept Communist elections as meaningful is the prevailing lack of an opposition slate. Quite obviously, Communist elections do not perform the functions that elections are supposed to perform in liberal democracies. Nevertheless, dismissing them as meaningless without examination is a questionable procedure; they do, in fact, appear to perform significant functions.

### *Background and General Introduction*

Jerzy Wiatr distinguishes Communist elections from competitive elections and identifies three major types: "semi-civil war elections," "safe elections," and "consent elections." This paper examines the third of Wiatr's categories, the "consent election." He defines consent elections as:

> Those elections in which the voter does not make any choice between parties competing for power, but: (1) he is personally free to express his acceptance or disapproval of the governmental policy with the assumption that his vote would have some meaning for the future policy; (2) he can influence the selection of the members of representative bodies, both in negative and in positive way [*sic*] (by voting against some and/or for some other candidates). The consent elections do not decide who will rule the country, but they influence the way in which the country will be ruled.[2]

Certainly Communist elections are patriotic exercises, even more so than are those in other countries; they inspire a patriotic fervor that in the United States, for example, appears to be confined to

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tially meaningless; Zbigniew Brzezinski, in *The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict* (New York, 1965), merely gives passing mention to elections; despite his having included nothing on elections in his edited collection, *Eastern Europe in the Sixties* (New York, 1963), Steven Fischer-Galati contends in his introduction that "the Achilles heel of each of the regimes is popular apathy toward Communist creed and practice" (p. x); *Eastern Europe in Transition* (Baltimore, 1966), Kurt London, ed., includes nothing on elections; Stephen Kertesz's *East Central Europe and the World: Developments in the Post-Stalin Era* (Notre Dame, Indiana, 1962), contains only a few brief references; and in Richard C. Gripp's *The Political System of Communism* (New York, 1973), a book that discusses some fourteen Communist political systems, there is hardly more than one page devoted to elections.

[2] Jerzy J. Wiatr, "Elections and Voting Behavior in Poland," in Austin Ranney, ed., *Essays on the Behavioral Study of Politics* (Urbana, Ill., 1962) 239.

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such activities as pledging allegiance to the flag and playing the National Anthem. It seems unwise, however, to dismiss them as solely patriotic exercises, particularly if Wiatr is correct in his description of the "consent" election. It is, of course, essential to proceed with caution, because Wiatr is attempting to describe, in Western terms, practices that are foreign to Western experience. Nevertheless, his formulation appears to have value if used judiciously.

Elections in Communist states may serve to legitimate, and to demonstrate popular support for, the regime, and they also perform functions of education and recruitment. Although Communist elections cannot serve as a clear measure of public opinion, the regime is able to obtain some awareness of the popular sentiment. The negative votes, however miniscule in number by Western standards, can serve to some extent to make popular feeling known. Wiatr has warned against underestimating the political importance of dissenting votes in Communist countries.[3] More recently Gilison has demonstrated that there are substantial insights to be gained from studies of negative votes in Communist elections.[4]

Despite their differences from elections in liberal democratic states, elections in Communist countries may be mechanisms that to some degree do permit the people to participate in the ruling of their countries. Even though opposing political parties have been eliminated, and there is no competition for political power within the election itself, the voters can exercise some opposition to the official policy, not by rejecting it, but by lowering their acceptance of it.[5] It is true that Communist voters, at best, are not given a free decision in the selection of goals, but the electoral procedure increasingly appears to permit popular participation in the fulfillment of the goals of the leadership.[6] Moreover, regardless of policy considerations, it is highly likely that officials, in order to lessen the likelihood of rejection of a candidate, will avoid selecting for nom-

[3] *Ibid.*, 238.

[4] Jerome M. Gilison, "Soviet Elections as a Measure of Dissent: The Missing One Percent," *The American Political Science Review*, LXII, (September, 1968), 814–826.

[5] Wiatr, "Elections and Voting Behavior in Poland," 251.

[6] Zbigniew Pelczynsky, "Poland 1957," in *Elections Abroad*, D. D. Butler, ed., (London, 1959), 160.

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ination any person against whom there appears to be popular hostility.[7]

C. B. Macpherson argues persuasively that the liberal democratic systems in the West are not the only systems that can lay legitimate claim to the title of democracies.[8] As opposed to liberal democracy, he sees two forms of nonliberal democracy, the one prevailing in underdeveloped states, the other the Communist variant. If, as Macpherson argues, Communist states are coming increasingly to qualify for the title of nonliberal democracies, Communist elections may assume more importance, both practical and theoretical, than has hitherto been acknowledged. Louis Hartz notes perceptively that "No modern political system as it has risen to power has ever developed an image which corresponds to the real procedures by which it works," and that "systems work, despite the anguish men have when they discover how they work."[9]

The 1971 elections in Czechoslovakia lend support to Macpherson's classification of some Communist states as nonliberal democracies, and offer an opportunity to gain some insights into the workings of a "nonliberal democracy—communist variant." In studying these elections and the accompanying nominating processes, it seems apparent that they did play a significant role in the life of the nation. In view of the activities during the Soviet invasion when masses of Czechs and Slovaks demonstrated openly, it would seem that the high participation levels in the elections should not be dismissed out of hand. Where were the Dubcek supporters during the elections? Earlier they had risked severe penalties when they had taken to the streets. Surely they would also have been ready to stay away from the polls, or to vote against the candidates presented to them, had they been hostile to the Husak regime. Nevertheless, they participated massively. Apparently, if Husak had not won their support, he had at least succeeded in dampening their overt hostility. Any conclusions must remain tentative, of course, because of the limited materials at the disposal

[7] Howard R. Swearer, "The Functions of Soviet Local Elections," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, V, (May, 1961), 137.

[8] C. B. Macpherson, *The Real World of Democracy* (Oxford, 1966), *passim*.

[9] Louis Hartz, "Democracy: Image and Reality," in William M. Chambers and Robert H. Salisbury, eds., *Democracy in the Mid-Twentieth Century* (St. Louis, Mo., 1960), 14, 17.

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of scholars in the West. We have had to rely on Czechoslovakian sources, chiefly the government-controlled press, and some reports by Western observers. In view of the tight control over the press, its reports may be accepted virtually as official releases. It is fruitless to conduct a comprehensive analysis of all pertinent material from Czechoslovakia because it all reflects the official viewpoint. Even with allowances for the likelihood of error or misrepresentation in the only available sources of information, the results seem sufficiently significant to warrant close study.

In the November, 1971, elections over ten million voters in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic (CSSR) cast votes for candidates to representative bodies at all levels—federal, republic, regional, district and local. Since the preceding elections had been in June of 1964, these were the first elections since the adoption of the "Law on Federation" that transformed Czechoslovakia from a highly centralized unitary state into a federal republic consisting of the Czech Socialist Republic (CSR) and the Slovak Socialist Republic (SSR). The Law on Federation was adopted by the Czechoslovak National Assembly on October 27, 1968, and proclaimed by the President of the Republic on October 30, 1968 (the fiftieth anniversary of the formation of the Czechoslovak Republic) at Bratislava Castle in Slovakia. Put in effect on January 1, 1969, the new law was the result of years of struggle by the Slovaks for equality and political autonomy within the Czechoslovak Republic.[10] Government officials and party leaders hailed the new federalism as a step of historical importance, and as the realization of "years-long dreams of the Slovaks."[11]

The constitutional change required a reorganization of the governmental structure at the highest level and the establishment of new governing bodies at the level of the constituent republics. First came the creation of a bicameral Federal Assembly and a

[10] Constitutional Law 143/1968—*Pravda* (Bratislava), October 28, 29, 30, and 31, 1968. (All references here are to *Pravda*, the official organ of the Communist Party of Slovakia and not to Moscow *Pravda*—unless specifically stated.)

[11] President Svoboda at the signing ceremony of the Law on Federation. Other prominent Party leaders made similar statements, *Pravda*, October 31, 1968. The reorganization of Czechoslovakia into a federal state was among the first reforms advocated by Dubcek's regime, and it appears to be the only reform carried out by his successor.

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Federal Government (reflecting the federal character of the state). The existing National Assembly with its 300 members was transformed into the Chamber of People, and the Czech National Council (CNR) and the Slovak National Council (SNR) each sent 75 deputies to the newly created Chamber of Nations.[12] On January 1, 1969, the President of the Republic, in accordance with Article 61, Section 1, of the Law on Federation, appointed the first Federal Government of the Czechoslovak Republic and named Oldrich Cernik as its Premier.[13]

Since the new law provided for direct popular election of deputies of both Chambers of the Federal Assembly, it was necessary to call elections. Under the electoral law of 1964, elections were to be held every four years and one had been planned for 1968, but because of "unusual circumstances," Dubcek postponed it, as did Husak when he came to power.[14] These, so-called "unusual circumstances," according to official Party sources, were caused by "deep internal crisis, attempts of right-wing and anti-socialist forces to mis-use the elections . . . to deprive the Communist Party of its leading role, and to disrupt the function of the National Front as a unifying agent."[15] Obviously, neither Dubcek nor Husak felt that their positions of leadership were consolidated enough to hold elections in 1968. The Party leadership maintained that under such circumstances an election "could mean a return to pre-February political practices, confusion in the economy, anarchy, . . . and a serious endangering of the socialist order in the country."[16]

Yet as time went on, it became necessary for the regime to plan for elections to support its contention that the consolidation process was working. Finally, in October, 1969, a new law (Law 117/1969) stipulated that there would be general elections by the end of 1971.[17]

In May, 1971, the Fourteenth Party Congress convened in Prague

[12] *Pravda*, November 26, 1971.

[13] *Pravda*, January 2, 1969.

[14] *Praca*, July 29, 1971; (*Praca* is the official organ of the Revolutionary Trade Union Movement in Slovakia).

[15] *Pravda*, November 26, 1971.

[16] Ibid., (The reference here is to February 1948, when the Communists seized power in Czechoslovakia.)

[17] *Praca*, July 29, 1971.

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under the leadership of the new First Secretary, Dr. Gustav Husak. The Congress adopted a resolution which, among other things, stated that the coming elections would require special attention. The Party leadership directed all Party organs and all the organizations united in the National Front (an umbrella organization of the Communist Party, four other parties, and a number of mass public organizations) to "gear the pre-election preparations toward strengthening the unity and activism of the working people in a struggle for a further development of socialist society."[18] Evidently, by mid-1971, the Party leadership concluded that the consolidation process had been effective to an extent that elections not only were possible, but desirable. As the official press put it: "the Party and the State were sufficiently strengthened to be able to hold elections in November."[19]

The Party's directives led to action in the Federal Assembly, the highest organ of state power and the highest legislative body at the national level, and in the Slovak and Czech National Councils, as the highest legislative bodies at the level of the constituent Republics. In June, 1971, the Federal Assembly began to discuss the proposals for the new electoral laws. Speaking on behalf of the proposed legislation, the Assembly's Chairman, Dalibor Hanes, said that with the passage of the new electoral laws "the legislative bodies will be fulfilling one of the most important tasks outlined by the Fourteenth Party Congress."[20] The Federal Assembly approved the proposed legislation on July 6, 1971. The Czech National Council and the Slovak National Council also passed the necessary legislation. Altogether there were five new electoral laws—one adopted by the Federal Assembly and two each by the Czech and Slovak National Councils. The basis of the laws was the legislation adopted in 1964, with the changes necessary to conform to the federal reorganization of the State.[21] The new legislation provided

[18] *Praca*, May 31, 1971; *Praca*, May 26, 1971.

[19] *Praca*, July 29, 1971. On June 19, 1971, *Praca* wrote that "the high degree of political consolidation permits us to have this year's elections not only to the highest representative bodies, but also elections of deputies to the People's Committees at all levels." (The People's Committees are the local government bodies on various levels.)

[20] *Rude Pravo*, June 26, 1971. (*Rude Pravo* is the official organ of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia.)

[21] *Praca*, June 22, 1971.

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for "public, direct and equal elections by secret vote" for all citizens 18 years old and older by election day, without regard to nationality, sex, religious belief, occupation, residence requirements, social origins, property, or "previous activities." The only exceptions were persons currently serving prison terms and persons who were legally deprived of the right to vote because of crimes connected with the loss of certain civil rights.[22]

Nationally the election law provided for the establishment of special electoral districts for the election of deputies to both chambers of the Federal Assembly. The 200 deputies in the Chamber of People were to be elected on the basis of population in both constituent republics from electoral districts with approximately equal population. According to the existing population distribution, this meant the election of 137 deputies from the Czech Socialist Republic, and 63 deputies from the Slovak Socialist Republic. In the Chamber of Nations the principle of equal representation for both republics was to be observed regardless of population numbers, with half of the 150 deputies in that chamber to be elected from each constituent republic.[23]

The laws passed by the Czech and Slovak National Councils provided for direct election of deputies to these national councils and also for the election of deputies to regional, district and local People's Committees. The laws adopted in the Czech Socialist Republic established 200 electoral districts, each with approximately 49,000 voters for the election of deputies to the Czech National Council. In the Slovak Socialist Republic the laws provided for the election of 150 deputies to the Slovak National Council.[24] In both republics the new laws lowered the size of the People's Committees at all levels. Thus, for example, in villages with up to 300 population the minimum number of deputies was set at nine instead of the previous eleven, and in cities with over 50,000 population the minimum was reduced from 100 to 85. The laws also stipulated that the Regional People's Committees should have at least 80 deputies, and the District People's Committees in districts with less than 80,000 inhabitants should have at least 60 deputies, and at least 80 in districts of over 80,000. It was estimated that

[22] *Praca*, September 14, 1971; also *Rude Pravo*, July 7, 1971.
[23] *Praca*, November 15, 1971.
[24] *Rude Pravo*, July 8, 1971; *Pravda*, July 8, 1971.

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more than 220,000 deputies had to be elected to representative bodies at all levels. The term of office was extended from four to five years to run concurrently with the Five Year Plans.[25] In addition, the new laws provided the method of selecting candidates, the voting procedure, and the election regulations, and stipulated that the working people should elect as deputies persons "devoted to socialism, politically progressive, with high moral standards and capable of uniting the creative forces of the working people."[26]

The elections were scheduled for November 26 and 27, 1971. This was the first time that elections had been held over a two-day period. The Party and the Government made it clear that there would be a gigantic effort to mobilize the entire population in preparation for the coming elections:

> In the coming elections we want to achieve a maximum participation of voters and an impressive victory of the candidates of the National Front. Victorious elections will strengthen the leading role of the Party, its ties with the people, and will contribute to the development of our socialist state. At the same time a victory will be a proof that our people are fully in support of socialism . . . a vote for the candidates of the National Front will be a vote of confidence in the Communist Party and the Party line as stated in the 14th Congress.[27]

All communication media were fully utilized to impress upon the people the importance of the elections and to convince them of "the positive results achieved in the development of socialist society."[28]

Sharing with politicians everywhere an understanding of the importance of "grass roots" relations, the Party opened thousands of so-called "agitation centers" all over the country. Staffed with an army of "agitators," these centers were designed to be the "main machinery for political education of the broad masses of people."[29] The press reported that thousands visited these centers during the pre-election campaign to listen to lectures, engage in discussions and publicly call the candidates to account for their work during their past term and to reveal what they planned to do for the people

[25] *Praca*, November 16, 1971.
[26] *Rude Pravo*, July 19, 1971.
[27] Jaroslav Mesko, "Ziskavat a ziskat," *Pravda*, November 19, 1971.
[28] *Praca*, June 30, 1971.
[29] *Praca*, August 20, 1971.

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if they were elected.[30] Between October 22 and 24, "agitation teams," armed with statistics and propaganda material, visited almost every home and every place of work to praise the accomplishments under socialism, to promise improvements in the future and to "criticize deficiencies and mistakes of past regimes."[31] The Bureau of Press and Information prepared thousands of posters, banners, leaflets, and other propaganda material and distributed them in factories, offices, collective farms and homes.[32]

In accordance with the provisions of the electoral laws, Election Commissions were established at all levels to supervise the electoral procedures, prepare voters' lists, register candidates,[33] handle complaints regarding the elections, and to count and record the vote. These commissions were composed of representatives of the Communist Party and other political parties and mass organizations united in the National Front. They involved over 130,000 persons in the preparation and organization of the elections.[34] The electoral laws stipulated also that the Central Election Commission on the national level had to be elected by the Central Committee of the National Front (headed by Gustav Husak) fifty-five days prior to the elections.[35]

After the Election Commissions had prepared voter lists and registered candidates, there were mass public meetings throughout the country to give the voters an opportunity to meet and question the candidates and discuss the election platform of the National Front. The platform, according to Husak, was the general party line set at the Fourteenth Party Congress—a "program of development of socialist society, and a five-year plan of development of the national economy."[36]

It appears that the Party's efforts to encourage mass participation

[30] *Ibid.*

[31] *Pravda*, November 9, 1971; also *Praca*, October 20, 1971. (In Slovakia alone, there were some 40,000 "agitators"—*Praca*, October 22, 1971).

[32] *Praca*, August 7, 1971.

[33] Legally, the Election Commission could refuse to register a candidate and thus exercise a veto over the nominations; however, the authors were unable to find a single report of such refusal.

[34] *Praca*, October 4, 1971; also *Pravda*, November 9, 1971.

[35] *Praca*, October 4, 1971.

[36] Gustav Husak in a speech at the meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia—*Praca*, September 16, 1971.

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in the election campaign were successful. Millions of persons seem to have participated in the pre-election assemblies. In the Slovak Socialist Republic alone, 1,046,879 persons (out of the total 3,002,948 eligible voters) were reported to have participated in one or more of over 5,000 such assemblies.[37] The Chairman of the Slovak Election Commission, pleased with the mass involvement, said in an interview a few days before the elections:

> On the basis of numerous facts, we can conclude, that the pre-election campaign course is characterized by a high degree of social and political activity of the people. This was proved, above all, by the high participation of the voters in the pre-election assemblies. This is a proof that the people are showing a genuine interest in furthering our socialist development and that in an absolute majority they are in agreement with the political program of the 14th Party Congress and that the Party is again generally recognized as the leading force in the society and has the support of the broad masses.[38]

### *The National Front and the Selection of Candidates*

In order to gain at least a degree of understanding of the nominating process in the Czechoslovakian election of 1971, it is necessary to examine the "unparalleled feature of the Eastern European States"[39] that is officially charged with the task of nominating candidates—the National Front.

The National Front in Czechoslovakia originated during World War II, when an alliance was formed between the Communists and other antifascist parties. After the war, this alliance constituted the basis for a coalition government that signified the postwar cooperation of the various antifascist parties and other mass organizations. Before the Communist seizure of power in February, 1948, the National Front was a genuine coalition of independent political parties and mass organizations in which the Communist Party gradually strengthened its position and eventually assumed a mon-

[37] *Pravda*, November 26, 1971; (*The Washington Post* incorrectly reported on November 29, 1971 in an article written by Richard Homan that "under Husak's procedures there were no public appearances [of candidates]").

[38] *Pravda*, November 22, 1971.

[39] H. Gordon Skilling, *The Governments of Communist East Europe* (New York, 1966), 65.

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opoly of power. Today all of the members of the National Front "publicly acknowledge the leadership of the Communist party and praise its basic policies."[40] Some students of Eastern Europe see the National Front as a "transmission belt" used by the Communist Party to control the non-Communist majority,[41] while others believe that the National Front is "intended to link the regime with sectors of the population not otherwise accessible to the Communists."[42]

Czechoslovakia appears to have what Jerzy J. Wiatr, in his typology of party systems, has called the "hegemonic party system," under which "all the existing parties form a lasting coalition within which one of them is accepted as the leading force of the coalition."[43] In Czechoslovakia this "lasting coalition" is between the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, the Czechoslovak Socialist Party, the Czechoslovak People's Party, the Slovak Renaissance Party, the Slovak Freedom Party, and a number of mass nonparty political and social organizations. Among the latter the most prominent are the Revolutionary Trade Union Movement (with some 5,500,000 members), the Union of Socialist Youth (almost 500,000 members), and the Czechoslovak Union of Women (with over 400,000 members).[44] These parties and organizations are united under the leadership of the Communist Party in the National Front. The electoral laws of 1971 strengthened the role of the National Front in the electoral process by assigning it the task of recommending, selecting, and registering candidates, formulating the election program, and preparing and conducting elections at all levels.[45]

The National Front organizations held meetings early in August, 1971, at all levels throughout the country. At these public meetings various member organizations proposed the names of candidates and the National Front endorsed one candidate for each

[40] *Ibid.*, 66.

[41] Vaclav Benes, Andrew Gyorgy, and George Stambuk, *Eastern European Government and Politics* (New York, 1966), 78.

[42] Skilling, 65.

[43] Jerzy J. Wiatr, "Political Parties, Interest Representation and Economic Development in Poland," *The American Political Science Review*, LXIV (December, 1970), 1239.

[44] *Praca*, September 14, 1971.

[45] *Rude Pravo*, July 7, 1971.

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elective position. It is impossible to determine exactly how the selection process works; the Czechoslovak press does not discuss this in detail nor is other information available. The press reports that the selection of one name from among those proposed involves "the agreement of the individual organizations represented in the National Front."[46] There is no information concerning how this agreement is reached, but since the other parties and organizations are united in the National Front under the "leadership" of the Communist Party, it is reasonable to assume that the Party determines the final selection of candidates. In discussing the candidate selection, Milan Rusko presented the official view in an article in *Praca*, saying that the general public would have the opportunity to find out who the candidates were and,

> if it turns out that the selection is not a good one, there may be a change before the registration of candidates . . . . It can happen, however, that a group will try to exert pressure to put forward 'its man'. If it is not in the interest of the collective, the individual organizations must be strong enough to withstand this separatist and conjunctural pressure. They should be able, if necessary, to defend the candidacy of an uncompromised comrade against the proposal of some 'flexible' opportunist.[47]

The National Front's freedom in the nominating process has been somewhat limited by directives of the Fourteenth Party Congress. It adopted a resolution specifically stressing that in the selection of candidates, there must be special care to increase the representation of workers, women, and younger persons so as to reflect the "class structure" of the state, and that the candidates must be selected from among persons who are "best qualified and devoted to socialism."[48] To meet the Party requirements set in this resolution, it was necessary in some cases to discard over fifty percent of the incumbent deputies and replace them with candidates from the ranks of younger workers and women. Once approved, the

[46] *Praca*, August 25, 1971.

[47] *Praca*, August 17, 1971. (Opportunism is defined as "the adjustment and control of the interest of the workers' movement to the interest of the bourgeoisie," and as "a deviation from the class struggle and from the socialist revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat."—Vladimir Gerloch, "Do boje s pravicovym oportunismem," *Nova Mysl*, XXIII, No. 10 (1969), 1156).

[48] *Rude Pravo*, May 31, 1971.

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candidates, regardless which group or party recommended their candidacy, presented themselves as candidates of the National Front, to symbolize the unity of the nation behind the Communist Party and the National Front.

Governmental and Party leaders, scientific societies, youth organizations, writers, athletes and other celebrities issued appeals to make the elections an expression of national unity and support of the Party; its program was adopted at the Fourteenth Party Congress. The Chairman of the Federal Assembly, Dalibor Hanes, and the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Slovakia, Jozef Lenart, both referred to the coming elections as "the most important political event since the Fourteenth Party Congress," and both expressed hope that people would cast their votes for the candidates of the National Front and thus would "approve the socialist order and the policies of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia."[49]

Speaking at a pre-election assembly in Prague, on November 24, Dr. Husak frankly admitted the many shortages in housing, electrical power, and gas, and said that these insufficiencies would not be remedied in a month or even a year; and every effort must be made to solve these and other problems. "Today," he said, "after political and economic consolidation of our country, we can gradually realize hopes for a faster advancement of our society, for solving its problems, and realizing all the hopes that people put into January, 1968."[50] The Slovak Academy of Sciences called upon all members of the "creative intelligentsia—scientists, technologists, writers, and artists—to rally around the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and the National Front."[51] The newly formed pro-regime Federal Association of Catholic Clergy, *Pacem in Terris*, made an appeal to the people saying that the Catholic faithful would contribute to making the election "a real manifestation of moral and political unity of the people as represented by the National Front" by participating in the elections and voting for the official candidates.[52] The regime made special appeals to the young people, since some 1,800,000 persons between the ages of 18–25 were

[49] *Praca*, October 29, 1971; also *Praca*, November 9, 1971.
[50] *Pravda*, November 25, 1971.
[51] *Pravda*, November 24, 1971.
[52] *Pravda*, November 20, 1971.

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to go to the polls for the first time. They were told that the "youth has the trust and full support of the highest organs of the Party and the State" and that the youth is "an important partner." The regime emphasized that "the rousing unrest, so typical of youth, is one of the motors that is moving our society forward."[53] The authorities appeared to make every possible effort to involve all groups and every person in the campaign and to make each voter believe that his vote was important.

### *Elections and Voting Procedure*

According to official statistics, the population of Czechoslovakia as of December 1, 1970, was 14,381,557. Out of this total 65% were of Czech nationality, 29.2% were Slovaks, 4% Hungarians, 0.6% Germans, 0.5% Poles, 0.4% Ukrainians and Russians, and 0.3% of other or undeclared nationalities.[54] When the voters' registration books closed on November 25, there were 10,253,796 registered voters—7,250,848 in the Czech Socialist Republic and 3,002,948 in the Slovak Socialist Republic.[55]

Numerous press reports spoke of the intensive pre-election campaign as being very successful. Over 99 percent of the eligible voters are reported to have participated in the elections. In many towns and villages, according to the press, voters went to the polls in large groups accompanied by marching bands and carrying banners and placards proclaiming "unity under socialism." In many polling places the first voters were welcomed with flowers and music. Whole factories, dormitories at universities, and offices voted together.[56]

The elections were the first as mentioned earlier to be held over a two-day period. On the first day, Friday, November 26, the polls were open from 2 p.m. until 10 p.m. The next day, Saturday, the polls opened at 7 a.m. and closed at 2 p.m. In many instances the press reported voters waiting in line long before the polling places opened. Altogether there were 18,874 voting precincts, each with one polling place. The election precincts as a rule contained ap-

[53] *Praca*, November 22, 1971.
[54] *Praca*, September 14, 1971.
[55] *Praca*, November 29, 1971.
[56] *Praca*, November 27, 1971.

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proximately one thousand voters. The polling places, centrally located so as to make participation in the elections most convenient to the voters in the precinct, were decorated with flowers, slogans, and the pictures of the President and the candidates.[57] In addition, in accordance with the new electoral laws, election precincts were established in hospitals, sanitoria, spas, welfare institutions and similar places, if these contained at least fifty voters. Special election precincts were established at Czechoslovak diplomatic missions abroad, and aboard ships to be used only for voting for deputies of the Federal Assembly and deputies to the Czech and Slovak National Councils.[58]

Voters cast their ballots for deputies of both chambers of the Federal Assembly, for deputies in either the Czech or Slovak National Council, for deputies to the Regional People's Committees (10 regions), for deputies to the District People's Committees (there are 120 districts including the cities of Prague and Bratislava) and for deputies to the 10,500 Local People's Committees.[59] Altogether, the people were asked to elect 204,929 deputies: 200 for the Czech National Council, 150 for the Slovak National Council, 1,522 for the Regional People's Committees, 11,261 for District Committees and 191,446 for the Local People's Committees.[60]

In places of over 5,000 population each voter received a "Voting Authorization Card," which was checked against the list of registered voters. In places of under 5,000 population, cards were not issued and the voter, if he were not recognized by any member of the election commission, had to present his identification card.[61] Any voter who moved after the publication of the voters' registration list, or who because of "important reasons" would be absent from the precinct where he was registered, was issued a "Certificate of the Right to Vote" which entitled him to vote wherever he found himself on election days. He could not however vote for the candidates in his own district but only for those whose names appeared on the ballots in the precinct in which he decided to vote.[62] In most cases, it is likely that he knew nothing about the candi-

[57] *Ibid.*
[58] *Pravda*, November 9, 1971.
[59] *Praca*, November 16, 1971.
[60] *Praca*, November 27, 1971.
[61] *Pravda*, November 16, 1971.
[62] *Pravda*, November 9, 1971.

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dates and their qualifications for the office they were seeking. At best, he probably recognized the names of one or two candidates for the office of deputy in the Federal Assembly or the National Council. This "absentee vote" cast for unknown candidates would seem to suggest that elections in Communist political systems do not mean simply the choosing of representatives to the various governmental bodies, but rather that they reflect "the need felt by every regime (even a one-party regime) for the popular endorsement and consent to its program no matter how unreal the conditions under which that endorsement [could] be produced."[63]

After presenting his authorization card, the voter received a number of ballots corresponding to the number of representative bodies for whose candidates he was to vote. This, as a rule, meant that the voter received six ballots (except in five larger cities where he received only five)[64]—a green ballot for the Chamber of People, blue for the Chamber of Nations, yellow for Czech or Slovak National Council, pink for regional, orange for district, and white for local People's Committees.[65] The voter then "with full guarantee of secrecy of the voting act"[66] could enter the privacy of the voting booth (or a room provided for that purpose), or he could simply fold his ballots and deposit them unmarked into the ballot box—thus casting his votes for the candidates of the National Front. In order to vote against a candidate, the voter had to cross out his name on the ballot. According to press reports, a majority of the voters did not bother with the election booth and deposited their folded ballots publicly in the ballot boxes. This public show of voting again suggests that elections in Communist political systems must be viewed from perspectives different from elections in Western democratic societies. The slogan "We love our country—we vote for a socialist future" seems to express the real meaning of elections in Communist societies—a ritualized "affirmation of regime legitimacy."[67]

After the polls closed, the precinct Election Commission in each

[63] Richard M. Scammon, "Why the Russians Bother With Elections," *The New York Times Magazine* (April 6, 1958), p. 14.

[64] In the cities of Prague and Bratislava, the local People's Committees constitute the Regional Committees, and the Area Committees are on the level of District Committees. In the cities of Plzen, Brno, and Kosice, the local committees are on the level of District Committees.

[65] *Pravda*, November 26, 1971.

[66] *Pravda*, November 16, 1971.

[67] Gilison, p. 814.

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precinct counted the votes. The election laws permit the presence of representatives of various political parties and organizations united in the National Front at the counting. The representatives of the mass media were also permitted if they received authorization from the Election Commission. The laws specify that the votes, and any complaints or problems arising out of the elections, must be properly recorded and reported to the election commission on the next higher level.[68] Thus the precinct Election Commission counts the votes and reports to a district commission, and the district commission in turn reports to a regional commission. The latter report to the Slovak or Czech Election Commission and these to the Central Election Commission of the National Front. There, under the supervision of the commission, clerks from the state statistical office tally and record the votes.[69]

A candidate is elected only if a majority of the registered voters in his election district participate in the election, and only if he receives a majority of the votes cast. This, of course, means that a candidate must receive a minimum of more than 25% of the votes of the registered voters. If for either of the two reasons a candidate does not get elected, a special election is held within 14 days. In case a vacancy occurs, because of death, resignation, or disqualification, a special election must be held within 90 days after the vacancy occurs. This rule does not apply, however, during the last year of the election term.[70]

### *Election Results*

Election results seemed to exceed even the most optimistic expectations, and surprised foreign observers as well as many persons in Czechoslovakia. This occurred despite frequent statements by Party and government officials during the pre-election campaign regarding the necessity of fighting the still-existing "right-wing and antisocialist" elements in the country. Dr. Husak's pre-election speech referred to people who could not accept developments in the country and were still hoping that "somewhere and somehow a crack will

[68] *Praca*, November 23, 1971.
[69] *Pravda*, November 17, 1971.
[70] *Praca*, November 24, 1971.

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open in the system to enable them to realize their antisocialist plans."[71] The reported election results suggest that a campaign launched from abroad, as well as by several underground groups at home, urging the people to boycott the election or to spoil their ballots[72] was unsuccessful; only about 40,000 voters cast invalid ballots and only 56,562 eligible voters did not vote. The regime credited the high participation and high percentage of votes cast for National Front candidates to the hard work of hundreds of thousands of people—party activists, trade-union members, youth groups and many others in the pre-election campaign.[73] It is possible also that the voters believed, as did some diplomatic observers, that "any sign of substantial opposition would strengthen the hands of hardline members of the Prague leadership against Dr. Gustav Husak's relatively moderate internal rule," and decided to cast their votes for the official candidates and for Husak's leadership.[74]

The Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and the Presidium of the Central Committee of the National Front in a joint announcement heralded the elections as a "spontaneous plebiscite of confidence of the Czechs and Slovaks and other nationalities in the policies of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and the National Front."[75]

According to reports of the Central Election Commission of the National Front, 10,197,234 of the 10,253,797 registered voters, or 99.45% participated in the elections. In the Czech Socialist Republic 99.41% voted, and in the Slovak Socialist Republic the turnout was 99.54%. The candidates for deputies in the Chamber of People received 99.81% of the valid votes cast and the candidates for deputies in the Chamber of Nations received 99.77% of valid votes. (See Table 1.) In local elections, the turnout was slightly lower. From the more than 200,000 candidates, only one did not get elected—a candidate for a local People's Committee somewhere in Slovakia.[76]

The Moscow *Pravda*, praising the election results, said that "so-

[71] *Praca*, November 25, 1971.
[72] *The New York Times*, November 26, 1971.
[73] *Praca*, December 2, 1971.
[74] *The New York Times*, November 26, 1971.
[75] *Pravda*, November 29, 1971.
[76] Ibid., also *Praca*, November 29, 1971.

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TABLE 1

*Voting for Deputies of the Federal Assembly*

| | *Registered Voters* | *Voting in Elections* | | *Voting for Deputies in Chamber of People* | | *Voting for Deputies in Chamber of Nation* | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | *No.* | *%* | *No.* | *%* | *No.* | *%* |
| Czechoslovak Socialist Republic | 10,253,796 | 10,197,234 | 99.45 | 10,153,572 | 99.81 | 10,144,464 | 99.77 |
| Czech Socialist Republic | 7,250,848 | 7,207,961 | 99.41 | 7,171,935 | 99.76 | 7,170,889 | 99.71 |
| Slovak Socialist Republic | 3,002,948 | 2,989,273 | 99.54 | 2,981,637 | 99.94 | 2,973,575 | 99.91 |

Source: Table compiled from data given in *Pravda*, November 29, 1971.

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cialist Czechoslovakia in an unprecedented unity cast its votes for the candidates of the National Front and voted for socialism and the policy of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia . . . for brotherly friendship, cooperation and close bonds with the Soviet Union and all other socialist countries."[77]

Dr. Husak, the Party leader, though referring to the election results as the final step in the process of political consolidation and normalization, nevertheless warned that the Party should not have any illusions that the 99% vote represented 99% of "class-conscious Marx-Leninist internationalists, who tomorrow could join the Communist Party," but should be regarded as proof that "the great majority of the working people support the policies of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia out of inner conviction."[78]

Whatever their reasons—inner conviction, social coercion, or hope for a better future, the people voted overwhelmingly for the candidates of the National Front and for the leadership and policies of the Communist Party. They thus created the "necessary conditions" which the regime says will enable it to overcome "stagnation in political and economic life."[79] It is also possible that the success at the polls will give Husak more room for maneuver in his dealings with the Soviet Union and other countries of the Warsaw Pact.

### *The Candidates*

The legal qualifications for candidates to representative bodies at all levels are very simple: any Czechoslovak citizen, regardless of nationality, religion, or social origins who reaches the age of 21 can become a candidate even for the highest legislative body—the Federal Assembly. This law, of course, is in sharp contrast to practices in many Western democracies where the age requirements for elective offices are much higher. In Belgium and in Italy, for example, a person has to be over 40 years of age to be eligible for candidacy to the Senate. In France and the United States, a candidate has to be 35 and 30 years old, respectively. In the newly

[77] *Pravda* (Moscow), November 29, 1971.

[78] *Pravda*, December 4, 1971.

[79] Dr. Husak in a pre-election speech (November 24, 1971), *Pravda*, November 25, 1971.

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TABLE 2

*Occupation by Age & Sex—Federal Assembly*

| | | Male | | Female | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Occ.* | *Age* | *No.* | *%* | *No.* | *%* |
| Blue | 21–40 | 19 | 5.4 | 5 | 1.4 |
| Collar | 41–60 | 16 | 4.6 | 4 | 1.1 |
| Skill. | 61–up | 0 | 0.0 | 0 | 0.0 |
| Blue | 21–40 | 11 | 3.1 | 21 | 6.0 |
| Collar | 41–60 | 7 | 2.0 | 20 | 5.7 |
| Unskill. | 61–up | 0 | 0.0 | 0 | 0.0 |
| White | 21–40 | 31 | 8.9 | 11 | 3.1 |
| Collar | 41–60 | 156 | 44.6 | 14 | 4.0 |
| | 61–up | 11 | 3.1 | 0 | 0.0 |
| Agriculture | 21–40 | 0 | 0.0 | 5 | 1.4 |
| | 41–60 | 2 | 0.6 | 4 | 1.1 |
| | 61–up | 0 | 0.0 | 0 | 0.0 |
| Other | 21–40 | 0 | 0.0 | 2 | 0.6 |
| | 41–60 | 4 | 1.1 | 2 | 0.6 |
| | 61–up | 4 | 1.1 | 1 | 0.3 |
| | | 261 | 74.5 | 89 | 25.3 |

elected Czechoslovakian Federal Assembly about 10% of the deputies are under 30 years of age, including a deputy who is 21.

Another requirement, as prescribed by the 1971 electoral laws, is that the candidates must be selected from among persons of high moral standards, politically progressive, "devoted to socialism" and "capable of uniting the creative forces of the working people."[80] The candidate does not need great financial resources in order to get elected. Once the person has the nomination, he is assured of the full support of the National Front, the Communist Party, the Election Commissions, the agitation teams, and the whole machinery of the state.

A closer look at the elected deputies in the Federal Assembly and in the Slovak and Czech National Councils reveals that about 25% of the deputies are women. (See Table 2 for the breakdown by age and sex.)

As far as the age of deputies is concerned, younger persons (21–40 years old) constitute 24% of the Chamber of People, 22.7% of

[80] *Rude Pravo*, July 19, 1971.

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the Chamber of Nations, 34% of the Slovak National Council and 30% of the Czech National Council. Interestingly, in the Chamber of People women of this age constitute a larger percentage (13.5%) than men (10.5%). However, in the Chamber of Nations and in the Slovak and Czech National Councils the opposite appears to be true.

A scarcity of information on the educational background of the deputies exists; only two basic categories were available—deputies with or without a doctoral degree or its equivalent. In the Chamber of People 63 deputies (60 men and 3 women) or 31.5% hold doctoral degrees or the equivalent as compared to only 32 (29 men and 3 females) or 21.3% in the Chamber of Nations. For the Slovak National Council and the Czech National Council the percentage of deputies with a doctoral degree or the equivalent is 24.7% and 22.5% respectively, while for the Federal Assembly as a whole the percentage is 27.7% Most of the deputies in this educational category are men between 41–60 years old (20.6% in the Federal Assembly, 19.3% in the Slovak National Council, and 18% in the Czech National Council).

Since the published lists of deputies elected to the Federal Assembly and to both National Councils gave the deputy's name, age, sex, academic degree (if any) and occupation held at election time, we were able to divide the deputies into the following occupational categories: 1. Blue collar-skilled; 2. blue collar-unskilled; 3. white collar (including professionals); 4. agricultural; and 5. others (such as retired persons and priests). Although both categories of blue collar workers have a substantial representation in the Federal Assembly (12.6% blue collar-skilled and 16.8% blue collar-unskilled), the majority of the deputies in that body (63.7%) are white collar workers. (See Table 2.) A similar situation exists in the Slovak and Czech National Councils.

Thus, while workers (blue collar-skilled, unskilled and agricultural) constitute 32.5% of the deputies in the Federal Assembly, most of them (53.5%) are between 21–40, and there is a tendency for women to fall in the unskilled worker category. Thus, sex was somewhat associated with occupation, though the association with skilled women workers was much less clear. A 2 x 2 table associating unskilled males and females compared with white collar

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workers of both sexes was significant at the .001 level (chi square = 88.40). Apparently, there was an attempt to satisfy the Fourteenth Party Congress directives requiring a higher representation of women, younger people, and workers on the representative bodies, by putting up for candidacy a selected number of younger unskilled female workers.

Even though both Chambers of the Federal Assembly are constitutionally equal, it seems that the Chamber of People is the more prestigious body since eight of the eleven-member Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia were elected to that chamber, as were four members of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Slovakia, while only two members of the Czechoslovak Presidium and one of the Slovak Presidium were elected to the Chamber of Nations. (The eleventh member of the Czechoslovak Presidium, Ludvik Svoboda, by virtue of his office—Presidency of the Republic—was not eligible for election to the Federal Assembly.) The more prestigious position of the Chamber of People is self-evident: not only the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, Dr. Husak, and seven other members of the Presidium sit in the Chamber of People, but also the Chairman of the Federal Government, Lubomir Strougal and the Chairman of the Federal Assembly, Alois Indra are deputies in that Chamber.

In the Slovak National Council we found that eight of the eleven members of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Slovak Communist Party, including the First Secretary, Jozef Lenart, are members of the Council. One deputy in the Slovak National Council, Peter Colotka, is at the same time a member of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Slovakia, Chairman of the Slovak National Council, Vice-Chairman of the Federal Government and a deputy in the Chamber of Nations. Another, Jozef Lenart, is at the same time deputy in the Chamber of People, member of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the National Front in the Slovak Socialist Republic.

Out of the 115-member Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, 37 were elected to the Chamber of People and 13 to the Chamber of Nations. Obviously, then, the Chamber of People is the more sought after group—at least among the Communist elite.

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## *Conclusion*

The November, 1971, elections in Czechoslovakia appear to have constituted an overwhelming success for the Communist Party and the National Front, and to reflect the consolidation of Husak's power. We can ask, however, what other functions did the elections perform besides electing the deputies to the representative bodies. "Simply because elections have the same institutional characteristics in different countries, it does not follow that their functional significance is comparable."[81] In Western democracies, as noted earlier, elections are expected to involve choice of parties, choice of candidates, and choice of policies, while in the Communist countries there is an absence of competition, and the voters are presented with either a single slate of candidates or with competing slates of candidates presented by parties and mass organizations which fully support the policies of the leading Communist Party. Such a noncompetitive system and its elections are viewed in Western democracies as undemocratic or simply as a means of legitimizing the regime in power and thus performing a system-maintenance function. Communist countries nevertheless regard the single candidacy as "one" among the "proved political principles of elections,"[82] and a way of selecting from among the people "the best qualified, the most devoted to the interest of the people—those who can prove that they will work to their best and will administer the affairs of the state to the benefits of all . . . "[83]

It is certain that the National Front in Czechoslovakia could find two or three reliable candidates for each elective post and thus present a façade of competitive elections. That they choose not to do so may indicate that they see the single candidacy as giving the people an adequate opportunity to participate in candidate selection and that it corresponds to their view of the class structure of society.

As is true in Western democracies, elections in the Communist countries serve a number of purposes and perform many functions. Rose and Mossavir list the functions voting performs for the individual voter under six broad categories, and give six functions

[81] Richard Rose and Harve Mossawir, "Voting and Elections: A Functional Analysis," *Political Studies* XV (June, 1967), 177.

[82] *Praca*, September 14, 1971.

[83] M. Nemecek, "Elections—Reflection of Socialist Democracy: A Real Government by the People," *Praca*, September 25, 1971.

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that elections perform in a political system.[84] Some of these functions are applicable to the Communist political systems as well. If the press reports of the early mass turnout and the festive mood at the polling places are credible, one would have to say that elections did have an "emotional significance" for the people and that they contributed to the "development of maintaining an individual's allegiance." Thus, the act of voting in Communist political systems is, to be sure, a civic ritual, but the 1971 Czechoslovak elections seemed clearly to legitimize the regime, since they appeared at best to be a public display of personal reaffirmation of the policies and the leadership of the Communist Party and the National Front. At a minimum they seemed to signify the cessation of obvious hostility toward the regime.

### *Significance*

The meaning of the 1971 elections in the latter respect becomes apparent because Czechoslovakia went through a crisis period in 1968–69. The elections were regarded by the leadership as a final step in the consolidation process. This was long and difficult because of the high level of popularity enjoyed by Dubcek and his democratization process, the hostility toward the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact countries because of their intervention in Czechoslovakia, and the replacement of Dubcek by Husak, who, while respected and liked in Slovakia, was not overly popular among the Czechs given his strong Slovak nationalism. Thus, on the one hand, Husak had to face hostility from the supporters of the formerly popular Dubcek, and on the other hand he was confronted with a constant pressure by the Soviets to "normalize" the domestic situation and to restore the Party to a position of leadership and

[84] The categories of functions for the voters are: 1. Choice of governors or major governmental policies; 2. exchange of influence with the office-holders and candidates; 3. development or maintenance of an individual's allegiance to the existing regime; 4. development or maintenance of voter's disaffection; 5. emotional significance for individuals; 6. functionlessness, i.e. devoid of any emotional consequences. The functions voting performs for the political system fall into the following categories: 1. Providing leadership succession; 2. controlling policy decisions of government; 3. influencing policy decisions; 4. securing the legitimation of a regime or maintaining legitimacy; 5. repudiation of a regime; 6. elections may tend toward being functionless. Rose and Mossawir, 174–179.

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control. The elections were but a last step in rallying the people's support behind the policies and the leadership of the Party and performed a positive unifying function in the previously divided country. The tremendous effort to involve as many persons as possible in the election campaign, was designed to give them a feeling of participation in the affairs of the state. Husak reflected the official view when he said: "Elections in our country mean the involvement of millions of people in the basic social problems."[85]

The elections also helped to rebuild the image of Czechoslovakia as a loyal member of the "socialist commonwealth" and thus in a sense performed an international system-maintenance function.

The results of the elections demonstrate that Czechoslovakia is politically consolidated, the Party is in full control and has reassumed its leading role in society. This situation is of great importance if we accept the proposition that one of the main reasons for Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968 was the conviction of the Soviet leadership that under Dubcek the Party lost, or was in the process of losing, its position of leadership, and was unable to control the "anti-socialist and rightist elements" in the country. Whether this analysis was true or not is not really important; what is important is that the Soviet leadership believed it to be true and that the Czechoslovak leadership also admitted it to be true at a later date. Dr. Husak at the Fourteenth Party Congress said clearly that during the 1968–69 crisis the leadership of the Party failed, the Party became disorganized, divided ideologically and politically and ceased to be the leading force in the society. "The Party," said Dr. Husak, "became ideologically disarmed" and was unable to cope with the activities of rightist and anti-socialist forces."[86] There is evidence that such forces were at work in Czechoslovakia during the "Prague Spring."[87] After censorship was removed, Czechoslovakia erupted in an orgy of free expression and the disorganized and disunited Party leadership was unable to control even the pens of its own Party journalists, not to speak of non-Party press such as *Literarni Listy* (the weekly of the Czechoslovak Writers' Union), *Kulturny Zivot* (the weekly of the Slo-

[85] *Pravda*, November 25, 1971.

[86] *XIV. Zjazd Komunistickej Strany Ceskoslovenska* (Bratislava, 1971), 24.

[87] For example, see articles appearing in *Literarni Listy*, especially during May and June of 1968.

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vak Writers' Union) or *Smena*, (the youth daily in Slovakia) in which leading journalists and publicists attacked the Party. They also called for a genuine competitive party system, even criticized the Party's relationship to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and opposed the close friendship and dependence upon the USSR and the other countries of the Warsaw Pact.[88]

Since Husak took over the reins of the Party from Dubcek in April of 1969, he has been working hard to re-establish the Party's leading role and to unite the Party ideologically. After cleansing the Party of some 350,000 "undesirables," and after consolidating his position as the undisputed leader of the Party, he was able to claim at the 14th Party Congress in May 1971, that once again "the Party became the leading force of our socialist society and a strong member of the international Communist movement."[89]

The November 1971 elections served Husak as a means of proving that the country was consolidated and that the Party was in full control. It was in this spirit that the elaborate preparations for the elections were organized and the elections conducted. These elections gave legitimacy to Husak's regime, not only at home, but also among Warsaw Pact nations.

[88] Ladislav Hrzal, "Demokraticky socialismus a vedouci uloha strany," *Nova Myśl*, XXIII, No. 10 (1969), 1169.

[89] *XIV. Zjazd Komunistickej Strany Ceskoslovenska*, 14.

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# Governor Alfred E. Smith and the Red Scare, 1919-20

DAVID R. COLBURN

With the ending of World War I, Americans looked forward to a period of peace, security and normalcy. But social tensions actually increased in the years 1919 and 1920. American fears were nourished by the emergence of radicalism abroad and the seeming possibility of a Bolshevik revolution in their own midst. In New York the state legislature expelled five of its duly elected members because they were members of the Socialist party and passed six anti-sedition bills restricting civil liberties.

Among the first public figures to speak out against the Red Scare furor was New York's Governor Alfred E. Smith, a fact little noted in existing studies. Smith not only opposed the reactionary wave of public feeling—he condemned the expulsion of the socialists and vetoed the anti-sedition bills—but he also implemented a series of laws which helped ease the discontent among New York's lower classes and diminish the long-term appeal of the Communist party.

## I

Events contributing to the Red Scare began in March, 1919 when the Russian government organized the Third International as a ve-

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hicle for promoting worldwide revolution. During the rest of that year communism made significant gains in Germany, Hungary and along the Soviet border. A Communist party was also organized in the United States and its leaders called for the violent overthrow of the government. Despite these successes, communism actually presented no real threat to the United States. The Communist party was a very small, uninfluential organization, and the International Workers of the World, an extremist labor union, had all but collapsed during the war. The Socialist party was the sole left-wing organization of any consequence to survive World War I, but its ranks were sorely depleted and its morale quite low.[1]

Thus, the size and vigor of the radical movement in America were not prime causative factors in the Red Scare of 1919-1920. Rather, American insecurity stemmed in large part from the postwar economic dislocation which coincided with other distressing factors, specifically, bomb scares, violent labor strife and the renewed outpouring of radical literature. As Stanley Coben has surmised, the postwar economic and social turbulence left Americans "extraordinarily susceptible to psychological stress."[2] Emotionally drained by World War I, Americans had expected that the postwar world would be calm and prosperous. Instead, they found their country mired in a severe economic recession and confronted by an enemy far more dangerous than Kaiser Germany.

Americans were ill-prepared to deal with such a situation. In their anxiety over the menace of radicalism, they swung out wildly to smash this new threat to their security. They applauded the illegal imprisonment and deportation of alleged Bolsheviks. The evangelist Billy Sunday mirrored the public's attitude toward Communists when he stated: "If I had my way, I'd fill the jail so full of them that their feet would stick out the windows. . . . Let them rule? We'll swim our horses in blood up to the bridle first."[3] Statements by public officials only accentuated society's fears. J. Edgar Hoover, then head of the Justice Department's General Intelligence

[1] The left wing of the Socialist party had seceded in September 1919 and organized the Communist party and Communist Labor party.

[2] Stanley Coben, "A Study of Nativism: The American Red Scare of 1919–20," *Political Science Quarterly*, LXXXIX (March 1964), 63.

[3] Seattle *Post Intelligencer*, May 3, 1919, 1; also quoted in Robert K. Murray, *Red Scare, A Study in National Hysteria, 1919–1920.* (Minneapolis, 1955), 83.

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Division, declared that at least fifty percent of the influence behind the nation's labor strikes was traceable to Communist agents.[4] Near public panic ensued when bombs were sent through the mails to Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, John D. Rockefeller, and thirty-one other prominent citizens.

The atmosphere in New York reflected the state of national feeling. A man who applauded the policies of the Bolshevik regime in Russia during a film documentary at the Strand Theater was beaten senseless by the audience and then arrested by the police for inciting a breach of the peace.[5] The fears of New Yorkers were further agitated by the millions of recent immigrants from southern and eastern Europe. Their Catholic and Jewish religion, peculiar social customs and strange languages rekindled the nativism of World War I. Mrs. Thacher Guernsey, president-general of the Daughters of the American Revolution, declared, "Nothing will save the life of this free Republic if these foreign leeches are not cut and cast out." Even businessmen were modifying their view of immigration as nativism increased in temper. In a letter to the editor of the *New York Times*, one businessman wrote: "We need immigration; the more the better, but it must be the right kind of immigration."[6]

A feeling of malaise, provoked by the Red Scare, gripped New York in 1919 and 1920, a feeling that sorely perplexed Governor Alfred E. Smith and which he sought to abrogate throughout his first gubernatorial term. An astute politician who had come up through the ranks of Tammany Hall, he realized that the reactionary wave of public opinion would bring innovative government to a halt. He was particularly aware that it would undermine his reform program. Smith also opposed the Red Scare sentiment for personal reasons. A descendent of Irish and Italian immigrants and a resident of New York's Lower East Side, he vigorously objected to the charge that many immigrants were agents of the Bolsheviks.

One of the great failings of earlier studies of the Red Scare is the

[4] *New York Times*, April 25, 1920, 23.

[5] *Ibid.*, September 8, 1919, 28.

[6] National Society of the Daughters of the American Revolution, *Report, 1919–20*, 21; also quoted in John Higham, *Strangers in the Land; Patterns of American Nativism, 1860–1925*. (New York, 1965), 227, 228. *Times*, August 21, 1919, 10.

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lack of attention Smith has received. Charles Evans Hughes, former governor of New York from 1907-1911 and Republican presidential candidate in 1916, has generally been credited by historians as the man most responsible for the abatement of the Red Scare in New York.[7] While Hughes's role should not be minimized, Smith, as governor, was certainly in a much more critical position to influence the climate of opinion. Miss Mary Dreier, chairman of the Women's Legislative Conference, remarked after the easing of Red Scare tensions: "We owe it to the good sense of the Governor that we are now a free people and not half slaves."[8]

## II

Smith had been elected governor in 1918 in something of an upset over the incumbent, Republican Charles S. Whitman. His election marked the high point of a career that saw him overcome an impoverished background and a rudimentary education. As a self-made man, Smith was very proud of his success in life, and also very proud and staunch in his support of America's democratic institutions. His work with the Factory Investigating Commission, appointed in the wake of the disastrous Triangle fire, had convinced him, however, that these institutions had to be modified if the injustices faced by the working classes and their families were to be remedied. Smith's own personal experience and awareness of their plight committed him to their well-being.

[7] See Merlo J. Pusey, *Charles Evans Hughes* 2 vols. (New York, 1951) I, 391–94; William E. Leuchtenburg, *The Perils of Prosperity, 1914–32.* (Chicago, 1958) 79; Higham, 233; John M. Blum et al. *The National Experience.* 2 vols., Second Ed. (New York, 1968), II, 619; Samuel Eliot Morison, *The Oxford History of the American People* (New York, 1965), 883–84. Also see Murray, 243–44, and Thomas E. Vadney, "The Politics of Repression; A Case Study of the Red Scare in New York," *New York History,* XLIX (January 1968), 62–63, 67–68. Both authors credit Smith with denouncing the suspension, but each contends that Hughes's statements and activities were much more influential in easing the Red Scare alarm in New York. John P. Roche in *The Quest for the Dream* (New York, 1963) notes the important role Smith played in calming tensions. Julian F. Jaffe in *Crusade Against Radicalism: New York During the Red Scare, 1914–1924* (Port Washington, 1972) also mentions Smith's denunciation of the suspension in his veto of the Lusk bill, but fails to see any significance in these actions.

[8] *Times,* August 26, 1920, 2.

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His inaugural message to the legislature in January 1919 demonstrated his determination to improve their lot. He urged the legislature to protect women and children in industry, eliminate illiteracy, create a minimum-wage commission, extend workmen's compensation benefits, and establish health and maternity insurance. He argued that "the weak and helpless should be protected against exploitation and oppression and given the opportunity to enjoy those material and spiritual blessings which alone make life worth living."[9] Within a month's time he recommended several specific bills to accomplish these goals and appointed a Reconstruction Commission to seek other solutions to postwar poverty and unemployment.

Smith had no sooner settled into his routine as governor when public agitation over bolshevism began. The people's fear of radicalism threatened to cripple his reform program. During 1920, for instance, certain business groups and the Republican party exploited the Red Scare to stymie many of Smith's recommendations. Mark Daly, chief lobbyist for the Manufacturer's Association, seized upon the fears of the people to create a League of Americanization which used patriotism to denounce an eight-hour day, a living wage, and workmen's compensation bills. Daly and the Manufacturer's Association apparently had the support of Republican Speaker Thaddeus Sweet, who was allegedly demoting and punishing assemblymen for refusing to kill bills opposed by the Daly lobby. As early as January 1919 Sweet had characterized Smith's program as "Bolshevik and socialistic."[10] Senator Clayton R. Lusk, Republican member of the Senate from upstate Cortland, supplied the rationale for assault on Smith's welfare measures contending that "it is all part of a German propaganda effort to break down the United States Government."[11]

Smith tried unsuccessfully to lessen fears of a proletarian revolution and undermine the opposition of Sweet and his colleagues by taking steps to ease the labor turmoil in the state. He appointed a

[9] *Public Papers of Governor Alfred E. Smith of New York, 1919* (New York, 1920), 35.

[10] "Reconstruction in State Politics," *Nation*, CVIII (January 11, 1919), 38.

[11] Belle Zeller, *Pressure Politics in New York* (New York, 1937) 53; *Times*, March 23, 1920, 1, 2; *Ibid.*, March 24, 1920, 17.

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State Labor Board of nine members—three employers, three employees and three citizens—to mediate all labor disputes. He also urged labor's cooperation for at least six months until New York could adjust to postwar economic conditions. Thereafter he promised his support in helping the employees secure rightful wage increases and other benefits. Smith personally regarded labor strikes as an inconvenience to everyone. He frequently remarked that "there is really nothing to be gained by that [strike]—it is a loss to the laborer and it is a loss to the manufacturer. It is a waste of time and a waste of money that can never be made up."[12] The workers respected Smith because of his Lower East Side origins and his support of numerous labor laws as an assemblyman. Nevertheless, they were unwilling to postpone their demands. During 1918 and 1919 nearly one thousand strikes occurred in New York City, many of which were violent.[13]

The numerous labor strikes and sporadic bombings in New York made the atmosphere overwhelmingly oppressive. So in May 1919 Smith signed into law a measure outlawing the display of the Red Flag at any public assembly or parade. He permitted motion picture cameras to film the signing to demonstrate to the public that the state was taking action to suppress radicalism.[14] The law calmed no one. Fears remained at a fever pitch as labor strikes and labor violence continued unabated.

In New York City, where a large immigrant population bolstered the thinning ranks of the Socialist party, nativism was especially virulent. New Yorkers demanded that the radicals be weeded out of society and returned to their native shores. Smith was aware of the growing influence of communism and socialism among the immigrant classes. However, he believed the public should not react hostilely but "in a spirit of sanity, a thorough and sympathetic understanding and a fearless and courageous meeting of their needs."[15] He endeavored to reduce nativist alarm by stressing the great contributions the Irish, Italians, Poles and Jews had made to American society. He proclaimed an Irish, Italian and Polish day to honor

[12] *New York Tribune*, January 31, 1919, 1; *Times*, January 31, 1919, 7; *Ibid.*, August 27, 1919, 2; *Public Papers, 1919*, 763.

[13] *Times*, July 20, 1919, II, 2; *Ibid.*, September 21, 1919, IV, 1.

[14] *Tribune*, May 8, 1919, 1; *Times*, May 18, 1919, I, 12.

[15] *Public Papers, 1920*, 31; Higham, 255.

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the accomplishments of each group in America. When the Jewish inhabitants of New York's Lower East Side came under heavy criticism for allegedly supplying many leaders of Bolshevik Russia, Smith came immediately to their defense. He was present to welcome Jewish soldiers home from France, and on such occasions he emphasized the important contributions New York Jews had made to the war effort.[16]

Nevertheless, public apprehension, abetted by bombings in the state and exaggerated reports of Communist subversion, continued to mount at a hectic pace. Heeding society's demands for stronger state action, the New York legislature created in May 1919 a committee under the chairmanship of Clayton R. Lusk to investigate Bolshevik and other radical activities in the state. Following the example set nationally by Attorney General Palmer, the Lusk committee ignored civil liberties and constitutional canons. Raids were conducted against purported Bolshevik headquarters and homes, arrests were made, documents were confiscated and aliens were deported. When the committee was criticized by press and public for its high-handed activities, Lusk responded that the Red Menace was so widespread that such steps were necessary to preserve state and national security. In June 1919, after an extensive raid, Lusk declared that police evidence revealed fifty radical newspapers in circulation in New York with over 500,000 subscribers. Such exaggerated reports helped increase the importance of the committee and its investigations, and to stifle criticism.[17] There was just enough radicalism, bombings and violent strikes to lend credence to Lusk's contention that a proletarian revolution had begun.[18]

Lusk committee investigations also badly influenced the legislative program of Governor Smith. With increasing public fears over bolshevism, it appeared that his program to assist the poor and working classes would be defeated. The Republican majority had

[16] *Public Papers, 1920*, 10, 13, 369; *Times*, February 17, 1919, 4; *Ibid.*, April 18, 1919, 9.

[17] *Tribune*, June 12, 13, 1919, 1; *Times* June 4, 1919, II, 2. The committee also alleged that the pacifist movement was an integral part of international bolshevism. *Revolutionary Radicalism: Its History, Purpose and Tactics*, 4 vols. (Albany, 1920) I, 7.

[18] *Times*, July 20, 1919, II, 2; *Ibid.*, July 27, 1919, III, 1; *Tribune*, June 3, 1919, 1; *Ibid.*, November 20, 1919, 1; *New York World*, September 17, 1920, 1.

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shown no inclination to act upon his measures; in fact, they claimed that support for his legislation would only further the cause of socialism in America.

In presenting his second message to the legislature in 1920, Smith and his staff sought to diminish the reactionary sentiment in the state and to build support for his program. He urged the American public to avoid the mistake of branding all protestors as Bolsheviks. He agreed that violence and anarchy should be vigorously suppressed by the state, but he argued that nonviolent radicalism could be dispelled only by a comprehensive reform program aimed at eradicating society's ills and evils. Repressive action, Smith continued, would only alienate the discontented and drive them to the doors of bolshevism. He called upon the legislature to enact a series of reform measures: a minimum wage commission, a forty-eight hour work week for women and children, a health and maternity insurance fund, and a broader health and welfare program. Such a program he declared, "will make . . . [the discontented] understand and respect the ideals of America and make them feel at home."[19]

Since 1920 was an election year and the Republicans were determined to defeat Smith's re-election bid, there appeared little chance for passage of the governor's recommendations. In fact, opposition to Smith's program of moderate response to radicalism formed with dramatic suddenness. No sooner had the Assembly been called to order following the governor's message, when Simon L. Adler, the majority leader, rose and asked Speaker Thaddeus Sweet's permission to introduce a resolution. Waiting for complete silence, Adler read a statement charging the Socialist party of America with deliberately formulating principles and platforms that were "inimical to the best interests of the United States of America and the State of New York." He then moved that the five socialist assemblymen be suspended pending further Assembly investigation of their activities for the Socialist movement.[20]

Speaker Sweet asked the five socialists, Samuel Orr, August Claessens, Louis Waldman, Samuel DeWitt and Charles Solomon,

[19] *Journal of the Senate of the State of New York*, 143 Sess. (Albany, 1920) II, 5.

[20] *Journal of the Assembly of the State of New York* (hereinafter cited as *Journal*), 143 Sess. (Albany, 1920), I, 21; Louis Waldman, *Labor Lawyer* (New York, 1945), 90–94.

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all of New York City, to stand and accompany the Sergeant-at-Arms to the speaker's rostrum. There, in the well of the Assembly, in full view of their legislative colleagues, families and friends, the five men were charged with disloyalty to the state and nation. Sweet quoted excerpts from several resolutions and manifestos of the Socialist party which, he claimed, proved the subversive and unpatriotic nature of the organization and its solidarity with the Soviet Union. Charles Solomon made two attempts to respond to the charges but was repelled both times; finally he was escorted forceably to his seat. The remaining four persons were then paraded back to their seats for the vote on the ouster resolution. The vote was overwhelming, 140 to 6; they were suspended.[21]

The suspension charges had been prepared quietly by State Attorney General Charles D. Newton as counsel for the Lusk committee. This sentencing occurred despite the fact that the Socialist party was a duly constituted party and recognized as such by the New York state board of elections. Furthermore, the five legislators had been legitimately elected by their constituents in Manhattan, the Bronx and Kings counties. Indeed, all but one of the five socialists (Samuel DeWitt) had sat in the state legislature during the war years without anyone expressing concern for national security. However, the psychological impact of the Red Scare was so great that any person or group expounding ideas the least bit suspect were automatically equated with Bolshevism and all the attendant horrors that word brought to mind.

Speaker of the Assembly Thaddeus Sweet attempted to capitalize on these emotions in furtherance of his political ambitions. He seems to have had visions of himself as governor of New York. (As early as 1919 the *New York Times* reported that he had his eye on the governorship.) However, he desperately needed an important issue or event such as the suspension of the five socialists to enhance himself to the voting public and to launch himself into the governorship. Despite his position as speaker and his many years in politics, he was barely known outside his native Oswego County, a small, rural province. Working closely with Senator Lusk and

[21] *Journal*, I, 21-25. According to legislative law, each house had the power to determine the qualifications of its members and to expel any member it so desired. *New York Legislative Documents*. 143 Sess., Number 35, XIII, 2450-51.

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Attorney General Newton, Sweet assisted in preparation of the charges against the five assemblymen. Undoubtedly he was concerned about the threat of bolshevism. Yet the political considerations appear to have been the decisive factor in determining his course of action.[22]

Initially, Sweet's plan seemed to promise success. The legislators had voted overwhelmingly to suspend the socialists. Of the six votes cast against the suspension resolution, four had been cast by the socialists themselves (Louis Waldman refused to take part in what he regarded as an illegal proceeding). The other two assemblymen voting against the proposal were representatives of large socialist districts in the Bronx. The temper of New York's citizenry and its elected officials in 1920 was such that events might well have gone far beyond the suspension of five socialists. Indeed, Louis Culvillier, a Democratic Assemblyman from Manhattan, said that if the five socialists were guilty of the charges against them, they should "not be expelled but shot." Other legislators urged the enactment of laws which would have virtually wrapped the state and its citizens in a strait jacket.[23]

The Assembly's suspension of the socialists was heartily praised by many public leaders and newspaper editors. The *New York Times*, for example, not only defended the Assembly's decision but declared that if the constituents of the unseated Assemblymen intended to be Americans, they must "conform to American laws."[24] However, for the first time since the onset of the Red Scare, New Yorkers and Americans began to question seriously the hysteria generated by bolshevism. Among the first to condemn the action of the legislature was Governor Smith. In carefully reasoned words, he decried the Assembly's action:

Although I am unalterably opposed to the fundamental principles

[22] For a more detailed analysis of Speaker Thaddeus Sweet's role in the suspension of the five socialists see Vadney, 56-75.

[23] *Tribune*, January 21, 1920, 1. Senator Walter W. Law, Jr. introduced an antisedition bill providing for a fine up to $10,000 and a sentence of up to twenty years for acts and statements against the state government of New York. *Times*, January 20, 1920, 1. Senator Julius Miller of Manhattan introduced a bill making it a felony to teach, publish or advocate any doctrine or theory designed to effect government change by other than constitutional means. *Times*, January 8, 1920, 1.

[24] *Times*, September 23, 1920, 12.

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> of the Socialist Party, it is inconceivable that a minority party, duly constituted and legally organized, should be deprived of its right to expression so long as it has honestly, by lawful methods . . . succeeded in securing representation.

Calling for a more rational approach to the problem of radicalism in general, he concluded: "Our faith in American Democracy is confirmed not only by its results, but by its methods and organs of free expression."[25]

## III

Smith was convinced that the socialists did not pose any grave threat to American institutions. He had first gravitated toward this position in 1912 when a socialist was elected to the Assembly. At that time Republican Speaker Edwin A. Merritt asked Smith, then minority leader, what he would do with this man if he were speaker. Smith suggested recognizing him as a party leader, assigning him to the best committees and letting him see how the Assembly operated. Merritt took his advice and Smith recalled that once the socialist member found that nothing could happen in the Assembly without seventy-six votes, then a majority, he discarded his radical stance.[26] Smith had also served with socialists on the New York City Board of Aldermen, and had gradually come to respect their opinions.

The governor's criticism and the vigorous efforts of Charles Evans Hughes[27] failed to stir the legislators who refused to reseat the five socialists. On April 1, 1920, after conducting investigations and hearings into the background of each socialist, the legislature voted overwhelmingly to expel them from office. Smith was asked subsequently by S. John Block, counsel for the expelled socialists,

[25] *Public Papers, 1920,* 581. In his article on the Red Scare in New York, Vadney argues persuasively that the suspension of the five socialists signaled a decline in Red Scare hysteria. While he is probably correct, the hysteria did not totally disappear as is evidenced by the public's reaction to the Wall Street bombing on September 16, 1920. See *Times, Tribune, Sun, World* issues of September 17, 18, 1920.

[26] Alfred E. Smith, *Up to Now: An Autobiography* (New York, 1928) 112, 157.

[27] Hughes persuaded the Bar Association of the City of New York to join him in protesting the ouster proceedings. He also made several public addresses around the state criticizing the Assembly's action.

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to call for new elections in the five districts. The governor informed Block the following day that under the law he could not call for new elections when a legislative vacancy occurred on or after April 1.[28] Rumors circulated in several newspapers that the Democrats in the Assembly had blocked a vote on the expulsion resolution until April to spare Smith the political embarrassment of calling for new elections in the five New York City districts. Several Democrats believed that Smith had weakened his re-election chances in 1920 and the Democratic party by condemning the suspension of the socialists, and that a call for new elections in the five districts, especially if the socialists were re-elected, would do irreparable damage to the governor and the party. It seems more likely, however, that the Republicans and Democrats who pushed the suspension and expulsion of the socialists wanted to avoid the ordeal of going through the same procedure twice in the same year. Indeed, four months later, Smith decided to call the legislature into special session due to a housing crisis in New York City, and, according to the state law which defined a special session as a new session, issued a call for new elections in the five vacant districts. All five socialists were re-elected. Whereupon the Assembly, apparently concerned about growing public reaction to the initial suspension and its meaning for the November elections, expelled only the three socialists considered most radical: Waldman, Solomon and Claessens. DeWitt and Orr were allowed to keep their seats, but both men resigned immediately, refusing to serve without their colleagues.[29]

After the initial suspension of the socialists in April, the legislature, under the leadership of Clayton Lusk and members of his Committee on the Investigation of Bolshevism moved to suppress all forms of radicalism and nonconformity in New York. Six bills were drafted by this committee to bar socialists from holding public office, prohibit a Socialist ticket from appearing on the ballot box, establish a loyalty oath for teachers, close private schools operating without a license from the State Board of Regents, create a special bureau for investigating criminal anarchy, and change pro-

[28] *Journal*, 143 Sess. II, 1387-93; *Ibid.*, Sess. IV, 33-40, 51-62. The vote went against Waldman 115 to 28; against Claessens and Solomon 116 to 28; against Orr and DeWitt 104 to 40.

[29] *Public Papers*, 1920, 15-18.

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cedures by which legislators take the state oath of office. These antisedition bills were aimed at stamping out revolutionary dissent in New York; they also impinged severely on each citizen's constitutional rights. Nevertheless, at the close of the session, the legislature, with the support of many Democrats, passed the six bills overwhelmingly.[30]

Smith announced shortly thereafter that he would hold a public hearing in his chamber on the antisedition bills. This procedure provided him with a personal perspective on the legislation. Smith enjoyed mediating between opposing partisan groups infinitely more than reading dry pieces of legislation. Public hearings also allowed him to appear as an impartial observer on highly controversial measures, carefully weighing the strengths and weaknesses of the bills, while at the same time affecting the position of the bills' proponents by judicious cross-examination. This tactic was effective in dealing with the antisedition legislation. For example, when one of the bills' supporters sought to win the Governor's endorsement by reading graphic excerpts from *Married Love*, a socialist textbook, Smith replied: "Why get new laws? There are enough laws to suppress that."[31]

Once the hearings had been completed Smith called upon Joseph Proskauer, an aide, lawyer and close friend also reared on the Lower East Side, to draft the veto message. Proskauer wrote a detailed defense of civil liberties quoting Thomas Jefferson, Benjamin Franklin and Alexis de Tocqueville. When Smith delivered the veto message, the quote from de Tocqueville was noticeably missing. That evening Smith said to his secretary Belle Moskowitz: "Tell Joe I'm supposed to know Ben Franklin. I'm supposed to know Thomas Jefferson. But if I used that quotation from that French ———, ——— everyone would know that Al Smith never wrote that message."[32]

The governor's veto message presented a compelling argument for the continuance of a free society in America. He asserted that the bills made no allowance "for the difference of opinion, for the right

[30] *Tribune*, May 15, 1920, 1; *Times*, May 15, 1920, 1.
[31] *Sun*, May 15, 1920, 4; *Times*, May 15, 1920, 1.
[32] Joseph M. Proskauer, *A Segment of My Times* (New York, 1950), 46.

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of every citizen to advocate his own opinion lawfully and honestly, and most of all for the fact that real progress comes from the expression and exchange of conflicting opinions." He added, "It is a confession of the weakness of our faith in the righteousness of our cause when we attempt to suppress by law those who do not agree with us." He termed a charge made by the Deputy Attorney General that many teachers were disloyal "ridiculous," adding that education would be of no consequence if the teachers were deprived of their freedom of thought and expression.[33]

Smith regarded education as one of the most important functions of the state. In his eyes, if the state could spend $150,000,000 for a canal and $100,000,000 for good roads, it could certainly spend that much for education, "without which neither canal nor roads would be worth a quarter."[34] He believed that education served the dual purpose of providing the country with an intelligent populace and serving as as an effective barrier against socialism. During the signing of a new education bill, Smith remarked:

> I regard education as the best remedy for the mistaken or false political conceptions. In the language of Thomas Jefferson: "Error of opinion may be tolerated when reason is left free to combat it," and the best way to meet the evils of ultra-radical agitation is with reason which proper education supplies.[35]

Most immigrants, however, were too busy making a living to take advantage of the educational opportunities. Hampered by ignorance and illiteracy, they had a difficult time understanding American government and politics.[36] In this respect they had a greater rapport with the socialists whose ideas had been rather widespread in their former homelands. To reach these newcomers, Smith proposed establishing courses of instruction in English, history and civics in factories and other places of employment. These and other courses were also offered in evening schools across the state.[37]

[33] *Public Papers, 1920*, 367-370; *Times*, June 1, 1920, 20.

[34] *Times*, June 1, 1920, 20.

[35] *Public Papers, 1920*, 415.

[36] A commission appointed by Smith reported that there were approximately 400,000 illiterates in New York over the age of ten, the vast majority of whom were immigrants. *Public Papers, 1920*, 415.

[37] Alfred E. Smith, *Progressive Democracy: Addresses and State Papers of Alfred E. Smith* (New York, 1928) 272; *Public Papers, 1920*, 415.

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## IV

While Smith provided New York with a sane, moderate response to the Red Scare, he did resort on occasion to stringent measures toward the Bolsheviks, whom he regarded as a decided threat to America. In his eyes there was a clear distinction between a socialist and a Bolshevik. The former was willing to work within the system to achieve change while the latter did not hesitate to resort to violence and revolution to further his cause. When the Bolsheviks held a banquet welcoming Ludwig C.A.K. Martens, the self-styled Soviet Ambassador, to New York in April 1919, Smith ordered an inquiry by the District Attorney and the police department to determine whether the law prohibiting seditious statements had been violated. To counteract Bolshevik propaganda he proclaimed a "law and order" Sunday, at which time he encouraged clergymen, newspapermen and laymen to extoll the virtues of the United States. Less than three weeks later he issued another proclamation declaring the week of February 22 as loyalty week, and again requested all public officials to join in denouncing the "insidious and destructive propaganda" of the Bolsheviks.[38]

These steps by Smith were on the whole, however, the exception rather than the rule. True, he offered the Bolsheviks "education or the nightstick," but that was a much better offer than they received from most public officials.[39] United States Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer, for instance, conducted raids into homes and meeting halls, arrested alleged Bolsheviks on charges of sedition, imprisoned many of them without bail, and deported them without a hearing.

Even more important to the citizenry of New York, Smith refused to allow his reform program to be buried beneath the demands for conformity. At a time when most governors resorted to the police power of the state and called upon their citizens "to rally around the flag," Smith implemented a program which helped to alleviate the sources of discontent among New York's lower classes and thereby diminished a fertile source of Bolshevik manpower. In fact, his efforts to diminish the alarm over radicalism were essen-

[38] *Times*, April 25, 1919, 13; *Public Papers*, 1920, 6, 8.
[39] *Times*, June 21, 1919, 13.

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tially indirect. He endeavored to show the public that they could eliminate the threat of communism by removing the social inequities in New York. It was his belief that the state could not stop disorder and discontent "by defeating legislation in an indirect way and by throwing four or five men out of the Assembly."[40] He told the public that they "must recognize the necessity of a sound program of social, industrial and governmental betterment, which will remove those causes of discontent which true Americanism requires should be eradicated." He called upon Republicans to assist him in the formulation and passage of a reform program. "I am one of the easiest men to sit down with. I am well supplied with good cigars. I will take them all over to the Capitol and sit down and talk it all out and let us get some place. . . . "[41]

Anticipating to some degree the New Deal's public works program, Smith urged state, county and city public works departments to aid in relieving the widespread postwar unemployment through increased public works. He noted that $150,000,000 remaining from state war appropriations could be diverted into public improvements. The Republican legislature, however, rejected the governor's proposal, contending that it was not the state's duty to provide work for the unemployed.[42]

Many of Smith's reforms were greatly influenced by German experiments in social reform. He was deeply impressed by the effect the programs had on the general will of the German people. "There is no doubt in my mind," he declared, "that these activities have fostered love and devotion on the part of the people to the country. . . . " He added, "it implemented in their minds the thought that the government, vast and impersonal as it might be, was nevertheless concerned with each one's individual welfare."[43]

Smith initially sought to widen the scope of the workmen's compensation law by abolishing the direct settlement clause, providing payment for treatment of occupational diseases, increasing benefits to injured employees, and eliminating the fourteen day wait-

[40] *Ibid.*, March 27, 1920, 14.
[41] Smith, *Progressive Democracy*, 272; *Times*, January 13, 1920, 7.
[42] *Public Papers, 1920*, 769.
[43] Alfred E. Smith, *The Citizen and His Government* (New York, 1935), 146.

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ing period before compensation was paid. Under the compensation law then in effect, employees received payment only for accidental injuries. Furthermore, injured workmen were encouraged to settle their claims directly with their employer's insurance company rather than wait for a decision from the state insurance commissioner. Without work or pay, the injured workman was usually quite willing to sacrifice a few dollars for a quick settlement. One of Smith's investigators reported that of 114 cases he had examined, injured employees lost an average of $450 per person by settling directly with the insurance company rather than waiting a week or two for a decision from the commissioner. The loss amounted to almost three times the average payment made by the insurance company—$120.[44] When asked the rationale behind the state's expanding involvement in public matters, Smith replied:

> We conserve the animal life of the State, we conserve the forests, we conserve the State property wherever we may be. But we have given little thought to the conservation of the State's greatest asset, and that is the health and the strength of its men and women.[45]

The documented evidence persuaded the otherwise hostile legislature to approve the governor's compensation program. Reflecting upon the new law, Smith wrote: "This was the first important piece of legislation to recognize the fact that the working class as a whole and as individuals deserved a measure of protection. . . ."[46]

Since neither women nor children received benefits that accrued to labor union personnel, Smith moved that the state assume the responsibility for protecting their health and welfare. With the legislature's approval he signed into law a measure prohibiting women from working after 10 p.m. He also sought the enactment of a forty-eight hour work week for women and children and a minimum wage for women. Noting the legislature's endorsement of a bill preventing women from working after 10 p.m., the governor argued: "Is there any difference in principle between such

[44] Insurance companies awarded $13,712.40 as opposed to $52,279.84 subsequently awarded by the state insurance commissioner. *Public Papers, 1919*, 38, 388, 403.

[45] *Public Papers, 1919*, 764.

[46] Smith, *The Citizen and His Government*, 146.

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laws designed to preserve the health and vigor of women in industry and a law to fix a minimum salary to enable her to live in decency and health?"[47]

Many Republicans, particularly those in the Assembly, were inclined to agree with the governor but they never got the opportunity to express their support. Resorting to an old political trick, Speaker Sweet called a conference of Republican members of the Assembly and then announced that the conference would resolve itself into a caucus on the minimum wage bill and the forty-eight hour work week for women and children. Several Republicans protested and tried to leave the room, but Sweet had called the sergeant-at-arms who prevented anyone from absenting himself. After the caucus both bills were defeated by the Republican majority. As Governor Smith noted, his bills were not defeated; "they were smothered."[48]

Smith also encountered opposition to his programs from an unexpected source. The Women's party, a left-wing feminist group, lobbied vigorously against special legislation for women. Its favorite cry was "equality with men," and they contended that Smith's program emphasized women's inferiority. In a meeting with several leaders of the organization, Smith stoutly defended his support of this legislation. "It is not a question of inferiority," he declared. "I have been fighting for these laws upstairs in the Assembly and down here on the second floor because women have different physical needs." With typical bluntness he concluded the meeting, "Don't blame me. If you want to blame anybody, blame God."[49]

Smith's interest in the working people extended beyond their working hours. He was very much concerned with their home lives. Still maintaining a residence on New York's Lower East Side, the governor was acutely aware of the housing shortage and the cramped conditions in the city. An investigation conducted at his behest by the Reconstruction Commission disclosed that during World War I all housing construction in New York had been virtually at a standstill.[50] In 1918, New York City alone needed 40,000

[47] *Public Papers, 1920,* 34; *Times,* March 22, 1920, 17.
[48] *Tribune,* April 24, 1920, 1; *Ibid.,* April 26, 1930, 3.
[49] *Public Papers, 1919,* 263; *Ibid., 1924,* 296.
[50] Housing construction in New York City, for example, disclosed the following:

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new dwellings within a year. Moreover, the crowded living conditions had created serious health hazards, particularly cholera and typhoid epidemics.

Smith personally opposed government operation in any sphere in which he thought private initiative could do the job, but he believed that the preservation of the health and welfare of the people transcended even the Constitution. "I believe the emergency to be such," he proclaimed, "that the strong arm of the State must reach through its courts and protect the people for at least one year. . . ."[51] He proposed the creation of a central housing agency and local housing boards in communities of 10,000 or more. The local boards would have the authority to acquire land by condemnation, and, if necessary, to engage in large-scale housing construction. Anticipating Republican arguments that private enterprise could solve the problem as promptly and efficiently as the state, Smith pointed out that structures which had been condemned forty years before by the New York legislature were still occupied and had yet to be replaced by apartment owners or housing contractors.[52]

The conservative Republican legislature refused to consider the governor's proposal. However, they did agree to an alternate plan which gave local housing boards authority to control rents and to allow tax exemptions to corporations interested in large-scale housing construction. The Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, which constructed 54 apartments under the new law with rents not exceeding $9 per month, later declared that it could not have afforded to build the apartments without the tax exemptions.[53] The

| | 1917 | | 1918 | | 1919 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Tenements | Apartments | T. | A. | T. | A. |
| Manhattan | 113 | 4,077 | 16 | 714 | 5 | 144 |
| Bronx | 131 | 3,609 | 24 | 742 | 19 | 694 |
| Brooklyn | 376 | 5,314 | 62 | 943 | 58 | 576 |
| Queens | 139 | 1,238 | 28 | 307 | 6 | 64 |
| Richmond | 1 | 3 | — | — | — | — |

*Public Papers, 1920,* 210.

[51] *Ibid.,* 221; *Ibid., 1924,* 99.

[52] Alfred E. Smith, "American Housing," *The New Outlook,* CLXIII (February, 1934), 10; Smith, "A Housing Policy for New York," *The Survey,* XLV (October 2, 1920), 4.

[53] The legislature allowed a $5,000 tax exemption to builders for a single-family dwelling, $10,000 for a two-family home, and $1,000 per room (with

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new law did not ease the housing shortage immediately—it would be another five years before the problem was alleviated—but it did demonstrate to the citizens of New York that the state was aware of their plight and attempting to remedy it.

## V

The impact of Smith's program was of momentous consequence to the people of New York. Aided by an easing of social and economic disturbances in the state and nation, his program reduced public alarm over bolshevism in 1919 and 1920 without suppressing freedom of speech, freedom of thought or freedom of action. More important, reform was not allowed to die. At a time when fear and hostility often dominated the national and local scene, New York was busily enacting a series of reforms under the leadership of Alfred E. Smith that attempted to improve the quality of life for all its citizens.

Smith's defeat at the hands of Republican William Miller in 1920 led to a mild resurgence of Red Scare sentiment. The Lusk laws, which required teachers to take a loyalty oath supporting the government and private schools to be licensed by the state, were enacted by the new Republican regime. Furthermore, James J. Larkin, a leader of the radical International Workers of the World, and four other self-proclaimed radicals were arrested and imprisoned for allegedly plotting to overthrow the United States government.[54]

However, Miller and his Republican colleagues were reluctant to restore the Red Scare to the dimensions it had achieved in 1919 and 1920. When three socialists were elected to the state Assembly in the fall elections of 1920, Governor-elect Miller announced his opposition to another expulsion effort. The Republicans had been shocked by the tremendous showing Smith had made in defeat, and concluded that their efforts to unseat the five socialists from the Assembly, among other factors, had done the party more harm than good. Most Republicans were of the opinion that if 1920 had not

a maximum of $5,000 per family dwelling for apartment complexes). *Public Papers, 1924*, 284, 285; *Times*, September 25, 1920, 1.

[54] *Tribune*, January 18, 1923, 1; *Times*, January 18, 1923, 6. The other radicals were Minnie Kolnin, Anna Leissman, Ignatz Mizher and Paul Manko.

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been a presidential election year and Harding had not carried New York so decisively, Smith would have been re-elected.[55] In fact, two years later Miller, who ran bereft of Harding's coattails, was defeated soundly by Smith.[56]

Smith put the lid on the coffin of Red Scare events shortly after his inauguration in 1923. During the campaign he had pledged that if elected he would repeal the Lusk laws and review Larkin's conviction. To defenders of the Lusk laws who argued that they were opponents of dangerous radical propaganda, Smith replied, "So am I, but I think the way to combat it is to appeal to the common sense of the people." In May he signed the bill repealing both Lusk laws and commented, "They are repugnant to the fundamentals of American democracy."[57]

A review of Larkin's case disclosed that his conviction was based on his signing the "manifesto of the Left-wing of the Socialist Party," which called for the violent overthrow of the United States government. Nevertheless, there had been no evidence that Larkin or the four men and women imprisoned with him had ever conspired to incite a specific act of violence or lawlessness.[58] On January 17, the governor granted Larkin an unconditional pardon and one month later he did the same for the four other political prisoners. "Censorship," Smith declared, "is not in keeping with our idea of liberty and freedom of worship or freedom of speech." He concurred with former Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes who, in a minority decision, argued "with radical ideas, as with the not-yet-forgotten champagne, the best way to let them get flat is to let them get exposed to the air."[59] Smith's own views on radicalism were quite advanced for the time. In fact, it would be another thirty-four years before the Supreme Court would take this position.[60]

[55] *Journal*, 144 Sess., I, 19-21.

[56] *Tribune*, November 8, 1922, 1; *Times*, December 8, 1922, 10. The final vote showed Smith 1,397,670 to Miller's 1,011,725. It represented the largest plurality ever polled by a gubernatorial candidate in New York's history.

[57] *Times*, May 23, 1923, 3; *Ibid.*, May 26, 1923, 17; *World*, May 26, 1923, 1.

[58] *World*, January 18, 1923, 1; *Tribune*, January 18, 1923, 1.

[59] Glenn Frank, "Al Smith Pardons Jim Larkin," *Century*, CV (March 1923), 797; *Times*, January 4, 1923, 10.

[60] The Warren court expressed similar views initially in *Yates v. U.S.* (1957) and subsequently in *Albertson* v. *Subversive Activities Control Board* (1965).

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With the Red Scare buried behind him, Smith now pursued the enactment of various reforms during his next six years as governor of New York. His progressive policies facilitated his re-election as governor in 1922, 1924 and 1926, and enabled him to achieve such national prominence that he received the Democratic presidential nomination in 1928. Not only did such reforms as maternity and health care, minimum wages and maximum hours, broader educational opportunities, public works and conservation benefit the people of New York; ultimately they also benefited the nation as a whole. By keeping alive the importance of reform amidst the furor of the Red Scare, and by experimenting with new reform programs during a decade of unparalled materialism, Governor Alfred E. Smith helped prepare the way for the coming of the New Deal.

* I wish to extend my sincere thanks to Mr. Keith Heim of the University of North Carolina and Dr. Richard K. Scher of the University of Florida for reading and criticizing this article.

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# Term Paper "Mills," Academic Plagiarism, and State Regulation

LEONARD PRICE STAVISKY

By the mid-1970's, an estimated 63 million Americans will be enrolled in the nation's schools and colleges. Total attendance in higher education alone will exceed 16½ million. With almost one million earned baccalaureates, over a quarter of a million master's degrees, and nearly 50,000 doctorates awarded each year, servicing the academic world will be lucrative for many educational vendors, including equipment manufacturers, textbook publishers, as well as a new breed of supplier—commercial firms which provide ghost-written term papers for students.[1]

For years, educators have known about fraternity files and the exchange of papers among students. The assistance rendered by relatives and friends in the preparing of assignments has sometimes been met with academic oversight and even acquiescence. Only the most flagrant cases of plagiarism from known and traceable published sources have resulted in disciplinary action (warning, reprimand, grade reduction, failure, revocation of privileges, probation or, in rare cases, suspension or

[1] United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare, *Projections of Educational Statistics to 1977-78* (Washington, D. C., 1969, 1, 9, 128.

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expulsion from an institution).[2]

New student attitudes have also arisen to challenge conventional academic work. The late-nineteenth and early-twentieth-century goals of scientific scholarship, which had been transplanted to the United States from European university seminars, placed great emphasis upon research studies supposedly objective in outlook, disciplined in technique, and delimited in scope. During the 1960's and 1970's, many students began to question the validity of such scholarly research. Other changing values were espoused in the university: activism rather than detachment, commitment based on subjectivity rather than objectivity, involvement in causes as well as seclusion in the library. In a study entitled *Reform on Campus*, the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education reported widespread student demand for courses relevant to contemporary life and the selection of faculty on the basis of excellence in teaching rather than research.[3]

Growing numbers of students became disenchanted with required research projects. Doing a documented report alone in a library cubicle and having it graded by a graduate assistant rather than a professor has caused some students to turn to easy alternatives such as commercial term paper companies. In exchange for a fee, any student can obtain a ghost-written term paper, thesis, or dissertation. Commercial entrepreneurs are offering a new form of academic plagiarism.

## I

Historically, the term "plagiarism" is derived from the Roman word "*plagium*" which in antiquity meant the stealing of a slave. Both in Roman and Anglo-Saxon law, the word was subsequently applied to literary thievery as well as kidnapping. By common usage, plagiarism is

[2] John P. Roche, "The Problem of Recycled Term Papers," *Long Island Press*, December 21, 1971; Goodman Ace, "The Writer," *Saturday Review*, August 28, 1971; E. Edmund Reuter, Jr., *Schools and the Law* (Dobbs Ferry, N. Y., 1964), 68; M. Chester Notte and John Phillip Linn, *School Law for Teachers* (Danville, Ill., 1963), 222.

[3] See Michael Kraus' chapter on "The Rise of the Scientific School," *A History of American History* (New York, 1937), 302-20, *passim*; Ralph Henry Gabriel, *The Course of American Democratic Thought* (New York, 1940), 252-53; *New York Times*, June 23, 1972; Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, *Reform on Campus: Changing Students, Changing Academic Programs* (New York, 1972).

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usually defined as "the act of appropriating the ideas, writings or inventions of another without due acknowledgment; specifically, the stealing of passages either word for word or in substance, from the writings of another and publishing them as one's own."[4] Submitting work of another to fulfill academic requirements does constitute plagiarism. The "borrowed" manuscript is tendered as one's own work without proper acknowledgment. Yet the legal rights of the original author have not necessarily been violated. In plagiarism between consenting parties, the author cannot serve as complainant. The term paper companies usually require a "properly filled out release form" from the author; it states that in consideration of the money paid to him, he relinquishes all rights and holds the company harmless from any actions that might arise over questions of ownership and authorship.[5]

Professional ghost writers have plied their craft for many years by offering their services to business executives, celebrities, public officials and even other writers. During the 1940's and 1950's, a so-called literary service advertised each week in the book review section of a prestigious New York newspaper. Among the services provided by the head of this agency was the preparation of ghost-written dissertations, theses and term papers. Competing agencies also offered to write "educational research" papers. In the 1960's, a scandal erupted at Duke University; thirteen students were suspended, including some who admitted receiving money for ghost writing papers for football players. "There's a fine line between tutoring and cheating," one girl acknowledged. "I guess we were overstepping that line."[6] During the early 1970's, the practice proliferated. In major cities throughout the United States—notably Boston,

[4] Henry Goudy, "Plagiarism: A Fine Art," *The Judicial Review*, XX (January 1909), 302; Maurice Salzman, *Plagiarism* (Los Angeles, 1931), 27; Clark Jillson, *Modified Plagiarism* (Worcester, Mass., 1881), 1; W. A. Edwards, *Plagiarism: An Essay on Good and Bad Borrowing* (Cambridge, Eng., 1933), 114; *Funk & Wagnall's New Standard Dictionary of the English Language* (New York, 1959).

[5] Salzman, 34; Herbert A. Howell, *The Copyright Law: An Analysis of the Law of the United States Governing Registration and Protection of Copyright Works* (Washington, D. C., 1948), 1-2, 7, 51; New York City Termpapers, Inc., "Writers Responsibilities and Work Agreement," n.d., c. 1971-1972; New York City Termpapers, Inc., Application Form for Selling Written Work, n.d., c. 1971-1972, in *State of New York* v. *Kathleen Saksniit et al.*, Supreme Court of the State of N. Y., N. Y. County, Index no. 40266/72, Office of County Clerk, N. Y. County Court House.

[6] *New York Times Book Review*, October 2, 9, 16, 1949; *Newsweek*, July 29, 1968.

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New York, Washington, D.C. and Los Angeles—new firms were formed at the outskirts of major universities. A Boston-area firm, Termpapers Unlimited, set the tone for the entire industry.

A 22-year-old snack shop operator invested in such a new venture. The original staff consisted of two writers, former Vista volunteers who held master's degrees in English. The promoter recruited additional authors from the abundant supply of unemployed graduate students in the Bay area campuses. Undergraduates who lacked the inclination or the ability to do their own work flocked to the term paper office; the original company and its imitators produced an estimated 10,000 papers by the end of the academic year. Unfettered by "restraint of trade" admonitions, the firm branched out into other cities and entered into reciprocal arrangements with satellite companies for the exchange of ghost-written manuscripts. Grades were recorded, together with title entries, institutions to which it had been submitted, the instructor, and even the course name. Custom-prepared papers commanded the highest fees, but there was also a lucrative "bargain basement" market in recycled term papers to various buyers. Within one year, the original, modest investment in Termpapers Unlimited had been parlayed into a $1,200,000 gross-volume business.[7]

It should be pointed out at the beginning that in terms of percentages, the number of students purchasing term papers is extremely small. In absolute numbers, however, the potential buyers are sizeable enough to provide a substantial market. New York State, in particular, which had almost 5,000 public and private schools and more than 200 colleges and universities, seemed to provide a lucrative opportunity for the term-paper companies. Advertisements appeared in communities as divergent as Albany, Buffalo, Stony Brook and New York City. Enjay Termpapers of New York City offered the "best service in town" on "any subject—any length—largest selection of papers on file in the country." Term Paper Arsenal, Los Angeles, made a cross-country appeal to New Yorkers: "Send for your free descriptive catalog of 1,300 quality termpapers. . . . We need a local salesman." From Silver Springs, Md., Termpaper Research, Inc., proclaimed the availability of "termpapers fully

[7] *Time*, April 19, 1971; March 27, 1972; *Newsweek*, March 27, 1972; *New York Times*, January 29, 1972; *Long Island Press*, December 21, 1971; (State University of N. Y. at Buffalo) *Record*, January 28, 1972; (Queens College) *Newsbeat*, February 15, 1972.

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researched, written and professionally typed by our staff of professional writers. All of our writers have at least a B.S./B.A. and are experts in the fields in which they write!" Educational Research, Inc., also of Silver Springs, invited the public to use a toll free number which could be called without charge from any place in the United States. For the economy-minded buyer, Papers, Inc., of Hartford, Conn., printed bargain coupons under the banner headline "Clip and Save. . . . discounts available." A smaller business, apparently based in a private home in Westchester County, N.Y., advertised "writing" as well as "complete editorial and research services" for students. To be inconspicuous, the advertiser of ghost-written term papers placed his commercial message in the personal classified section of a campus publication, along with billets-doux, birthday greetings and a help wanted notice for lifeguards.[8]

Leaflets distributed on campus and at term-paper offices went into greater detail than the terse newspaper copy. In the shadow of the State University at Albany, D & D Research Service circulated its flyer to "the time-pressed undergraduate student." The overworked or passive undergraduate was counseled to "alleviate countless, needless hours of tedious library research." The company cited its willingness to prepare reports in "liberal arts, fine arts, business [and] related non-technical areas of study." Using language of the huckster, New York City Termpapers, Inc. asked the potential customer:[9]

> Do you have a term paper assignment that's a little too much work? Are you cramped for time with a nightmarish deadline closing in? Let us help you. We have a team of professional writers who can handle just about any subject. . . . The fastest service can be obtained by coming in person to one of our offices. . . . If you are unable to come in, call us and we will handle your order through the mail.

An investigator for the author visited two term-paper offices. Posing as a student in need of a report, he entered the first office and asked: "Do you do term papers?" "I'll show you the catalogue," the

[8] N. Y. State, *The New York Red Book, 1973* (Albany, N. Y., 1973), 625; *Columbia Daily Spectator*, January 17, 1972; February 10, 1972; (Brooklyn College) *Kingsman*, February 18, 25, 1972; (Queens College) *Newsbeat*, June 27, 1972, *Phoenix*, February 15, 1972; (S. U. N. Y. at Albany) *Albany Student Press*, February 11, 1972; (S. U. N. Y. at Stony Brook) *Statesman*, February 11, 1972.

[9] D & D Research Service, Leaflet, n.d., c. 1971-1972; N. Y. City Termpapers, Inc., Leaflet, n.d., c. 1972-1973.

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woman behind the desk responded. The catalogue contained a classified listing of titles. "These are the ones we have on file," she said. "They take three or four days because we can simply get them out of the file." When the investigator asked for a topic that was not listed, he was told that an original paper would require eight to twelve days, since the company had to engage a writer. Order forms were strewn on the counter; prices ranged from $2.50 to $5.50 per page. Customers were expected to leave a deposit when placing the order. The purchaser listed his name, address, school, course, instructor and referral source. Students requiring original research gave a "detailed description" of the assignment including scope, length, footnotes, bibliography, and delivery date.[10]

At another ghost-writing business office, the researcher repeated his question: "Are you the people who do term papers?" "Something like that," a man behind the counter answered. Prices were posted at the top of the counter. For existing papers, the rate had been reduced to $1.85 per page. Another employee told the investigator that original research would cost $4.50 a page. After showing him the general catalogue of titles, she said the firm was about to receive a master file containing detailed summaries and excerpts from every paper. "It's huge, like an encyclopedia," she reported. "People have been working on it . . .[for] days and nights trying to finish it. It's coming from Boston."[11]

A second investigator visited the same companies but pretended to be a writer in search of employment. His interviewer denied the company provided term papers for a fee, even though the words appeared in the firm's name. The woman insisted that the organization did "research work" for students. Pretending to be a prospective employee, the author's investigator asked how much he would be paid for writing papers. He was told to expect $2 per page for a fully typed and annotated paper; the rate would increase if the work proved satisfactory. He was handed an employment application, a set of regulations and a contract. The agreement stipulated that the employee could not enter into a similar contract with another firm for one year after leaving the company. When the presumed writer complained that $2 per page was inadequate, the company representative told of one writer who produced 35 pages a

[10] Robert Grey, Memorandum of Visit to Enjay Termpapers, N. Y., January 19, 1972; Enjay Termpapers, Order Form, n.d., c. 1971-1972.

[11] Robert Grey, Memorandum of Visit to N. Y. City Termpapers, Inc., January 19, 1972; N. Y. City Termpapers, Leaflet.

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day and ostensibly earned $70.[12] The work rules were summarized in a statement of "writer's responsibilities." Each author had to have at least one degree; assignments were to be handled in a "professional manner"; employees had to perform full-time work, deliver assignments promptly, submit a typewritten manuscript with footnotes and two copies, furnish all supplies, cite at least four sources in the bibliography of each 10-page paper, and produce a perfect finished product with a release form for each assignment.[13] The employer could withhold payment if company guidelines were not followed.

Staff size and extent of service varied from company to company. Within its first month of operation, Enjay Termpapers had an office staff of three and working arrangements with 100 writers. When the movement reached its stride in early 1972, even small companies were reporting brisk business of 60 papers a month produced by 20 to 60 freelance writers. The larger operations employed 100 to 300 authors and were capable of filling 1,000 orders a month. Termpapers Unlimited and its local affiliates at one point theoretically controlled 90 percent of the market. The office staffs, which numbered in the hundreds, included sales personnel, librarians, cataloguers, readers, editors and even attorneys. Among its 3,000 writers, some were capable of earning up to $500 per week. The operations were even more profitable for the business executives. The president of Minuteman Research acknowledged a "large profit margin." Beyond the writer's fee, there was a mark-up of $1.50 to $2 per page. On an average 12-page paper, the company netted $16.50 to $24 after author's expenses were deducted; papers sold to more than one student represented virtually clear profit.[14]

The experience of one company was illustrative of the commercial operation. Over a three-month period, at least 965 persons actually purchased papers from this company. More than two-thirds of the buyers selected copies rather than original research. Gross sales during this period totaled $35,416, an average payment of $37 per customer. Students from over 100 colleges and universities did business with the firm; at

[12] Jacques Koppel, Memorandum of Visit to N. Y. City Termpapers, Inc., January 19, 1972.

[13] N. Y. City Termpapers, Inc., "Writers Responsibilities."

[14] *N. Y. Daily News*, January 23, 1972; *N. Y. Times*, January 29, 1972; (Jamaica, N. Y.) *Action World and Good Times*, April 19-May 2, 1972; *Saturday Review*, August 28, 1971.

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least one of the buyers was a high school student.[15]

The term paper companies maintained that they were rendering a public service. "We encourage [clients] to do additional research and discourage plagiarism," one spokesman stated. "Students are not prepared properly to do research work." Another term-paper executive insisted that many undergraduates would fail their courses without professional assistance; these students were certain to gain knowledge from the well-written reports they received. The most singular rationale came from the president of Champion Research Company of Boston. In an indignant letter to the editor of *Time* magazine, he wrote that he was astounded to read that "a City University of New York professor and a Fairleigh Dickinson dean think that my company threatens the educational system. Indeed, I have always thought that CUNY, with its open-enrollment program in which valuable educational resources are squandered on illiterate savages, and Fairleigh Dickinson, which is essentially four more years of high school for the upper middle-class youth of New Jersey who are too stupid to get into Rutgers, are far more threatening to American Education than term-paper companies."[16]

Apologias came from some business managers and editors of campus publications. The defense was twofold, motivated by advertising revenues and by the conviction that freedom of press was involved. "We'll print anything—if we get paid for it," one business manager stated. Only the parents, professors and administrators have complained about term-paper advertisements. The students have not expressed their opinions, except to solicit the names and phone numbers of the companies; these sales, she insisted, were just as ethical as ads for contraceptives, abortion services and ROTC. Others also defended the right of term-paper companies to exist. "If a kid decides he'd rather watch "Gilligan's Island" (on television) than spend his time knocking off a paper, and if he can afford the fee, it's his business," one campus observer contended. Another student rationalized the practice by saying that anyone can spend time in the library in search of dull information. Why not have somebody else do it for you and save the time? Still others argued that

[15] (John Jay College) *Lex*, March 7, 1972; N. Y. City Termpapers, Inc., Order Form, c. 1971-1972; Complaint of Attorney General of the State of N. Y., February 9, 1972, in *State of New York* v. *Saksniit*.

[16] (Jamaica, N. Y.) *Action World*, April 19-May 2, 1972; *N. Y. Daily News*, January 23, 1972; *N. Y. Times*, January 29, 1972; *Time*, April 19, 1971; Letter from David Martin to the Editor, *Time* Magazine, Boston, April 3, 1972.

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every institution deceives the public. Even colleges "cheat" students by compelling them to meet standards and perform assignments which will do them no good in later life.[17]

## II

Some faculty members took an introspective look at traditional research. A Yeshiva University professor acknowledged that "if we in the academic world did not misuse the idea of a paper; if we read and returned the paper; if we worked with the student while he wrote it; if we made the topics a bit more relevant, then these [term-paper] organizations would die out on their own account." A faculty member of the State University of New York wryly observed that "the conviction of someone for having sold such theses would create a prima facie case of negligence on the part of persons supervising the work of the purchasers of theses."[18] Academicians have long lamented the persistence of academic dishonesty. A half century ago, the president of a major midwestern university summoned a dean into his office and asked: "Can you ever get the boys educated so that we shall no longer be troubled with these things?" "I could, I think," the dean replied, "if I were allowed to work with them long enough. But when they are educated, they leave us. A big new crowd of young ones is introduced every year, and the process of education must be begun again." Even at this post-World War I campus, the dean was appalled that some students looked upon cheating with indifference, while others condoned it or recognized it as a virtue.[19]

In 1964, the Bureau of Applied Social Research of Columbia University reported widespread evidence of academic fraud in American colleges, even before the outbreak of commercially inspired plagiarism. The project director, William J. Bowers, surveyed more than 5,300 students.

[17] Some college publications voluntarily discontinued the acceptance of advertisements from term-paper operations. (Queens College) *Phoenix*, February 1, 1972; February 15, 1972; February 29, 1972; (Stony Brook) *Statesman*, February 11, 1972; *Action World*, April 19, 1972; (Long Island University) *Seawanhaka*, February 17, 1972; Examination of Diane ——, before the Attorney General of the State of N. Y., March 6, 1972, in *State of New York* v. *Saksniit*; (Queens College) *Newsbeat*, June 27, 1972; Letter from John S. Toll, Stony Brook, February 15, 1972.

[18] (Queens College) *Phoenix*, February 15, 1972; Letter from Edward Ames, Stony Brook, February 8, 1972.

[19] Thomas A. Clark, *Discipline and the Derelict* (N. Y., 1921), 1-2, 143, 149.

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Fully 38 percent of those interviewed admitted handing in papers which had been copied from published sources. Nine percent acknowledged doing it once, 16 percent on a few occasions and 3 percent plagiarized published sources many times. In addition, 14 percent of the students had handed in papers written by other students. Among those who cheated in college, 64 percent had done so in high school. Bowers concluded that "the magnitude of the problem is grossly underestimated by members of the campus community."

Academic dishonesty is usually not detected or the incident is overlooked. The discipline administered by a faculty member is usually limited to a warning, reprimand, make-up assignment, grade reduction or course failure. Suspension or expulsion is the prerogative of an administrator, not the average instructor. In only 10 percent to 13 percent of the reported cases has the act of plagiarizing a term paper resulted in suspension or expulsion of the offender. Many faculty members are loathe to proceed to higher authorities; suspension procedure entails red tape, a burden of proof and risk that the recommendation may be rejected. At a time when students are beginning to demand a greater role in academic policy, a professor who merely suspects fraud may not wish to risk his relationships with his students in a questionable test of veracity.[20] Ironically, educational institutions have considerable latitude in handling student misconduct. New York state colleges forewarn prospective students that attendance is a privilege not a right. Barnard College emphasizes that "continuance in college, receipt of academic credit and conferring of degrees are subject to the disciplinary powers of the College. Any registration may be cancelled . . . upon such grounds as the College shall in its sole discretion determine." Syracuse University "reserves the right to require withdrawal of any student at any time for any reason deemed sufficient to it, and no reason . . . need be given." Similarly, at the City University of New York, incoming students are cautioned that "academic freedom . . . cannot be invoked by those who . . . violate the norms of conduct to protect that freedom. Against such offenders the university has the obligation to defend itself."[21]

[20] William J. Bowers, *Student Dishonesty and Its Control in College* (N. Y., 1964), 1-3, 8, 14, 16-17, 21, 41, 43, 128, 193-94; Karel Montor, "Cheating in High School," *School and Society*, 99 (February 1971), 96; Harry H. Lunn, Jr., *The Student's Role in College Policy Making* (Washington, D. C., 1957), 78-81.

[21] *Barnard College Announcement, 1971-1972*, 40; *Utica College Bulletin, 1971-1972*, 132; *Ithaca College Bulletin, 1971-1972*, 36, 39; *Skidmore College Bulletin, 1972-1973* (Saratoga Springs, N. Y., 1972), 198; *Bulletin of Vassar College:*

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In their bulletins, the institutions also stress academic assignments. Yeshiva University recalls that scholarly research is part of the Jewish tradition and a major function of an American university. "Here research is a . . . component part of the educative process for both students and faculty, and one of the yardsticks by which the institution's progress can be measured." At the Graduate Center of CUNY, an applicant is informed that he must submit evidence of "demonstrated research ability," while Vassar's potential students are reminded of the fact that a grade is based in part on "written work throughout the semester."[22]

After admission, a student is given further guidelines. The City College handbook notes that "it's definitely not worthwhile to plagiarize or borrow someone else's paper. Besides the penalties you face if you're caught, you'll be cheating yourself out of the knowledge (and maybe the enjoyment) you would derive in working on it. And that's what college is about, isn't it?" At Staten Island Community College, the warning is stated more bluntly. "All your work, whether it be on tests or papers, must reflect your own efforts. There can be no compromise with the fact that cheating on examinations and plagiarizing . . . are gross violations of a proper code of academic behavior." At the University of Rochester, the guidelines stipulate that "plagiarism is a concern not only to the student and the professor involved, but the entire University." The university's total involvement is reflected in the elaborate procedure for handling suspected fraud. After charges are lodged by a faculty member, a Board of Academic Honesty is empanelled. The student is given an opportunity to defend himself. The findings and recommendations are then forwarded to the dean. Appeals from the penalties imposed by the dean are reviewable by the president.[23] At Rochester Institute of Technology, a student may be "warned, placed on probation, or in serious cases, dismissed." At Ithaca College, erring students are subject to "verbal warning, fines, work assignments, behavior or social probation, sus-

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*Catalogue Issue, 1971-1972*, 41; Rochester Institute of Technology, *Official Bulletin, 1971*, 28; CUNY, City College *Arts & Science Bulletin*, 29.

[22] Yeshiva University, *Bulletin of General Information, 1967-1969*, 15; CUNY, *Bulletin of University Graduate Programs, 1970-1971*, 17, 20-21; *Vassar College Bulletin*, 41.

[23] CUNY, City College, *Confidential: 1971-1972 Student Handbook*, 17, 19; CUNY, Staten Island Community College, *Student Handbook and Guide, 1971-1972*, 43; University of Rochester, *Official Bulletin: Undergraduate Studies, 1971-1972*, 35, 51.

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pension or expulsion." Persons in violation of CUNY's disciplinary rules may be penalized by admonition, warning, censure, probation, restitution, suspension or expulsion. Students at the State University of New York are subject to dismissal for "dishonest and fraudulent conduct." At Syracuse University, "the minimum penalty for dishonesty . . . in the writing of themes, term papers or laboratory reports will be loss of credit for the course. An F because of cheating will be so recorded on the student's permanent record . . . The [University's] Judiciary Committee may impose more severe penalty." On April 7, 1972 at John Jay College of Criminal Justice, the New York Police Department's chief of personnel issued the following memorandum: "Each member of the force is to be aware that submission of a purchased paper as his own work brings discredit upon the institution he attends, the Police Department and himself," thus posing the prospect of economic sanctions in employment.[24]

## III

Within New York state, rule-making responsibility for educational policy is vested in the Regents whose chief executive officer is the Commissioner of Education. The power to incorporate an educational institution, to suspend its charter, visit and inspect, authorize the issuance of degrees, diplomas, certificates and professional licenses seems to provide ample authority for rooting out all forms of academic malpractice. Yet the Regents and the Education Department have been reluctant to supercede local governance. In primary and secondary education, the Commissioner has invariably cited the broad responsibilities which school officials have in disciplining students undermining the educative process. Unless local authorities have acted in an "arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable" manner, state officials have refused to intervene. Nevertheless, the Education Department has insisted that a student accused of misconduct must appear before the administration and discuss the factual situation. The Commissioner's regulations are silent on the issue of plagiarism; the only parts that deal even remotely with the problem are sections on "fraud" defined as using "unfair means," "giving aid to, or obtaining aid from, another person" and "intentional misrepresenta-

[24] Rochester Institute of Technology *Official Bulletin*, 28; Ithaca College, *Bulletin*, 36; City College *Bulletin*, 30; CUNY, Queens College *Bulletin* (1970), 126; SUNY, Buffalo, 1971, 9; Utica College, *Bulletin*, 132; *New York Post*, April 14, 1972.

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tion." In all references, fraud is limited to the examination process and is applied to elementary and secondary, not higher, education.[25]

The courts have been reluctant to intervene unless power has been abused or a student's rights have been violated. In a 1967 case involving cheating, the state Supreme Court reinstated a student on the grounds that the "Department of Education deprived infant petitioner of her rights by imposing sanctions . . . without a hearing to ascertain the truth of the charges at which she might defend herself with the assistance of counsel." The court ruled that its decision applied only to a Regents examination and did not apply to other forms of cheating. To date, the suspension of a student on the basis of submission of a ghost-written report has not been tested in the state's courts.[26]

In 1972, the concept of academic dishonesty entered a new legal phase. On February 9, the state Attorney-General, Louis J. Lefkowitz, initiated action in the Supreme Court of New York County against 5 defendants: Kathleen Saksniit, Termpapers, Inc., New York City Termpapers, Inc., Termpapers Unlimited of New York, Inc. and Termpapers Unlimited of New York. The summons and complaint alleged that one individual defendant had not filed a business certificate as required by law; several of the other defendants were not duly incorporated within the state; all the defendants could reasonably be expected to know that papers they sold to students were intended for submission to educational institutions. The final manuscripts were devoid of any evidence to indicate that the work had been prepared commercially and fraudulently submitted to various schools and colleges as representing the student's

[25] N. Y. State, *Constitution*, Article XI, section 2; New York State, *Red Book*, 625; New York State, *Manual for the Use of the Legislature of the State of New York, 1970* (Albany), 635-36; Lee O. Garber and William J. Hageny, *The Law and the Teacher in New York State* (Danville, Ill., 1967), 33-40; Burton D. Friedman, *State Government and Education: Management in the State Education Agency* (Chicago, 1971), 5-7; Reuter, 69; Notte and Linn, 222-24; New York State, *McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated*, Book 16, *Education Law*, I (St. Paul, Minn., 1969), and *Cumulative Annual Pocket Part for Use in 1971-1972* (St. Paul, 1971), sections 208-209, 214-219, 305-308, 310 (notes 169, 171); N. Y. State Education Department, *Reports: Judicial Decisions of the Commissioner of Education*, 5 (Albany, 1966), 115; 7 (Albany, 1968), 62, 112, 179-83; 8 (Albany, 1969), 33, 104, 125, 216-17; 9 (Albany, 1970), 62-63, 109-10, 167; N. Y. State, *Official Compilation: Codes, Rules and Regulations of the State of New York*, 8, *Education* (Albany, 1972), section 102.4, 155.

[26] *Application of Goldwyn* v. *Allen*, 54 Misc. 2d 94, 281 N. Y. S. 2d 899 (Sup. Ct., Queens County, 1967).

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own efforts.[27]

On February 10, Supreme Court Justice George M. Carney signed an order to show cause. The defendants were required to appear in answer to the plaintiff's request for an injunction and a dissolution of the term-paper operation. Seymour H. Metnick, the defense counsel, responded that his clients were conducting a legitimate enterprise. Their service aided people in furthering their education; the material was intended for reference purposes only and waivers had been obtained from all writers. He cited as precedent the informational services rendered to subscribers by encyclopedia publishers and the assistance to students provided by relatives and friends. "Shall they be enjoined from this conduct?" he demanded to know. The defense further emphasized that "the legislature up to the present time, has not seen fit to outlaw the conducting of a research and reference enterprise. . . . If such a business shall be declared unlawful, it should only be by legislative act, not by judicial act."[28]

Late in April 1972, Supreme Court Justice Abraham Gellinoff held that "promoting plagiarism—the most serious academic offense—strikes at the core of the educational process. . . . Doing a student's work for him not only deprives him of the valuable disciplines of the learning process, but . . . [lends] credence to the all-too-prevalent notion that anything, including a college degree, can be bought for a price." He said that the defendants' business "is directly opposed to the declared public policy of our State" and "exceeds the purpose for which the corporate defendant [Termpapers, Inc.] was formed." The other defendants are "without authority to do business in New York." In granting the Attorney-General's motion for a temporary injunction, the judge barred the defendants during the pendancy of the action from engaging in term-paper operations, conducting business under these trade names, paying out any corporate money or transferring property. During June 1972, the trial proceeded before Justice Peter A. Quinn. In October, the final judg-

[27] Attorney General's Summons, Complaint and Affidavit, February 9, 1972; Memorandum of Law of Attorney General, February 22, 1972; Department of State, Negative Certificate of Incorporation concerning New York City Term Papers, Inc., January 4, 1972, and Negative Certificate of Incorporation concerning Term Papers Unlimited of New York, Inc., January 11, 1972, in *State of New York* v. *Saksniit*.

[28] Order to Show Cause, Justice George M. Carney, February 10, 1972; Affidavit of Opposition of Seymour H. Metnick, February 29, 1972; Answering Affidavit of Stephen Mindell, March 8, 1972, in *State of New York* v. *Saksniit*; Grolier Interstate, Inc., *Information Service Coupons* (New York, 1972).

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ment was announced. The offending corporations were dissolved. All defendants were permanently enjoined from engaging in term-paper operations. They were ordered to make restitution in the amount of $35,416 and to pay $10,000 in fines.[29]

In the defense, the counsel had argued that the legislature had not prohibited the sale of term papers. In New York state the legislature does enjoy plenary powers in the field of education. This constitutional mandate echos Aristotle's belief in his *Politics* that "the education of youth ought to form the principal part of a legislator's attention." Yet among many leaders of academe there is the belief that lawmakers lack understanding of educational problems and the unattractive specter of legislative investigations of curricula, faculty hiring, textbooks, teacher loyalty and campus unrest.

As early as 1892 and more recently in 1973, the legislature of New York dealt with the issue of plagiarism by prohibiting the fraudulent issuance, sale or use of degrees, diplomas and certificates and forbidding misrepresentation, cheating and impersonation in examinations.[30] New York state's legislative effort to prohibit commercial term-paper sales began in December 1971. A measure entitled "An Act to amend the education law in relation to the sale of dissertations, theses and term papers" was drafted for introduction in the Assembly. The essential thrust was embodied in the first section:[31]

[29] Order, Justice Abraham J. Gellinoff, April 24, 1972; Oath of Receiver, Harry Grossman, May 1, 1972; Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Justice Peter A. Quinn, September 26, 1972; Final Judgment of Dissolution, Permanent Injunction, Restitution and Statutory Costs, Justice Peter A. Quinn, September 26, 1972; Letter from Norman Goodman, County Clerk, New York County, to John P. Lomenzo, Secretary of State, re Dissolution of Termpapers, Inc., October 4, 1972, in *State of New York* v. *Saksniit*.

[30] Affidavit of Opposition, Metnick; N. Y. State, *Constitution*, Article XI, section 1; Stephen K. Bailey and Edith K. Mosher, *ESEA: The Office of Education Administers a Law* (Syracuse, N. Y., 1968), 1; Robert Bendiner, *The Politics of Schools: A Crisis in Self-Government* (New York, 1969), 169; Truman M. Pierce, *Federal, State and Local Government in Education* (Washington, D. C., 1964), 68-69; Roy W. Bahl, "State Taxes, Expenditures and the Fiscal Plight of the Cities," in Alan K. Campbell, ed., *The States and the Urban Crisis* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1970), 105-06; New York State, *Report of the New York State Commission on the Quality, Cost and Financing of Elementary and Secondary Education*, I (Albany, 1972), 2.9-2.13; *Education Law*, I, sections 224, 225.

[31] The original bill was Assembly 8651, formally introduced in the Assembly on January 19, 1972. The amended version, 8651-A, was enacted into law.

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> No person shall sell or offer for sale to any person enrolled in a university, college, academy, school or other educational institution within the state of New York any assistance in the preparation, research or writing of a dissertation, thesis, term paper, essay, report or other written assignment intended for submission to such educational institution in fulfillment of the requirements for a degree, diploma, certificate or course of study.

The initial draft was intended as a study bill. Copies were widely circulated through the academic community. On February 11, 1972, at Hunter College, the sponsor convened a conference of administrators, faculty, student government representatives and newspaper editors from 25 academic institutions within the New York region. The conference elicited remarkable candor; administrators, faculty members and students examined incidence of academic dishonesty, relevancy of research projects, need for improved faculty supervision in all phases of student research, influences against term-paper advertising and responsibilities inherent in academic freedom. Major provisions of the legislation were endorsed. The conferees agreed that the state should act against the sellers, while the schools should be prepared to discipline students who purchased term papers. Other sections of the bill (1) prohibited the sale of term papers to persons who, in turn, sold them to students; (2) exempted from the provisions of the bill tutorial, typing, transcription and reproduction services, assistance authorized by the educational institutions as well as copyrighted materials; (3) precluded disclosure of personal data obtained from students; (4) authorized the Attorney-General to seek court injunctions against offenders and (5) made violation of the act a class B misdemeanor, subject to a maximum penalty of 90 days imprisonment.[32]

With considerable backing from the academic community, the press and the Attorney-General, the legislation gained momentum;[33] on April

[32] *New York Post*, February 11, 1972; February 12, 1972; February 17, 1972; (Queens College) *Phoenix*, February 15, 1972; *Long Island Press*, February 12, 1972; *New York Times*, February 13, 1972; Letter from Robert Stone, Counsel to the State Education Department, to the author, Albany, February 14, 1972; Letter from Louis J. Lefkowitz, Attorney General, to the author, New York, February 16, 1972.

[33] The author has voluminous resolutions, letters and editorials to support the legislation such as: Resolution of the University Faculty Senate of the City University of New York, New York, February 15, 1972; Resolution of John Jay College Council, New York, February 25, 1972; *New York Daily News*, March 6, 1972; *Long Island Press*, March 31, 1972; *Writer's Digest*, 52 (February 1972), 13.

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12, 1972, the state Assembly approved the measure, on May 3rd, the Senate concurred. A month later Govenor Nelson A. Rockerfeller signed the bill, as chapter 963 of the Laws of 1972. Finally, on July 1, 1972, the effective date of the legislation, New York became the first state in the nation to ban the sale of term papers to students.[34] What is significant about the dispute involving academic plagiarism in New York State is the reaffirmation of the importance of education to the student. If certain skills are not mastered in the nation's schools and colleges, where will they be learned? If sophistry is inculcated among the young, what hope is there for ethical conduct in later years? And if educational opportunity is abdicated, when, if ever, will it be redeemed?

[34] Parallel action has been undertaken in other states. On July 1, 1972, a new law took effect in *Maryland*. The legislation prohibited the sale of "dissertations, theses and term papers," derived almost entirely from wording of the N. Y. statute. *California*'s new law to abolish the commercial "preparation, sale and distribution of term papers and other academic materials" became operative on March 7, 1973.

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# What Makes A Classic in Political Theory?

MICHAEL LEVIN

From the great mass of literature that has been written throughout the ages on political theory there are a select few books that have achieved a measure of permanency and have been raised to the status of "classics." The list of favored authors is, generally speaking, as follows: Plato, Aristotle, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Burke, Hegel, Marx, and Mill.

The process by which the elevation of these authors took place is, to say the least, obscure. The present hierarchy emerged for a wide variety of reasons, mostly now forgotten. The composition of this hierarchy, however, is relatively stable, for teachers prefer to teach what they themselves were taught. Thus I know, or think I know, what the "classics" are. They are the books I had to read when I was a student. This rather unsatisfactory reason is the first one that would come to mind were it suggested to me that the list of "classic" thinkers ought really to be constituted as the fol-

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lowing: Manegold of Lautenbach, Nicolas of Cues, William of Ockham, Hooker, Tyrrell, Mazzini, Weitling, and Bernstein.

This selectivity raises the question of whether we know how or why our current so-called "classics" managed to separate themselves from the now-obscure volumes of old and forgotten polemic and attained their present status.

Our collection of "great" books suggests a number of criteria by which their status might be justified such as:

1. Philosophical quality.
2. Original content.
3. Influence on events or on other political theorists.
4. The foremost example of a certain category of thought.
5. Extended relevancy beyond their own time of publication to the present, or even to provide judgments of universal application.

## I

It is with these sorts of questions in mind that some consideration will be given to the status of one of our "classics"—John Locke's *Two Treatises of Government*. That this work occupies a prominent place in the accepted list of political "classics" is beyond doubt.

What, however, are the political ideas that we associate with it? Very briefly, they consist of opposition to the theory of the divine right of kings, a belief in a law of nature which is ultimately God's law and which is discoverable through the application of reason, and a belief in society founded on contract and political relationships involving a trust between ruler and ruled. Locke accepted the state of nature as a historical reality, which men had left by making a contract whose primary purpose was the defense of property. Violation of the clauses of the trust by the ruler frees the ruled from any further obligation of obedience and, furthermore, allows them the right of resisting such a power that has forfeited its authority.

This work, published as a defense of the Glorious Revolution of 1688, was only one of many with such an aim. That it is the one which is still recommended to Politics students might lead us to suppose that its philosophical quality is particularly high. Such, however, is not the opinion of the following modern commentators:

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John Dunn, "Its academic standing had never been all that high."[1]
J. W. Gough, "Locke is full of illogical flaws and inconsistencies."[2]
P. Laslett, "As always Locke's language is inexact . . . Locke is, perhaps, the least consistent of all the great philosophers."[3]
C. B. Macpherson, "The postulates on which he was operating were confused and ambiguous."[4]
J. P. Plamenatz, "Locke, if we take account only of his political philosophy, was not a profound or subtle thinker."[5]

If we accept these reservations, then our question recurs: why the importance of the *Two Treatises*? Does the answer lie in its originality? According to J. W. Gough, "Locke's characteristic arguments, in fact, had long been commonplaces of political theory. They were part of the usual mental furniture of every 'liberal' thinker of his age!"[6] More recently John Dunn has written of the *Two Treatises* that "it was never recognized as being peculiarly original, and in those points in which it was considered to be so, it was frequently regarded as being mistaken!"[7]

Lack of originality, we might point out, can be attributed to other "greats" besides Locke. The nature of the subject is such that originality is hardly to be expected in terms of unit ideas, for all writers operate within a tradition of concern, social assumptions and methods of explanation. What can elevate the significance of a theorist is not so much the novelty of his ideas as the novel manner in which he combines, arranges or juxtaposes them. It is the shifting of emphasis rather than total novelty that is the

[1] J. Dunn, "The Politics of Locke in England and America in the Eighteenth Century," in J. W. Yolton ed., *John Locke: Problems and Perspectives* (Cambridge, 1969), 70.

[2] J. W. Gough, *John Locke's Political Philosophy* (Oxford, 1956), 123.

[3] John Locke, *Two Treatises of Government*, ed. P. Laslett (New York, 1965), 387, 395. Also see p. 75.

[4] C. B. Macpherson, *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism* (Oxford, 1962), 238.

[5] J. P. Plamenatz, *Man and Society* (London, 1965), I, 251.

[6] J. W. Gough, 124. See also Gough's *Social Contract* (2nd ed., Oxford, 1963) 145; H. J. Laski, *Political Thought in England from Locke to Bentham*, (1920, London, 1961), 40; R. H. Tawney, *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism*, (1926, Harmondsworth, 1964), 256.

[7] J. Dunn, 80. For view that medieval theory had already developed political ideas of succeeding times, see O. Gierke, *Political Theories of the Middle Ages*, trans. Maitland (Cambridge, 1922), 34–5, 48, 81, 87, 90. W. Ullmann, *A History of Political Thought: The Middle Ages* (Harmondsworth, 1965), 7.

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most we can reasonably expect.

From this perspective we can appreciate the significance of certain shifts of emphasis that Locke gave to commonplace ideas. Thus there was the importance that Locke placed on property rights as a derivation from natural law, on reason as a means of discovering such law, on the social rather than the governmental contract and on the belief in trust as the relationship between the ruled and their ruler.

Yet if Locke's originality was limited and his intellect unexceptional, he nevertheless managed to obtain a tremendous reputation. Leslie Stephen wrote of "Locke, the intellectual ruler of the eighteenth century . . . the mouthpiece of the Whigs of 1688."[8] From Paul Hazard, obviously prone to overenthusiasm, we learn that "you can count on your fingers the number of people who have not read, thumbed, and admired him . . . Locke was the moving spirit of the age . . . his influence was felt in every branch of intellectual activity."[9] Maurice Cranston believes that "no philosopher has exercised a greater influence."[10]

Extensive claims have been made for Locke's influence not only in England but in France and America. His ideas are said to have encouraged the Encyclopedists, Rousseau and the Physiocrats in France, and the revolutionary colonists and "founding fathers" of what became the United States of America.[11] John Dunn has attempted to temper the more exaggerated claims, pointing out that "In the purely academic tradition of discussing political obligation, the work is seldom even noticed in the first half of the [eighteenth] century in Britain . . . It is certainly untrue, despite the wealth of secondary testimony, that many people read the *Two Treatises of Government* in France in the first half of the eighteenth century." With regard to America, Dunn finds that "most

[8] *History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century*, ch.2., para. 11; ch. 10, para. 60.

[9] *European Thought in the Eighteenth Century* (1946, Harmondsworth, 1965) 53–4.

[10] M. Cranston, *Locke* (London, 1961), 7.

[11] See, in addition to the above, P. Hazard, *The European Mind, 1680–1715* (1935, Harmondsworth, 1964), 454, 456; G. Sorel, *The Illusions of Progress* (1908, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1969), 47, 51; P. Gay, *The Enlightenment An Interpretation*, vol. 2, "The Science of Freedom," (London, 1970) 559, 560, 562–3; A.M. Potter, *American Government and Politics*, (London, 1961), 26.

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educated Americans derived their view of politics directly from Locke's *Two Treatises* not persuasive."[12] Their political outlook was determined by numerous influences, among which Locke's political writings have no particular dominance.

Nevertheless, it was Locke's reputation, far outstripping his actual influence, that brought him renewed prominence at the end of the eighteenth century. The revolutions in America and France brought to the fore once again the vexed question of the citizen's conditional right of disobedience. Having provided the theoretical justification for the upheaval of 1688, certain later English reformers, particularly those associated with the dissenting academies, turned to Locke for the solution of their problems.[13]

Although not as influential as has often been claimed, Locke is still a figure of some significance. To an extent this has occurred precisely because Locke was not original. One of the reasons for his influence was surely that his theories were propounded in an environment well prepared and suited for their acceptance. Locke had the good fortune to express reasonably commonplace ideas at the right time, that is when circumstances made men particularly disposed to accept them. Furthermore he presented his thought in a manner that could be immediately understood by his readership. Peter Laslett has pointed out that "the scholars of our own day have been confused by it, not the men of the eighteenth century."[14] To an extent all theorists must speak to their own age; if not, they run the risk of being unintelligible. Yet more than most other political theorists Locke served a contemporary need. In an immediate sense he provided a necessary justification for an act of resistance against the monarch and he did so in a manner calculated to achieve a wide base of support. Although rightly regarded as having made an unconscious contribution to the secularization of thought, Locke still managed to formulate a position acceptable to nearly all Christians, excluding, of course, the Roman Catholics. Although he attacked the patriarchal attitudes of Filmer and provided a more tenuous theological framework than Hooker, Locke

[12] J. Dunn, 62; *The Political Thought of John Locke* (Cambridge, 1969) 8; Yolton ed., 79.

[13] See A. Lincoln, *Some Political and Social Ideas of English Dissent, 1763–1800* (Cambridge, 1938) 33, 82, 90, 114, 123.

[14] P. Laslett, Introduction, 24.

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still accepted a theological sanction for politics; he even included in the *Two Treatises* sections that seem inconsistent with full reliance on human consent.[15] Indeed, perhaps the most brilliant aspect of this work is the high level to which it carries the art of political persuasion. In such an attempt inconsistency might indeed be a merit.

Furthermore, the style of Locke's presentation served to extend its readership to the middle levels of educational ability. There is no trace of the numerous classical quotations that Algernon Sydney paraded before his readers, or the long theological passages that Hooker provided for his. Locke made no great show of erudition. His readers did not have to be theologically or legally learned in order to understand him. He wrote so that the reasonably educated man (the lettered and not just the erudite) could understand him, a device possibly containing the implication, that is still largely accepted, that politics need not be the preserve of the specially trained.

In a longer term perspective Locke provided a rationale for some basic changes in social and political conditions that were gradually taking place. He managed to reconcile belief in the private accumulation of property with the idea of original natural equality, thus revealing an evident compatibility between traditional ethical values and emerging economic practice. Locke, then, spoke not only to and for his own age, but also for the social groups that were slowly coming to form the basis of modern society. In the words of J. P. Plamenatz, "Locke's treatise was popular because it suited the social aspirations and also the intellectual prejudices of classes growing in importance, classes living on rents and profits and employing wage-labourers."[16]

Perhaps part of the continuing importance ascribed to Locke's *Two Treatises* derives from our still living in a later form of the kind of commercial society that he seemed to be advocating. That it is this form of commercial society may be a misconception, but it is not unprecedented for the continuing influence of a thinker to derive precisely from the fact that he is misunderstood. Perhaps part of Locke's appeal is due to the fact that he still seems to speak

[15] For example, *Second Treatise*, para. 6.
[16] J. P. Plamenatz, vol.1, p. 213. Also see M. Cranston, 7.

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to modern liberals. C. B. Macpherson has pointed out that the *Two Treatises* "seems to have almost everything that could be desired by the modern liberal democrat. Government by consent, majority rule, minority rights, moral supremacy of the individual, sanctity of individual property—all are there, and all are fetched from a first principle of individual natural rights and rationality, a principle both utilitarian and Christian."[17] There are points at which the reader might put what content he likes into Locke's pronouncements. Do all men make the contract, or is it only the propertied? By the late eighteenth century Price and Priestley were able to give the notion of consent a more democratic ring than Locke had ever envisaged. That Locke's writings should have been taken up by movements more radical than those with which he was personally associated can hardly surprise us. J. P. Plamenatz has remarked on the *Two Treatises* that "no one could guess that the revolution of which its author approved was the work of a small and wealthy part of the nation which dominated a legislature consisting of a hereditary House of Lords and another house elected on a very narrow franchise."[18] Thus Locke may appear relevant in a way that Augustine, for example, does not; for we think (often misleadingly) that Locke shared many of our assumptions.

The renown of Locke's *Two Treatises* then, stems more from the timing of its publication than from the originality of its content. Earlier writers who forwarded particular ideas that we now think of as Lockean are largely forgotten.

## II

Ideas usually exist in embryo for some time before their logic can be gradually followed through and before they can pervade society by enabling certain social groups to use them in a way that attracts wider attention than the norm. The radical ideas of the few have to be popularized before they can, in conjunction with other necessary factors, provide an impetus for social change. Locke's fame rests not only on the fact that he expressed old ideas in an acceptable and partly new form, but also because he expressed these views

[17] C. B. Macpherson, 194.
[18] J. P. Plamenatz, vol. 1, 209.

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at the opportune moment. The moral is the same as that which made poor Lord Monboddo a derided eccentric whilst winning for Charles Darwin extensive fame and esteem.[19]

And so, one can account for Locke's considerable fame relative to that of his so-called "predecessors" by this major difference: due to the fortuitous chance of good timing, his ideas were socially significant in a way that theirs could never be.

Thus at one level, Locke is included in studies of political thought not because he was startlingly original or philosophically brilliant, but because his reputation has been very considerable. However, we noted that Locke's reputation has been based on a rather exaggerated notion of his political influence. To the extent that we study past thinkers because they have been very influential, it would appear that Locke's status rests upon a partial misconception. The *Two Treatises* is regarded as a book to be read partly because it is regarded as having been widely read!

Perhaps a further irony is that the status of the *Two Treatises* was established not by virtue of its own intrinsic value, but by the reputation of its author. Before the *Two Treatises* was at all widely known Locke had won a considerable reputation with *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* and the *Letters on Toleration*. That Locke the philosopher had written on politics was enough to attract more attention to the *Two Treatises* than it would otherwise have gained. Laslett has pointed out that Locke's ability to cast a historically specific preoccupation in general philosophical terms was an essential precondition for durability.[20] This is true, but in itself it is not enough. Locke's *Two Treatises* have endured for reasons that are primarily social rather than intellectual. Locke's personal involvement with Shaftesbury and his previously gained intellectual reputation both helped considerably in making his account the standard defense of the "Glorious Revolution." But even more important is the fact that the "Glorious Revolution" was a tremendous popular success, and it is the combination of these factors that has given Locke a political reputation denied such figures as Algernon Sydney, Trenchard, Gordon, Neville and Tyrrell.

[19] See A. O. Lovejoy, *Essays in the History of Ideas* (Baltimore, 1948), ch. 3. especially 61; B. Russell, *A History of Western Philosophy* (London, 1962) 662.
[20] See P. Laslett, 91–2.

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In terms of the criteria of significance outlined at the beginning of this inquiry, Locke's status would appear to be related to points 3, 4 and 5 rather than to points 1 or 2. Thus more convincing claims can be made for his influence, typicality, and relevancy than for his intrinsic philosophical quality and originality. It ought therefore to be clear that the status of a political theorist may partially depend on a whole series of random factors, the significance of which is not usually taken into account. It seems to me that if one were to submit other political theorists to a similar investigation, factors of a similar order would be found to have contributed to their durability. For example, is it not true that the Russian Revolution has helped to make Marx appear academically interesting? His writings all date from before that event, but without the occurrence of a social unheaval made in his name they do not so obviously appear to warrant academic attention.

## III

So far I have assumed political theory to consist of the study of certain past thinkers. Now I want to consider whether there are any advantages in such an approach, a question that has an obvious bearing on whether works such as the *Two Treatises* are still worthy of attention. In an influential article Andrew Hacker wrote that "students are told to read the books with great care. But why they have to read them *at all* is a question which has seldom been squarely confronted!"[21]

Economists place no great emphasis on the history of economic theory. They assume past theories to have been superseded. Why should we not do the same? The distinction is perhaps between those who believe that the only good philosophers are dead ones, and those who hold that the only relevant philosophers are living ones. If one holds the former belief one might argue that intellectual contact with the "greats" sharpens one's own political thinking as no other intellectual experience could.

I should, however, prefer to base my argument on the view that a historical approach to political theory provides the surest

[21] A. Hacker, "Capital and Carbuncles," in J. A. Gould and V. V. Thursby, *Contemporary Political Thought* (New York, 1969) 103.

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means for emphasizing that all thinking takes place within an inherited tradition. We think our own thoughts but with the material at our disposal.

Karl Mannheim once wrote that "strictly speaking it is incorrect to say that the single individual thinks. Rather it is more correct to insist that he participates in thinking further what other men have thought before him."[22] The past has shaped the present, lives on in the present and provides part of the context which determines whether any set of thoughts are found plausible. In studying ideas chronologically one learns not just that all ideas, including our own, have a particular heritage from which they derive part of their character, but also that, as J. S. Mill pointed out, ideas that now seem implausible were once accepted by large sections of society, including its most educated men.[23]

To understand why this could have been so requires an imaginative leap into an age with very different assumptions and concerns. Thus part of a teacher's job is to suggest factors that once made plausible a work that no longer appears so, and, for related reasons, to encourage a certain becoming modesty concerning the status of contemporary values.

What separates political theory from other writings on politics (such as political history or journalism) is that it always exhibits the tendency towards generalization or abstraction, that is, "[it] has a constant tendency to become philosophy."[24] This characteristic must not be allowed to disguise the fact that nearly all political theory was written in response to certain particular problems of the time, and to try and understand a particular work requires one to be aware of what these problems were. The task is one of "grasping the point of the original intellectual enterprise,"[25] and this will be achieved more completely in proportion to the degree of related historical knowledge one can bring to bear. Thus we see that the understanding of past political theory requires wider

[22] K. Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia* (London, 1960) 3.

[23] See J. S. Mill, *On Liberty* (1859, London, 1962) 80.

[24] J. G. A. Pocock, "The History of Political Thought: A Methodological Enquiry," in P. Laslett and W. G. Runciman, *Philosophy, Politics and Society*," 2nd series (Oxford, 1969), 187.

[25] J. Dunn, "The Identity of the History of Ideas," *Philosophy*, XLII (1968), 99.

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knowledge than that of the texts themselves. C. B. Macpherson has pointed out that "where a writer can take it for granted that his readers will share some of his assumptions, he will see no need to set these out at the points in his argument where we, who do not share those assumptions automatically, think they should have been stated to make the argument complete."[26] In addition if we rule out any help we can get from history, that is, by looking at a writer's society, we not only deprive ourselves of possibly valuable help but are in danger of reading back into the mind of an earlier author some twentieth-century assumptions about man in society.[27] W. H. Greenleaf has recently pointed out that "it is necessary, in illuminating a political tradition, to draw on as wide a range of evidence as possible, to see political ideas and activity as part of a general cultural, social and historical context and to be correspondingly broad in the type of evidence deployed: literature, art, science, religion and so on can be very fruitful sources of data and are too often neglected for this purpose."[28]

In terms of the student's studying political theory as one course amongst many, such demands seem excessive and therefore unrealistic. But, generally speaking, even bringing to the subject some consciousness of broad social and historical trends would be a welcome first step.

To encourage a historical approach one should avoid referring to past philosophers in the present tense—"This is not how Hobbes speaks of it" as if one were commenting on a seminar paper that the great man had just given at one's own college.

To aid the process of comprehension it has been a characteristic of political theory, as of history in general, to provide broad categories by which basic similarities can be emphasized. Thus we relate individual thinkers to particular types of thought, ideology or even social movement. We categorize Burke under conservatism, Mill under liberalism and Trotsky under socialism. In doing this we aid comprehension by placing thought explicitly within "the

[26] C. B. Macpherson, 5.

[27] From a seminar paper C. B. Macpherson delivered at L.S.E. 1965.

[28] W. H. Greenleaf, "Theory and the Study of Politics," *British Journal of Political Science*, II, 1972, 475. In the same spirit A. O. Lovejoy has commented that "The history of ideas is therefore no subject for highly departmentalized minds," *The Great Chain of Being* (New York, 1965) 22.

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tradition of discourse to which it rightfully belongs"[29] but at the same time run into several dangers. For example, categories whose status ought to be merely suggestive become accepted as accurate descriptive frameworks. Thus "liberalism" has become widely accepted as the correct category for Mill's thought, which is thereby oversimplified by neglect of the conservative aspects of his fear of mass society and of his later socialism. Thus our organizing categories can tend to a static view of a thinker's ideas.[30] An even worse case when "the conceptual organization chosen has often deformed the data"[31] is where acceptance of the category leads us to a too simple view of whatever is subsumed within it. Thus one might mistakenly impute certain ideas to Mill "because he was a liberal" rather than because of textual evidence.[32] At this point our categories can become more real than the material they categorize. Herbert Butterfield has warned that "the division of history into periods would hardly be important as an issue if we were not liable to become the slaves of our system, liable to forget how much of convention has entered into the dating of epochs and the fixing of the labels. When a concept like that of the Renaissance is imposed upon the course of history it is capable of having serious consequences for the student, for the simple reason that human-beings are prone to absentmindedness. The framework that we give to the events of the past often becomes a harder form of knowledge than anything else; so that, for many people, the Renaissance becomes a 'thing' as firm as a battle or a bench, and even stands in history as the cause of causes. In these circumstances it is possible to imagine that we have explained something when we have said that it is due to the Renaissance."[33]

We might also find ourselves forgetting the *post facto* nature of our classifications. To classify Paine under "progress" does not mean that it was his primary intention to contribute to this school of thought (which did not exist as a school) rather than to reply to

[29] J. G. A. Pocock, 200.

[30] See Q. Skinner, "Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas," *History and Theory*, VIII, 1969, 19.

[31] J. Dunn, 104.

[32] Also see Q. Skinner, 18.

[33] H. Butterfield, *Man on His Past* (Cambridge, 1955) 136. Also see J. Dunn, 85.

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Burke.[34] Our categories, then, while helping us to see each thinker within a wider context rather than in isolation, should be used with the utmost caution.

## IV

So far I have tried to indicate both some merits of the history of political thought and also the manner in which one should approach it. In opposition to this, one can argue that modern theory embodies all that is best in traditional political theory, which it has thereby rendered superfluous. If one is interested in system survival, rather than read Hobbes's *Leviathan*, one should turn to Chester Barnard's *Functions of the Executive*.[35] I am far from wishing to deny the value of modern organization theory, which need not be taken as an *alternative* form of study, but merely to emphasize certain advantages deriving from the historical approach. Thus, it tends towards awareness of an inherited culture as a determinant of contemporary thinking and thereby provides a necessary perspective on the present. It also tends towards a dynamic approach to thought which is viewed, as both it and society should be, in terms of an ongoing process of change.

A major alternative approach to political theory is where the study is organized around concepts rather than thinkers. Rather than study Hobbes's views on contract, sovereignty obligation, property, and then study Locke and Rousseau in the same way, we organize our inquiry around such concepts as contract, sovereignty, obligation and property and consider Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau only in so far as they can further our understanding on each topic. Thus attention is given only to those thinkers who are judged to be good on topics that concern us.

My objection to this approach is that its conclusions tend to appear as certainties rather than merely as summaries of present thinking. The nonhistorical approach tends to eternalize or deify the conclusions of one moment. It takes ideas out of the wider context in which they were held, and which gave them their real life and meaning. It presents thought as static rather than dynamic, dead rather than alive. I do not want to suggest that there is any-

[34] See Q. Skinner, 24.
[35] Cambridge, 1938.

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thing intrinsically wrong with the study of ideas as *ideas*, irrespective of any broader considerations of the emergence of or preconditions for various *beliefs*, but merely that it is not an appropriate method for those of us in a social [studies] science faculty. Our concern should be with ideas as social phenomena, and as such our approach should indicate the historical and social context of thought in the manner I have outlined.

I want briefly to conclude by considering theory within its wider political context, taking politics first as a practical activity and then as an object of study.

In respect of political activity, theory, at one level, indicates the way in which political events are perceived.[36] It indicates the categories into which facts and events are organized. The significance of this is that it is on the basis of such perceptions that political decisions are made. At another level, theory appears as ideology either when it expresses the political perceptions and motivations of a group or class of society, or when it is used as propaganda in political struggle. This makes theory appear as an issue solely affecting that minority who take an active part in political affairs, but it is, in fact, much more diffuse. First, I would like to suggest that there is much truth in the well-known quotation from J. M. Keynes that

> "the ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed, the world is ruled by little else. Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influences, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist. Madmen in authority, who hear voices in the air, are distilling their frenzy from some academic scribbler of a few years back."[37]

Second, I believe that novelist Saul Bellow did much more than project onto others his own interest in ideas when he wrote that "People are dying—it is no metaphor—for something real to carry home when day is done. See how willing they are to accept the wildest nonsense."[38] The search for a comprehensive social perspective, for a *Weltanschauung*, then, is far more extensive than is often

[36] W. H. Greenleaf, 468.

[37] Quoted in P. J. Madgwick, *Introduction to British Politics* (London, 1970) 394–5.

[38] S. Bellow, *Herzog* (Harmondsworth, 1972) 34.

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supposed.

Turning to the study of politics, let me suggest that my remarks on political theory are applicable throughout political studies. I have argued that political theory should be studied in a historical and social context, and I now assert that this framework should apply to the study of political institutions. To give just two brief guidelines: how can one understand the composition of the British House of Lords if one is not conscious of its historical continuity from the times of landed power in feudal society? Does not an assessment of the political influence of the civil service require, among other things, an inquiry into the social composition of its membership? What such suggestions amount to is that political studies, in all its aspects, draws much nearer both to sociology and to social, economic and political history. This suggestion is far from novel, but needs re-emphasizing until it is more widely implemented.

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# Book Reviews

Class and Politics in the United States *by Richard F. Hamilton. New York, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1972.—xiv, 589 pp. $14.95.*

One of the important points which Hamilton makes is that academics tend to exist in an ingrown world, talking primarily to each other or, on occasion, to other professionals or powerful figures in business or government. This isolation is a breeding ground for many myths, especially for those myths that see the rest of the population as closeminded, bigoted, and conservative. The great virtue of Hamilton's book is that he uses survey data to destroy these myths, and shows that blue-collar workers and the lower paid white-collar workers are less conservative, less authoritarian, and no more bigoted than are high paid white-collar workers, particularly the upper-middle class white Protestants.

Hamilton puts great emphasis on social welfare issues and demonstrates that a majority of the population has for years been to the left of either party on social welfare issues like health care and job guarantees. He shows that candidates who run as liberals on such issues tend to be immunized against repercussions of less popular stands on issues further from people's everyday concerns. His major conclusion from this—which is strengthened by analysis of trends in birth rates, migration patterns, and occupational structure—is that the United States has an electorate which would support a well-led attempt to organize a Social Democratic party. Hamilton, of course, would not see McGovern as having represented bread-and-butter working class politics. Furthermore, he argues that in the absence of such a party, American politics will be dominated by parties reflecting upper-class and upper-middle-class views, and thus will remain unresponsive to majority sentiments.



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Hamilton also examines the nature of class in America; in this examination he is a refreshing contrast to those he calls the "revised Marxists" such as Lipset and Bell. He does *not* assume that the key dividing line is that between manual and nonmanual workers. Instead, he finds that when you examine people's attitudes "the biggest 'break' in the class structure . . . is between the lower–middle and upper–middle classes" (p. 218). Thus, he holds that manual workers and lower paid nonmanuals should be viewed as one class and the higher paid nonmanuals as another. He also points out that the distinction between white Protestants and All Others marks another important differential of attitudes; the white Protestant upper–middle class is the great (and somewhat isolated) reservoir of conservatism in America. Hamilton does not consider changes within the upper–middle class. It would be interesting to know whether changes in the nature of work in such marginally upper-middle class occupations as teaching and social welfare, and the consequent growth of unionism in them, have been accompanied by "proletarianization" of their attitudes.

Perhaps the most telling drawback to Hamilton's work is his failure to seriously consider control-of-life issues. If one accepts his basic thesis that issues generated by everyday life are the fundamental shapers of politics, the immediate consequence is that there are *two* kinds of such issues. The first has to do with the "bread and butter" of income and expenditures; Hamilton bases his analysis around these issues. However, other everyday concerns include such questions as who controls what happens on the job (and thus, how tired it makes you, and how unsafe it is) and who determines the nature of one's community (for instance, is it "renewed" out of existence?). His failure to consider these issues leads to an underestimation of both the sources of popular discontent and the potential sources of political activists who might challenge the established parties. Therefore, Hamilton accepts European social democracy as a model for American working-class politics without considering the conservative politics of the AFL-CIO bureaucracy or the existence of movements seeking to establish rank-and-file control over both working conditions and wage issues. The author's discussion, in spite of ably documenting working-class discontent, thus misses possible solutions to both bread-and-butter and control problems of everyday life.

Although the book has these drawbacks and is extremely long, *Class and Politics in the United States* is one of the best recent works of American political sociology. It is hoped that it will soon appear in paperback so that it can be assigned as collateral reading for undergraduate classes.

SAMUEL R. FRIEDMAN
*University of California, Los Angeles*

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The Winning of the Midwest: Social and Political Conflict, 1888-96 *by Richard J. Jensen. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1971. —xvii, 357 pp. $12.50.*

Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics *by Walter Dean Burnham. New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1970. —xii, 210 pp. $3.95 (paperback).*

What are the "mainsprings" of American politics? To historians of Charles A. Beard's generation differences in economic situation were the "real stuff" of politics, and the impact of major depressions can hardly be denied. A more recent generation has joined Lee Benson in pointing to the potent effects of pietistic sects versus the more liturgical churches. Both of these issue dimensions compete within an institutional framework itself subject to change, and buttressed by habitual party loyalty to the Republican and Democratic parties. The relative impact of economic and moral issues is most evident in those relatively few elections in which party lines are broken, and new loyalties emerge. Burnham seeks to examine such major changes from the days of Andrew Jackson to Richard Nixon, but with most emphasis on the realigning election of 1896. Richard Jensen presents a more detailed account of the changes culminating in the election of 1896 in the Midwest.

Jensen covers much the same ground as Paul Kleppner's *The Cross of Culture* (1970), and with similar emphasis. Both Jensen and Kleppner see political changes in the late nineteenth-century Midwest turning primarily on cultural or moral issues such as state enforcement of prohibition and state regulation of parochial schools. The GOP, reflecting its Know-Nothing and Abolitionist background, was the usual vehicle of the pietistic reformers. In the evenly balanced Midwest both parties sought to mobilize their voters by vast army-like campaigns, with professional politicians directing the use of patronage workers, funds, and floating voters. Jensen is at his best in recreating this lost world. Just how greatly the post-1896 "political universe" differs from others is a theme taken up by Burnham.

Why the great change wrought by 1896 in the Midwest? Jensen's answer might be summarized as showing that reformist amateur leaders were catapulted into office by pietistic Republican voters in the late 1880s. Once in office they imposed moralistic reforms—prohibition in Iowa, the Bennett Law requiring schools to use the English language in Wisconsin —that brought electoral disaster. German-Americans swung to the Democrats, who won smashing victories in 1890 and 1892. But the panic of 1893 was universally blamed on the Cleveland administration, and Bry-

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an's nomination and 1896 campaign put the onus of moralizing political style on the Democrats. The liturgical groups were pushed away from the Democrats, and McKinley sewed them up for the Republicans by accepting cultural pluralism. With the return of prosperity the Republicans were the party of pluralism *and* of the full dinner pail, and not of pietistic reform. Jensen—like Kleppner—has performed a service in showing the importance of the moralistic reform issues. Both support their cases with a great deal of quantitative data. But the data is a bit too inductive and descriptive; what one longs for is some explicit comparison of the explanatory power of party loyalty, moral issues, and economic concerns.

Where Jensen in strongest in dealing with an independent variable—the pietistic-liturgical dimension in the electorate—Burnham concentrates almost exclusively on the dependent variable of the two-party vote. He organizes his discussion on the dependent variable of the two-party vote and orders his discussion around the concept of "Critical Election," defined as one which brings a sharp and durable change in party balance. He is most convincing in his discussion of the lessening of both turnout and party loyalty after the 1890s, and in demonstrating the considerable drop in major party loyalty among voters in the 1960s. The sharp decline in twentieth-century turnout might be related to the more pluralistic politics of post-1896, to the shift in campaign style, the drying up of patronage, the lack of close competition at the state level, the fading of post-Civil War party loyalties, development of registration systems, and the enfranchisement of unpoliticized women. Again we must weigh *relative* impacts of these factors on turnout, as well as contrasting effects of economic and moralistic issues on partisanship.

Burnham largely ignores independent variables, putting more of his emphasis on the search for possible cycles or periodicities in his dependent variable. This viewpoint strikes me as the most serious weakness of his approach: the "mainsprings" of American politics are its independent variables. Burnham simply falls back on Louis Hartz' "consensus" history to suggest that American society and government are structured to avoid making basic changes. Hence policy falls behind objective needs, until eventually things become so disastrous as to generate a "critical election." Changes are made, but the system begins to fall behind again. Something of this sort might be read into the 1920s-1930s, but does not seem to be what was involved in Jensen's Midwest, or in the America of the 1850s.

Systematic analysis of quantitative data should tell us a great deal more about the relative influence of different variables in electoral politics. Yet this promise remains largely unfulfilled. Explanatory power rests on the use of both independent and dependent variables to test explicit theories; it can not be achieved by more illustration of the role of moral-

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istic issues (as in Jensen) or by speculation about changes in the dependent variable (as in Burnham). The "new" political history thus falls considerably short—to date—of the impressive achievements of the "new" economic history.

H. DOUGLAS PRICE
*Harvard University*

Systematic Thinking for Social Action, *by Alice M. Rivlin, Washington, D. C., The Brookings Institution, 1971,—ix, 150 pp. $5.95.*

This short but informative book consists of the H. Rowan Gaither Lectures in Systems Science delivered in 1970 by Dr. Rivlin. Although PPBS (planning-programming-budgeting system), introduced into the Department of Defense in 1961, constitutes the point of departure of these lectures, they do not attempt to evaluate PPBS procedures. While analysts have not made decisions easier, they have developed a process needed in an age when "decision-makers rarely have time to read," and they have revealed "how difficult the problems and choices are." Dr. Rivlin's lectures reflect her own experience in HEW with action programs involving costs and benefits, many of them elusive.

The lectures reveal much, though they do not inquire in depth the degree to which individuals respond to programs in ways that counterbalance their effects (e.g., when measures to produce safety also foster careless or reckless behavior), the degree in which the growing availability of survey and other social data tends to substitute less informing cross-sectional analysis for more penetrating longitudinal analysis (e.g., of poverty), or the degree in which such human states are subjective rather than objective in character. Man and his behavior are not parameters; both tend to respond conceptually and behaviorally to changes in research and life situations and thereby qualify assumptions of *ceteris paribus*.

In a major chapter on "Who Wins and Who Loses?" Dr. Rivlin examines diverse views, solutions, and aspects of income-maintenance, welfare, educational problems, and budgetary constraints in the 1960s. The author reports "an almost complete absence of behavior information" regarding how beneficiaries of programs will react, but in later chapters she devotes some attention to estimating responses. Before doing so, however, Dr. Rivlin looks into the current shortage of indices whereby effects of programs may be measured, and the net results of quite different programs (e.g., "cancer cure versus reading") may be contrasted

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in terms other than narrower cost-benefit results. She points out that cost-benefit analyses of social action programs are not likely to sway congressmen, most of whom are interested in physical, not dollar, results and in the identification of beneficiaries. Yet benefit-cost analysis is useful for "primarily investment programs" (e.g., dams), though distributional problems (and a tendency to overestimate benefits) remain.

Chapter 4 is devoted to lack of knowledge on how to produce "effective services" (e.g., "particular kinds of health or education" programs), a lack intensified by increasing stress on "quality." Note is taken of the monopolistic character of production and delivery of such publicly supplied services as health and education, together with other sources of difficulty. In Chapter 5, "Finding Out What Works," the author recommends that, in addition to learning from "natural" experiments, "the federal government take the leadership in organizing, funding, and evaluating systematic experiments with various ways of delivering education, health, and other social services." Advantages of such experimentation would "far outweigh disadvantages," to some of which attention is called.

In the closing chapter the author examines such alternate means of achieving accountability as decentralization of decisionmaking, community control, and market mechanisms. She warns against reliance upon "single measures of social service performance" and indicates that they "must reflect the difficulty of the problem."

Dr. Rivlin's insightful conclusions should have wide currency among legislators and administrators.

JOSEPH J. SPENGLER
*Duke University*

Harry S. Truman *by Margaret Truman. New York, William Morrow & Company, Inc., 1973.—602 pp. $10.95.*

The historians and other social scientists who wrote the first scholarly assessments of the postwar era were almost unanimous in their praise of President Harry S. Truman's leadership. "Not one of his grave steps in foreign and military affairs has yet been proved wrong, stupid, or contrary to the best judgment and interests of the American people," concluded Clinton Rossiter in 1956. In 1962 seventy-five distinguished historians, responding to a poll by Arthur M. Schlesinger, placed Truman among the "near great" presidents—just below such "great presidents as Lincoln, Washington, Franklin Roosevelt, Wilson and Jefferson; and alongside Jackson, Theodore Roosevelt, Polk, John Adams and Cleveland.

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Harry Truman, wrote the elder Schlesinger, had "discharged impressively the awesome obligations devolving on the United States as the leader of the free world upon the advent of the cold war with Soviet imperialism. The Truman Doctrine for the protection of Greece and Turkey, the Marshall Plan for the restoration of Western Europe, the Berlin Airlift, the Point Four program for backward countries, NATO (our first peacetime military alliance) and the intervention in Korea in support of the United Nations—all these constituted landmarks in an assumption of global responsibilities undreamed of only a few years before."

In recent years a new generation of historians, disillusioned by a decade of war and civil disorder, have begun to challenge this orthodox appraisal of the Truman presidency. Their efforts have led to a much more severe assessment of Truman, assigning to him a large share of responsibility for the burgeoning cold war abroad and the failure of liberal politics at home. Margaret Truman's biography of her father may be read in part as an attack on these recent interpretations and as a reaffirmation of more traditional views about the man from Missouri.

This is not, of course, primarily a political biography, much less a history of the Truman era. Rather it is a daughter's intimate and admiring portrait of a father who also happened to be president of the United States. It is especially rich in anecdotal detail, most of which amplifies the traditional image of Harry Truman as a plain-spoken son of the middle border who dismissed much of official Washington as "prima donnas and stuffed shirts" (p. 193), who privately referred to presidential visitors as "customers" (pp. 19, 161, 249) and who called 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue "the great White Jail" (p. 327). Seen through his daughter's eyes, he was a man of simple virtues—a family man who was loving and attentive to his immediate kin and a peacemaker among the sometimes warring factions of the larger family; a loyal friend who refused to abandon his associates even when it was politically expedient to do so. Pressed in 1939 to repudiate one-time Kansas City Democratic Boss Tom Pendergast, he replied bluntly that "I'm not a rat who deserts a sinking ship" (p. 117).

For Truman, as for his daughter, the issues were always clear and the choices never ambiguous. The Atomic bomb was dropped to "save lives," and the new diplomacy of the cold war designed to restrain a Soviet regime which Truman privately characterized as "a Frankenstein dictatorship worse than any of the others, Hitler included" (p. 360). Those who opposed him were "crackpots" (William O. Douglas, Tommy Corcoran, Harold Ickes, Claude Pepper, p. 13), "pinhead[s]" (Robert Taft and the Republican right wing, p. 349), "professional liberals" (Americans for Democratic Action, pp. 7, 8) and "Reds, phonies and . . . parlor pinks"

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(Henry Wallace and his supporters, p. 317). In such a simplified world it is not surprising that even the most frightful decisions could be executed by Truman with such an unnerving serenity of conscience and lack of introspection.

There is some new information in this biography—drawn both from Margaret Truman's recollections and from her access to her father's private papers. Truman realized, for example, as early as the summer of 1944, that Franklin Roosevelt was seriously ill and would probably not live out the fourth term. "1600 Pennsylvania is a nice address," he wrote, "but I'd rather not move in through the back door. . . ." (p. 167). Such revelations are rare, however. In spite of the author's desire to correct the misinterpretations of those she refers to as "so-called historians" (p. 232), this volume will not greatly affect scholarly debate over the Truman presidency.

ROBERT GRIFFITH
*University of Massachusetts*

The Engineering of Restraint: The Nixon Administration and the Press (A Report of the American Civil Liberties Union) *by Fred Powledge. Washington, D. C., Public Affairs, Press, 1971.—53 pp. $1.00.*

The Credibility Problem: A report based on an in-depth study of the relationship between the Nixon Administration and the mass media *by the American Institute for Political Communication. Washington, D. C., 1972.—99 pp. $6.50.*

There can be little doubt at the present time that the media are subject to general criticism and perhaps even open attack. Constructive criticism has always been generally accepted within journalism and some of the harshest reformers have been, and continue to be, members of the profession. But coercion and repression are not akin to criticism and these are the subjects of the American Civil Liberties Union report authored by Fred Powledge. Disclaiming any pretense at being a scientific survey, the study is based upon interviews with more than forty-five individuals involved in the print or broadcast media. The author acknowledges that his sample of interviewees is overrepresented by persons working in one section of the country and that his study concentrates upon the experiences of the Columbia Broadcasting System more than those of its competitors: "This paper makes no apology for these apparent biases: the bulk of the news, and of the news action, takes place in Washington and

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New York, and, theoretically, at least, the press is more widely represented, more competitive, and more inclined to be free there than elsewhere. If the press is having a hard time in the intellectual confines of Washington and New York, the theory went, then we are in trouble" (p. 3).

Over the years the press and the government have developed, according to Powledge, "an elaborate game" wherein the government "puts out only the information it wants to put out" and the press "accepts the mimeographed press releases only at face value, treating them as mere tips of icebergs." Noting that this "relationship has almost always been an adversary one," the author suggests the situation is now "deteriorating": "Attacks on the press by the officers of government have become so widespread and all-pervasive that they constitute a massive federal-level attempt to subvert the letter and the spirit of the First Amendment" (p. 6). The author then catalogues the devices utilized to frustrate, restrain, and, in his view, even intimidate the press. The report also provides instances when these practices were exercised. In conclusion, Powledge writes: "It is in these ways that the First Amendment is being lost, a little each day. It could, and should, be argued that the threat would not be nearly so great if the press itself had fought harder for its own freedom. But it must not matter that the press has chosen to approach this delicate matter with kid gloves on; the First Amendment does not belong to the press, but to the people, and they must not allow it to be given away or traded for a little respectability, or a little immunity from a politician's criticism" (p. 41).

While material was being gathered for the ACLU report, the American Institute for Political Communication, a nonpartisan, nonprofit research organization, was conducting interviews in the autumn of 1971 for its study. Those participating in the project included policy and career officials of the federal government, both agency and White House personnel, newspaper and broadcast correspondents in the Washington press corps, and "the editors of newspapers in all regions of the country and broadcast media executives in each city in which an editor was interviewed." Details on these samples, administration of interviews, and copies of the interview schedules are included in the study.

In general the Institute's project is an excellent study, in terms of its methodology and its wealth of findings. While all of the report's revelations cannot be included here, certain of them are most interesting when compared with the conclusions of the ACLU study. Not only is "the Nixon administration . . . more active in seeking to move its message into the media and to the public than was its predecessor," but the administration was also viewed as one "which exercises greater control over in-

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formational dissemination than did the Johnson administration" (p. 21). Yet, in spite of seemingly tighter control of information, the study found that the "theory that government and press are, by the nature of things, adversaries, is open to serious question. The facts demonstrate that media-government cooperation and interdependence in the news dissemination process are more typical than are examples of adversary activity." Further, "Those who view the Executive Branch and the press as adversaries are reacting more to differences in political philosophy, bitterness engendered by opposition to some governmental policies, and antipathy to the President and his staff than they are to the basic realities of the working relationship between government agencies and the media."

Such a breakdown in the adversary relationship, noted by Powledge, is evident in the Institute's study regarding the extent to which Washington newspaper and broadcast media—about a third of their sample—complied with government requests to withhold a story already in their hands (p. 35). Indeed, such compliance and amicability between the press and the government may be due to the dependence of media upon the government for a story. At one point the Institute study notes "that the number of stories 'dug out' by reporters without governmental cooperation in some form is very limited" (p. 52). Contrary to the expressed view of Powledge, however, is the Institute study's finding that Washington media are not competitive, that there is a "herd instinct" which further serves to reduce adversary activity (pp. 66–68). Yet, after exploring much of the same material considered by Powledge, the Institute recommends: "Journalists [to] disabuse themselves of the notion that government and press are inevitably adversaries and focus on the truism that adequate coverage of governmental affairs requires mutual respect, tolerance and cooperation, as well as curiosity, a modicum of 'suspicion' of bureaucratic actions and the proverbial 'digging' for news." Such may be desirable if, as Powledge warns, the First Amendment is not a casualty of this accommodation.

HAROLD C. RELYEA
*Washington, D. C.*

A House for All Peoples: Ethnic Politics in Chicago, 1890-1936 *by John M. Allswang. Lexington, The University Press of Kentucky, 1971.—x, 253 pp. $8.95.*

Professor Allswang sees political history very much as does his mentor, Professor Samuel Hays of Pittsburgh. Socioeconomic class—with an emphasis on wealth and occupation—seems to explain behavior less well

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than scrutiny of ethnicity, especially that of national origin, religion and race. Since I agree, my review necessarily picks at method and inference, rather than presupposition. Before expressing reservations, let me record my admiration for the enormous labor and scrupulous attempts at classification which inform this book.

Not much besides presupposition is presented for the years prior to the 1920s. Urban social statistics are notoriously skimpy until the federal government provided census tract analysis. That the W.P.A. provided a survey and translation of the foreign-language press in Chicago is a pure blessing, even if Professor Allswang has scruples about inferring from newspapers what ethnics believed or did. More surprising is Professor Allswang's reluctance to avail himself of the tentative conclusions of scholars like Nelli, Vecoli, and Spear; though none of these specialists was primarily interested in *electoral* behavior, they have illuminated the character of ethnic life—admittedly less tangible and measurable, but, I should think, so real as not to be ignored. Perhaps because of these apparently self-imposed limitations, Allswang has confined himself pretty much to the period from 1928 to 1936.

I do not mean to be captious. Ethnic life in a metropolis is extremely hard to measure. Allswang, for example, has had to resort to "groups" like Czechoslovak, Yugoslav, and Jew—which probably make more sense in the mind of the beholder than in the consciousness of the individuals. He also directs the bulk of his attention to establishing that 1928 was a "turning-point" for ethnic life, politically—when an apparently deplorable preoccupation with personalities and issues finally yielded to the kind of commitment to party which constitutes Allswang's central criterion for Americanization. That is history written according to the conventional wisdom of the 1950's. Is it still true today, in the era of the Kennedys, of Goldwater, and of McGovern?

As in all ethnic group history, Allswang has had to choose, and he has opted for the group (rather than the individual), and for electoral behavior (rather than family structure and change, upward economic mobility, etc.). A historian certainly has the right to declare what he thinks were the *real* issues; his readers have an equal right to be noncommittal.

The best section of interpretation, in contrast to the many magisterial sections of ethnic indices, is Allswang's section on the character and mode of Anton Cermak. (We still have no study of Cermak to compare with Arthur Mann's *LaGuardia Comes to Power.*) The relationship of Cermak to Big Bill Thompson—the William Randolph Hearst of Chicago in the 1920's—is only hinted at, but suggestively so.

Finally, much as I learned from this volume, I am left with a nagging

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uncertainty about the theme announced in the title. In what sense *was* Chicago a "house for all peoples?" From Studs Lonigan to Studs Terkel, there is little affirmation; and black Americans might reasonably find the title phantasmagoric. Perhaps Chicago's political leaders—say from Jake Arvey to Richard Daley—might have consulted, to their benefit, with Polly Adler about what it takes to make a house a home.

ROBERT D. CROSS
*University of Virginia*

Ethnocentrism: Theories of Conflict, Ethnic Attitudes and Group Behavior *by Robert A. LeVine and Donald T. Campbell. New York, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1972.—310 pp. $10.95.*

The scientific study of race relations in the United States has traditionally been a ghetto itself. Ironically, this field of intellectual inquiry mirrored its subject: it was an insulated domain within social science, typically viewed with disdain, granted meager status and research funds, and cut off from many of the principal trends and advances in both theory and method.

LeVine and Campbell's *Ethnocentrism* is therefore an especially welcome contribution, for it signals the end of the insulated tradition for race relations thought. Together with Blalock's earlier volume, *Toward a Theory of Minority-Group Relations*, this new book establishes a solid theoretical base for the field that should be of interest to laymen as well as specialists.

LeVine, an anthropologist at the University of Chicago, and Campbell, a social psychologist at Northwestern University, combine their talents to consider the full spectrum of theoretical perspectives. Individual chapters consider the sweep of both societal theories, including evolutionary ideas, and sociopsychological theories, including frustration-aggression and learning ideas. Each chapter is well written, fairly presented, and organized into specific, testable hypotheses.

But the book's most valuable contribution is a brief 19-page summary chapter on the "concord and discord" among the various theories. For example, there is agreement from every perspective that groups return hostility with hostility in both behavior and attitudes, that increasing scarcity of the resources competed for heightens intergroup conflict, and that group differences are typically exaggerated in intergroup stereotypes. Interestingly, all theories concur that there is a positive relationship between a group's social complexity and its level of ethnocentrism.

There are also wide disagreements between the theories. Is ethnocen-

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trism affected, for instance, by the outgroup's power, proximity, and similarity? Theories contradict each other on these points. And research to date suggests that the answers are complex. Hence, the perceived *relative* power of the outgroup, and not its absolute power, may be controlling; the most hated and aggressed-upon outgroups are often at a *medium* range of proximity; and similar groups appear to be more liked when they are close, but dissimilar groups more disliked when they are close.

*Ethnocentrism* constitutes, then, a major contribution to our understanding of intergroup relations. It can be recommended not only to specialists but also to non-social scientists who want to learn how the field is progressing apart from the much-publicized policy debates over schools and "busing."

THOMAS F. PETTIGREW
*Harvard University*

Black Religion and Black Radicalism: An Examination of the Black Experience in Religion *by Gayraud S. Wilmore. New York, Doubleday and Company, 1972.—xiii, 343 pp. $7.95.*

This work is at once indebted to the 1964 work *Black Religion: The Negro and Christianity in the United States,* and is a revisionist attempt to correct and update it. As an introductory survey, it is useful; the uninitiated will find it readable. As a contribution to knowledge, it leaves off where the specialist wishes it began. There are two fundamental weaknesses: lack of careful definition respecting such terms as "black nationalism" or "radicalism" and lack of evidence for the title's theme. Superficially read the book seems to describe radicalism in the religious experience of the black American community. As such it reminds readers that the Afro-American interest in religion is unrestrained affirmation of spiritual equality in the world to come and a means to increase the will for human equality in our daily lives. Nevertheless, Mr. Wilmore really wishes readers to equate authentic black religion with radicalism. He goes beyond his evidence to connect black religion and black power. While never defining radicalism (black nationalism, black power), the descriptive use of the term causes the serious reader to infer from all implications that radicalism means overthrowing American structures and values.

Radicalism for Wilmore means revolution—black ideational and ideological replacements for Western values and institutions which he hopes will come through black power as the perfect blend of African and Afro-American elements. Unfortunately, however laudable his concern, it

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counters the intent and content of black folk in religion. Instead of revealing this dimension, the author ignores it through a highly selective use of black religious leaders (e.g., Nat Turner, Malcolm X). He is right in his analysis, but wrong in his conclusion. The radicalism of blacks through religion is root protest against color prejudice and institutional racism. Blacks seek not a new religion, economics, politics, but a society which gives them equal opportunity. Their faith is in America and they fight for the change precisely because they perceive America as measuring itself against the ideal of the kingdom of God or the brotherhood of man, the ultimate hope of black folk and their religion. Wilmore comes perilously close to ignoring the wisdom of the folk who have no more given up on the demand of the American dream than on the kingdom of God.

One suspects that the impatience of the black power movement has affected Wilmore: expediency replaces the real revolutionary dimension of the black movement in religion. Black folk have known the tension between the American ideal (Constitution, Bill of Rights) and the ethnodominant WASP (Thomas Jefferson, Abraham Lincoln) belief that they cannot be at one here with other Americans. Blacks have insisted that the ideal be realized and the racist ethos be overcome. There is a radicalism here that will ultimately change society irrespective of its economic, political, and social institutions. Black religion does not need a surrogate. The folk need to be reminded, instructed, encouraged and strengthened in their resolve. They will prevail because they are right and wise, and they have a doctrine of sin. This thesis is missing in Wilmore's black power religion. Even more is missing of the folk's doctrine of redemption combined with a grace to overcome in time, against odds, under pressure. In a word, Wilmore has not listened to black folk. His book seeks to give black folk his own religion (which is not bad)—it simply is not theirs.

JOSEPH R. WASHINGTON, JR.
*University of Virginia*

Sentencing in a Rational Society *by Nigel Walker. New York, Basic Books, Inc., 1971.—xii, 239 pp. $6.95.*

The centrally important moment in Anglo-American criminal justice is the meting out of sentence, when the man who stands convicted of crime will have a portion of his life disposed of by a judge who is making an honest effort to give substance to a rag-bag assortment of ideas about what ought to be done to criminals, ideas imposed upon him by the legislature, his colleagues, the news media, and the public at large. The

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depressing statistics on recidivism demonstrate the need for some better approach to sentencing. The American edition of Nigel Walker's book gives us a model for a better, rational system of sentencing.

Walker's system of sentencing is meant to achieve one main purpose, the reduction of legally prohibited conduct. Any penal technique which serves that purpose, subject to the limitations of economic reality and of the humanitarian bias against gratuitous suffering and brutality, should be available to the sentencer. Walker considers and rejects such other purposes as the protection of suspects from unoffical retaliation; the demonstration of society's abhorrence of crime; and the achievement of simple retribution, retribution appropriate to the offense, and H. L. A. Hart's retribution in distribution.

Walker considers the scope of the criminal law and suggests cost-benefit analysis as the best means for deciding what kind of behavior ought to be criminally prohibited. He examines the concept of general deterrence (an example of unfocused penal techniques) and six forms of corrective measures—custody, semi-detention, supervision, fines, nominal penalties, and psychotherapeutic techniques (examples of penal techniques that focus on individual offenders). Walker then lays the groundwork for the most interesting propositions in his book, the "strategic approach" to sentencing and the use of mathematical models for research, by noting the outcome of W. H. Hammond's research on the efficacy of various penal techniques in Britain. Hammond found the best (that is, fewest reconvictions after its imposition) penal measure to be the fine, followed by discharge (a nominal measure), then by imprisonment, with probation last and least effective (p. 94).

Walker forcefully argues that while current diagnostic techniques used by courts can predict with better than chance accuracy which offenders will be convicted again, they give the sentencer no guide as to what sentence to impose. Walker then argues (pp. 105-11) that the sentencer should follow a game-theory strategy in sentencing. Given Hammond's results, the sentencer can produce the fewest reconvictions by fining all first offenders. Those offenders reconvicted should next be discharged, then put on probation (a deviation from the logic of Hammond's results dictated by economic and humanitarian considerations), and, finally, imprisoned.

In Chapter 8 and in Appendix A, Walker suggests a mathematical-modelling approach to sentencing research. He constructs a model which conforms reasonably well to Hammond's data, using either of two assumptions: the offenders studied may be regarded as conditionally and indistinguishably responsive to available penal measures in the majority of cases, *but* (1) include a small minority of individuals who are unresponsive to all penal measures *or* (2) include a very large majority of

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individuals who respond to any penal measure at the first application. Only if the second assumption is correct would diagnostic research prove fruitful.

Walker's model for a system of sentencing improves on what we have by articulating its purposes and assumptions. This book is a policy guide, and as such, it deserves serious reading.

PAUL JEFFREY BRANTINGHAM
*Florida State University*

No Clear and Present Danger: A Skeptical View of the United States Entry into World War II *by Bruce M. Russett. New York: Harper & Row, 1972. 111 pp. Hardcover, $6.00; Paperback, $1.95.*

This little book—it is probably about 30,000 words—bluntly sets out a thesis in its subtitle and then, lest any reader be confused, restates the point at the outset, directly following a heading entitled "An unnecessary war": "American participation in World War II had very little effect on the essential *structure* of international politics thereafter, and probably did little either to advance the material welfare of most Americans or to make the nation secure from foreign military threats. . . . In fact, most Americans probably would have been no worse off, and possibly a little better off, if the United States had never become a belligerent." (pp. 19-20). A stalemate was in the making in 1939-41, and the entry of the United States into the war disrupted it. Had the United States remained a nonbelligerent, the Russians and Germans might have fought each other to a standstill. Instead, Russia replaced Germany as the great threat to European security (and Japan is once again a major power). The Hitler government could not have lasted, based as it was on the leadership of one man; sooner or later someone would have gotten the briefcase a little closer to the Fuehrer. The author remarks that he, Russett, was a child during the Second World War, and changed his views of that conflict during the Vietnam War—indeed, the inspiration of the book came the evening of President Nixon's announcement of the intervention in Cambodia, just after Russett had read an essay by the late Richard Hofstadter on Charles A. Beard's changing international outlook during the 1930's.

In many ways the author's argument is a model of logic and clarity. There is much to commend in this book, and it deserves reading by serious students. The chapters carefully consider the threat to American security, as leaders of the United States government drew that threat at the time and historians and political scientists later redrew it with minor changes. Russett has read the contemporary and later descriptions and has not just breezed through them. He follows no one; while he finds the

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recent New Left literature interesting because of its emphasis on economics, he says he does not find it convincing. And despite the accepted interpretations of American diplomacy during the Second World War, it is always helpful to have those interpretations questioned, looked at from later experience and from present sadness, in the hope of discovering alternatives and mistakes as well as successes. The letter and the spirit of such inquiries is that no foolishness or miscalculation will be repeated.

But Russett's fascinating inquiry, so this reviewer believes, comes down to two failures in approach, and perhaps a more general misunderstanding of what took the American nation into Vietnam. For in a larger sense this is a book about Vietnam rather than the Second World War. The author underestimates the extreme difficulties of moving a great mechanism such as the American government, and a mass of opinionated individuals, such as the American people, in one direction or another. The task of President Roosevelt was not easy; the choices in 1939-41, given what had gone before and was was going on at the moment, were not numerous. For another thing, the criminality of the Hitler government was in thorough evidence by 1939-41. It is true that its full depth had not yet been seen, not until the overrunning of the concentration camps; but enough was known to make the anti-Hitler governments certain they were dealing with a regime that would stop at nothing. Then is it not true that the war of 1939-45 was only a kind of way station to the present day, and that the present-day situation is only partly Vietnam? If the nations of the world are in a predicament today, the reason goes back before the Second World War, back at least to the First World War—the fact that the conflict of 1914-18 went on too long, that it began in misunderstanding and pride and turned into a blind, raging catastrophe of annihilation. For mistakes of statesmanship, this earlier great conflict is the war to examine.

ROBERT H. FERRELL
*Indiana University*

America's Outward Thrust: Approaches to Foreign Affairs, 1865-1900 *by Milton Plesur. DeKalb, Northern Illinois University Press, 1971.—vii, 276 pp. $12.50.*

The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1954 *by Joyce and Gabriel Kolko. New York, Harper & Row, 1972.—xii, 820 pp. $15.00.*

No greater contrast in style and tenor can be imagined than that between these two works by sometime colleagues at SUNY Buffalo, both of which

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deal with the question of continuity in American foreign policy.

Plesur's unpretentious study of the antecedents of late nineteenth-century expansionism in the United States describes the increasing American contacts with foreign nations in the decades following the Civil War, and America's changing perception—despite continuing ambivalence toward Europe—of its world role. It cites the words and deeds of statesmen and missionaries, businessmen and naval enthusiasts. In addition *America's Outward Thrust* points to increased involvement with Latin America, continued interest in Canada, tentative contacts with Africa, and the "opening" of such Asian areas as Hawaii, Samoa, and Korea as particularly significant. Plesur effectively counters the arguments of those who have regarded this period as the nadir of American relations with the outside world. In the process he provides convincing evidence in support of a truism: American imperialism did not rise suddenly, like Venus from the seashell, in 1898, but was instead the culmination of decades of economic and attitudinal development.

The Kolkos, in their turn, amass evidence for another, though more challenging truism: American foreign policy after 1945, and by clear implication for many decades before that, aimed at the establishment of an integrated capitalist world order. But their far from unpretentious work is a tour-de-force—a wide ranging, detailed, neo-Marxist analysis that is provocative, informative, and unflaggingly tendentious.

As in Gabriel Kolko's *The Politics of War*, the basic premises are that American foreign policy serves the needs and objectives of the country's bourgeois ruling class, that its dominant aim is to create conditions that will allow American business to trade, operate, and profit without restrictions everywhere. In the context of recent history it is, therefore, militantly counterrevolutionary, i.e., directed against the "ascendant movements of change" represented by the radicalized European workers and the equally radicalized anticolonial Third World peasants.

Within this framework, the cold war becomes an American invention. It is designed, through the deliberate creation and maintenance of tensions both at home and abroad, to persuade sometimes reluctant allies to accept American domination and to force a sometimes equally reluctant Congress to underwrite the military spending alleged to be essential to the development of American commercial hegemony. The Soviet Union, which according to the Kolkos pursued a conservative coexistence policy in an effort to appease the United States wherever its own central concerns were not at stake, served merely as a convenient foil for American policymakers. Indeed, it is argued, the functional equivalent of the Soviet Union would have had to be invented had Russia not been available to serve as a bogeyman.

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To the Kolkos, the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan appear as cynical and unsuccessful ploys for the frustration of progressive lines of national and international development. Germany and Japan, where American control could be most freely exercised, become the intended keystones of the new capitalist world order. Korea and Vietnam are seen as the most graphic illustrations of "the limits of power," and thus of the bankruptcy of American policy. "Amerca's attempt to reverse the main current of modern history," the authors conclude, "was to generate misery for numerous nations of the world without eliminating their ultimate ability to define their own destinies. And in the following decades, the inevitable consequences of its role abroad was to impose growing chaos, alienation, and economic crises on the American social system itself."

It is impossible, within the limits of a review, to deal adequately with the vast amount of information, including some misinformation, which the Kolkos have assembled in support of these contentions. Certainly they have demonstrated that American postwar policy was often self-serving, high-handed, and hypocritical, that it frequently rested on dubious and sometimes on dangerous assumptions, and that the official American version of the origins and nature of the cold war is, in important respects, false and misleading. They have also uncovered important new material, particularly concerning developments in Greece and Korea, and offer enough new insights and interpretations to occupy historians for years to come. But they have not succeeded in proving their central thesis.

The alleged unity of purpose and Machiavellian intent of America's leaders never fully materialize amid the welter of vacillations, ambiguities, and inconsistencies which the Kolkos describe, and the "militant Left," betrayed according to them not only by the United States but by the Communists and Socialists as well, remains too shadowy a target to have provoked American response. Most important, the Soviet Union cannot be dismissed as a factor in American policymaking quite as rigorously as is necessary to sustain the Kolkos' argument.

The Soviet threat appeared very real to a generation of statesmen that had lived through the Hitler holocaust. Even if none of them expected a Russian march to the Rhine in 1945 or 1950, all were convinced that a nation proclaiming a militant ideology at odds with American values and potentially strong enough to organize a world system competing with that of the United States would have to be checked at once if a third World War was to be avoided. That perception was a much a "fact" of the postwar scene as were the actions and immediate capabilities of the Soviet Union, and it provided as much of a rationale as any capitalist imperative for the American policy that was pursued. To be sure, the Trumans, the

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Achesons, the Harrimans, and the Rusks can properly be called to task for pursuing the Munich analogy beyond the limits of its applicability. But by the same token, the Kolkos err in pushing their own "Vietnam analogy" into a time to which it was not yet applicable.

MANFRED JONAS
*Union College*

The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947 *by John Lewis Gaddis. New York, Columbia University Press, 1972. —xi, 396 pp. Hardback, $12.95; Paperback, $3.95.*

The Road to Yalta: Soviet Foreign Relations, 1941-1945 *by Louis Fischer. New York, Harper & Row, Publishers, 1972.—xv, 238 pp. $8.95.*

Although these two volumes deal with the same time period and overlap in theme, that is about the extent of any similarity. Mr. Gaddis' book (a volume in the Contemporary American History Series) is a serious, scholarly contribution to cold war history, while Mr. Fischer's work is not.

Professor Gaddis has provided a thoughtful, well-written, balanced study between the too traditional view of cold war origins and the more recent radical revisionists. He has not attempted to provide insights or reach conclusions merely to attract attention, but has succeeded in carefully selecting and sorting out important materials for the treatment of a massive subject in one volume.

In writing of the mood of America during the Second World War, Gaddis has captured much of the feeling toward Russia, and nicely develops the point that past traditions prevented working compatibly toward a common goal. The idealism of the United States could not adjust to a partnership with the Soviets, and, right or wrong, the Grand Alliance was doomed. The author takes note of General Marshall's wartime concern over the possibility of Russia securing Europe before the Western Allies could get a foothold, and yet still worrying about postwar commitments: "If any postwar consideration shaped Washington's strategy, it was the desire to minimize overseas political responsibilities after Germany's surrender" (p. 76). Gaddis indicates that the absence of any clear American policy in a great number of important areas made many of our wartime talks with our Allies meaningless. The research and writing in Mr. Gaddis' book is of the highest quality; it is lucid, logical, and goes far toward providing a reasonable history of the subject.

Louis Fischer's work can not be judged in isolation; one must be im-

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pressed by his reputation and life's production. It is unfortunate, however, that an unfinished manuscript was put together as a history of Soviet foreign policy leading toward Yalta. The book is a series of essays—some related and some not, some researched history based on source materials, and many personal commentaries and insights into important world events of 1941-45. There is no real attempt by Mr. Fischer to provide basic documentation for many historical happenings that remain open to interpretation, and the author asks that much of what he relates be taken in good faith. The writing style makes the work difficult to judge as an historical contribution; it reads as a mixture of autobiography, history, and newspaper coverage and commentary of the time. The bibliography of Fischer's book is fairly extensive if aimed only at the subject of its title, but it is far from comprehensive; the author seems to have ignored it himself. Perhaps the most positive feature of Louis Fischer's *Road to Yalta*, and certainly of value, is that about every five pages, the author writes something personal, or makes an observation or reminiscence that keeps the reader involved and interested.

ARTHUR L. SMITH, JR.
*California State University, Los Angeles*

The Uneasy Alliance: America, Britain, and Russia, 1941-1943 *by Robert Beitzell. New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1972.—xiv, 404 pp. $10.00.*

Robert Beitzell has produced a well-written, narrowly researched, unremarkable book with no real beginning or end. As readers familiar with Sherwood, Feis and McNeill, among many others, are aware, the Grand Alliance began in the summer and autumn of 1941 with trips to Moscow of Harry Hopkins, Averell Harriman and Lord Beaverbrook. These missions laid the foundations of political and economic cooperation between Russia and the West some months before Pearl Harbor. Yet Professor Beitzell completely overlooks these journeys and completely ignores their significance, choosing to begin his narrative with the Eden mission to the Kremlin the day after Pearl Harbor. If the Eden mission is difficult to perceive as the beginning of the Grand Alliance, so is the Tehran Conference difficult to imagine as any kind of climax in Big Three relations. Yalta filled that role. At the time of Tehran the tides of war were just beginning to turn; the Red Army was still within the borders of Russian and Anglo-American forces were not to enter Western Europe for months. Therefore the big political decisions could continue to be deferred. True enough, Tehran did witness British capitulation to both American and Russian

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demands for a Second Front in France and Roosevelt did tell Stalin that America had no real intent to contest postwar Soviet control over Poland and the Baltic countries. But victory was not yet clearly enough in sight —as it was at Yalta—for such gestures to be considered firm commitments. The Tehran Conference remains in the perspective of thirty years an interim summit, not a conference of far-reaching decisions.

Professor Beitzell's work suffers primarily from narrowness of research. Vitally important as the State Department's *Foreign Relations* series may be to American diplomacy, it cannot carry the scholarly burden alone. The latter is particularly true for the war– and cold-war years when policymaking became so diffuse and manuscript collections of participants so large. There is no indication that the author has consulted the papers of such chief American policymakers as Roosevelt, Hopkins, Stimson and others. Nor has he employed as fully as he should the memoirs of Churchill, Kennan, Alanbrooke, Sherwood and Leahy to name just a few. In confining himself almost exclusively to the few selected volumes of *Foreign Relations*, Professor Beitzell has narrowed his perspective simply to the great wartime meetings and their briefing papers. This approach has meant, among other results, a total neglect of economic diplomacy. Any study of the Grand Alliance, 1941-43, must seek to place economic diplomacy within the overall framework of Alliance politics.

*The Uneasy Alliance* contains strongly redeeming qualities, however. If Kent Roberts Greenfield and Lord Alanbrooke stressed the great tensions between Washington and London throughout the early war years, Beitzell defines the sources and perimeters of those tensions with admirable clarity, reenforcing existing impressions that Americans and Britons had almost as much trouble getting along as they did with the Russians. Moreover, the author has restored to rightful primacy those military considerations which truly did create and define much of the Grand Alliance throughout World War II. Revisionist ignorance not only of military operations and imperatives, but also of the simple but powerful emotions that combat itself generated has lead us astray too long in attempts to understand World War II from a generation's distance. Professor Beitzell has helped restore proper balance by stressing how every decision was weighed and defined overwhelmingly in light of military success.

Nonetheless, the author does not add to numerous thoroughly researched and forceful examinations of the Grand Alliance such as Feis and McNeill. His efforts merit only a marginal impact upon the scholarly profession; however, the general public will find *The Uneasy Alliance* a useful, well-written introduction to a very complex topic.

LISLE A. ROSE
*United States Department of State*

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After Yalta *by Lisle A. Rose. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1973.—vi, 216 pp. $7.95.*

*After Yalta* presents the conclusions and some supportive evidence of a multivolume work soon to be published by Kent State University Press. The subject is America and the origins of the cold war from the Yalta Conference of February, 1945, through the spring and summer of 1946. During this period, the author contends, the relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States changed from ostensible friendship to unremitting hatred and mutual competition, constituting the first phase of the cold war. While admitting other factors, Rose's carefully qualified thesis is that the American decision in late 1945 not to share the so-called secrets of atomic weaponry and technology with Russia made cooperation between the two powers impossible and their enmity inevitable.

Despite the inherent revisionism of the argument, Rose maintains he is not a revisionist historian. Forrestal and Senator Vandenberg are clearly disliked. If Byrnes could have completed his atomic discussions with the Russians initiated at the Moscow Foreign Ministers Conference in December, 1945, he might have become a hero to Rose. Instead, well-intentioned men in Washington were caught up in a rush of events which they could neither control nor understand. During 1945 and 1946, as Rose also shows, the Russians were pushing very hard. Agreements about Poland had been violated; eastern Europe was being bludgeoned into line; Turkey and Iran were the objects of threats; Azerbaijan and Manchuria were occupied; the Soviet Union even expressed a desire to secure Libya as a colony. Given the circumstances, it was remarkable that individuals as diverse as Stimson and Acheson could contemplate some sort of nuclear dialogue with Stalin. It became inevitable that Truman should reject their advice. Rose further believes that national psychology and domestic pressures played a role in his decisions. Truman objected to time spent on foreign affairs.

*After Yalta* is meticulously researched and very well written. There are the inevitable slips—Molotov and Ribbentrop did not meet in Kirovograd in June, 1943—and even this error was made in the first instance not by Rose, but by Liddell Hart. Washington did indeed fear possible contacts between the Russians and the Germans, however, as Churchill rightly pointed out then; two years of terrible war had created an unbridgeable *cordon sanitaire* between Moscow and Berlin. Moreover, Hitler resisted advice here and viewed the struggle as a crusade between National Socialism and Communism. The author might have investigated or considered Stalin's own prediction of a possible cold war made to Roosevelt at the Tehran Conference in December, 1943. The Soviet Premier warned of the dangers of the President's policy of secret territorial concessions

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coupled with public declarations supporting the Atlantic Charter and the principles of national self-determination. Stalin urged Roosevelt to undertake some good propaganda and explain the practical historical reasons for coming changes in Europe and Asia—changes which prevented the Soviet Union and the United States from arming against each other. Roosevelt never followed Stalin's admonitions. Wilsonianism, no territorial changes until the Peace Conference and then only in accordance with the freely expressed wishes of the people concerned—these were what Americans thought the war was about. Instead there existed an already arranged and far different reality.

Rose admits that his theory of American atomic monopoly and Soviet reaction to it as a causative factor in cold war origins must take into account the known successes of Soviet espionage. In effect they already had what we did not offer. Here the author believes that confidence, not knowledge, was the issue. He rejects the views of Alperowitz by name and Kolko by implication.

ROBERT BEITZELL
*University of Maine*

Dragon by the Tail: American, British, Japanese, and Russian Encounters with China and One Another *by John Paton Davies Jr. New York, W. W. Norton Company, Inc., 1972.—448 pp. $10.00.*

John Paton Davies was one of that small group of U.S. Foreign Service Officers specializing on China when the United States maintained regular diplomatic relations with her and charged its officers with interpreting Chinese developments for the benefit of their government. Notoriously, when Senator Joseph R. McCarthy in the early 1950s struck at policymaking processes with his accusing demagogic cry "Who lost China?", some of those China Service officers were sacrificed on the altar of American domestic politics. Davies was one such.

The subtitle of the book indicates its main theme. The work is basically a consideration of the relations of five powers in Asia—and of China's first of all. The account begins with a survey of traditional Chinese society and nineteenth-century history, but it takes on its special flavor when Davies enters the scene, for he presents extracts from his diary, letters, and official reports to buttress an eyewitness account of Chinese affairs.

The personal story begins before Davies' Foreign Service career, for he was born in China and went to school there. The primary emphasis of the book is on the "controversial" period of complex international rela-

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tionship—the period of the Sino-Japanese and Pacific wars. From vantage points in Mukden and Hankow, Davies observed the beginning of the Japanese drive for conquest. Then, after Pearl Harbor made the United States an ally of China, he served on the staff of Lt. General Joseph W. Stilwell, commander of the China-Burma-India war theater. The reader thus sits in on both the fighting and the politics of that theater, to witness the growing conflict between Stilwell and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, and to see the Nationalists manipulating Americans by playing them against each other.

President Franklin D. Roosevelt played into the Chinese hands by sending to the field of action a series of special envoys. They usually were ignorant of Chinese conditions and ways; often enough, they bypassed completely not only China Service officers but also the experienced Ambassador Clarence E. Gauss. At last came Maj. General Patrick J. Hurley, Choctaw warwhoop, arrogant self-confidence and all. Hurley was charged with mediating the worsening Stilwell-Chiang dispute, but Chiang won the battle of tactics and got the recall of Stilwell. Hurley came to replace Gauss.

Davies describes how Hurley thought to reconcile the Nationalists and their Communist challengers, as brother Chinese, and how, failing that, the ambassador shifted to allout support of Chiang. Finally he records how, when experienced Foreign Service officers disagreed with the ambassador and his ill-founded estimates of the political situation, Hurley had the dissidents pulled out of China. Davies himself, after Stilwell's recall, was transferred to Moscow to view Sino-American-Soviet-Japanese relations from yet another angle. Hurley went on to fail in his China mission, but he denied that the responsibility was his; he blamed the course of events instead on Foreign Service officers who had foreseen them.

McCarthyism brought about the ultimate corruption of our China policy; effects on the Sino-American relationship are still felt after two decades. But the beginnings of the corruptive process were located in wartime China. Davies' work sheds a revealing light on that important segment of history.

O. Edmund Clubb

Pacific Estrangement. Japanese and American Expansion, 1897-1911 *by Akira Iriye. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1972.—ix, 290 pp. $12.00.*

Akira Iriye of the University of Chicago is in the front rank of historians

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of American-Far Eastern relations. This volume further enhances his reputation. Based on archives in Tokyo, Washington, London and Taipei, it dissects the fourteen-year period when the United States and Japan, once friends, ended as potential enemies because of conflicting expansionist policies. On one level *Pacific Estrangement* is a comparative study of expansionisms, on yet another—and this is the book's thesis—an analysis of how the two expansionist ideologies interacted and influenced each other.

A peaceful, economic expansionism characterized both Japanese and American penetration into Asia until 1904-05, Iriye argues. Japan, moreover, was at least as interested in Hawaii, California and the South Seas, as in Korea and Manchuria. The clash with Americans in Hawaii and on the West coast combined with a new militance derived from the Russo-Japanese War to transform Japan's expansionism into imperialism. The difference between these two terms is not precisely defined. This lack of definition is especially unfortunate in sections describing the Open Door policy as "nonimperialistic"; these portions fail to relate how this view can be reconciled with the use of American Marines in the Boxer Rebellion, or why the State Department took full advantage of extraterritoriality and foreign control of tariffs in China.

Yet Iriye's main contribution is his often brilliant examination of the emerging imperialists through the use of editorials, novels and best-selling works on international relations. These sections, which focus on elite opinion in Japan, will become a standard reference. In this sense, the volume is a companion to other works which stress economic or political aspects. But Iriye usually does not make this kind of separation. In an important discussion of Taft's Far Eastern policy, for example, he notes how these strands merge into an "economic-moralistic" diplomacy which fully anticipated Woodrow Wilson's approach to a new world order. This integration of the popular literature with official policy provides repeated insights into the post-1905 era. But during the formative period of the Open Door strategy itself, the official is too often separated from the popular, with public literature in Japan and the United States being confused with governmental policy. There is too little on policy-makers in Tokyo and Washington between 1897 and 1905, an omission that leads to debatable conclusions (e.g., William McKinley can be understood through the writings of Charles Conant and Alfred Thayer Mahan, or Japanese policy can be comprehended by noting editorials).

This problem is solved after 1906 with fine sections on Theodore Roosevelt, Japanese military strategists and the Tokyo Foreign Ministry. Here the book makes repeated contributions, either through synthesizing secondary works (as on emerging Japanese-American tensions over Man-

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churia), or through original insights into such problems as the immediate origins of "The Yellow Peril," the role of the immigration controversy in Japanese expansionism, and the changing concept of the Open Door in both Washington and Tokyo.

In both its theses and research design *Pacific Estrangement* is a major contribution. It adds a new dimension to our understanding of this crucial period of American and Japanese expansionism (or imperialism), and, as the Epilogue makes clear, to the 1911-71 years as well.

WALTER LAFEBER
*Cornell University*

Project Paperclip: German Scientists and the Cold War *by Clarence G. Lasby. New York, Antheneum, 1971.—x, 338 pp. $8.95.*

The German Rearmament Question: American Diplomacy and European Defense after World War II *by Robert McGeehan. Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1971.—xv, 280 pp. $10.00.*

Defeated in war and divided by the occupation, Germany has been important in the cold war: German scientists work for both sides and German military components are vital to the Warsaw and NATO pacts. The two books under review illuminate both contributions.

Americans have long been familiar with the postwar race for German scientists. When the Russians launched *Sputnik I*, a current quip was that *their* Germans were better than *ours*. Clarence G. Lasby has written a superb book about the American side of the race. Using the documentary record, archival materials, and interviews, Lasby describes the hunting that went on in the field in 1945 and the early military program to bring specialists to the United States under military control (Project Overcast). The military wanted to shorten the war against Japan and further American military and scientific research. They apparently gave little thought to the emerging cold war with the Soviet Union. Lasby shows that the early military program went into eclipse as peace set in and that a new program emerged in the context of the increasing cold-war tensions in 1946. The new policy, Project Paperclip, was to import German scientists, engineers, and rocket experts for research in the United States and to deny them to other countries. Altogether 642 German scientists were brought to the United States. Lasby discusses the doubts and uncertainties Project Paperclip raised for those who made policy and for others. He reviews how, after years of delay, the German scientists were exploited, and he adds a chapter on their assimilation and their responses to the Ameri-

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can experience.

Lasby's book is important. The prefatory note on sources, in which Lasby describes his difficulties in gaining access to postwar records, should be required reading for all aspiring cold-war historians. The book is a model of what archival research contributes to an understanding of the origins of the cold war. However, the clear, simple formula of causes of the East-West conflict applicable to traditionalists and revisionists is hardly adequate. Lasby's book shows a record replete with seized opportunities and missed chances. Bureaucratic necessity, momentum, and inertia led to hesitation, doubt, and imperfect conception as well as to determined action and clear purpose. Decisions were made by people far from the centers of policy formation, often without reference to the larger cold-war issues. There were few long-range plans. In short, the record shows decisions, choices, and actions, some based on the East-West struggle and some not.

Robert McGeehan's book is narrower than its title suggests. It is essentially a study of American diplomatic practice and maneuver to achieve German rearmament. It emphasizes the two years from the outbreak of the Korean war to the agreement on a draft treaty for a European Defense Community on May 9, 1952. McGeehan starts with the American determination in 1950 to have German rearmament in one fashion or another, and he shows clearly how Acheson's original call for more troops in Europe was transformed into a larger American program for the political unification of western Europe. The Americans pushed for European unification because Germany's neighbors (especially France) would not accept German rearmament unless Germany's sovereignty could somehow be limited. France eventually rejected the EDC in 1954, and McGeehan describes with clarity the process and the reasons.

The book is based on published materials which McGeehan uses to their fullest, in part by follow-up interviews with participants whom he does not identify. But none of the internal discussions and deliberations on policy that enrich Lasby's book so measurably are found here. One wonders, for example, whether Americans had not already decided on German rearmament prior to 1950—perhaps in 1948, during the discussions on a West German government. Did Korea provide leverage that did not exist before? Such questions can be answered only when scholars gain access to the archives. Lashby's experiences suggest how long that may be. In the meantime, McGeehan's book is a most useful and interesting study of the available record of American efforts between 1950 and 1954 to achieve German rearmament in the context of a united Europe.

JOHN GIMBEL
*Humboldt (Calif.) State College*

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From Resistance to Revolution: Colonial Radicals and the Development of American Opposition to Britain, 1765-1776 *by Pauline Maier. New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1972.—xviii, 318 pp. $10.00.*

This lively and well-written volume does not fundamentally alter our present understanding of the development of American opposition to Britain between the Stamp Act Crisis and the Declaration of Independence. It argues against the view (which the author mistakenly suggests was "the prevailing historical interpretation" when she began her studies a decade ago) that the Revolution was brought about by "a handful of agitators," who, "dedicated to independence for their own psychic or material satisfactions, manipulated the colonists." The central theme is that no colonist, not even the most radical opponent of British policy, wanted independence initially and that a progressive disillusionment (first with Parliament, then with the King, and finally with the British people) was required before a deep American affection for Britain had been sufficiently dissipated to permit the colonists' move from resistance to revolution. This point of view has been widely accepted since publication of the important studies of Max Savelle and Edmund S. Morgan over two decades ago. Similarly, a second important theme—that the resistance movement was throughout punctuated by a compulsive concern for restraint, even on the part of its most militant leaders—was a crucial component of many scholarly arguments in the 1950s, including Daniel J. Boorstin, Clinton Rossiter, Morgan, and Benjamin F. Wright.

If the author does not offer us any major new conclusions, however, she does contribute in important ways to the elaboration and deepening of our understanding. Thus, she shows that the experience during the Townshend Acts crisis was more important in contributing to disillusionment of colonial leaders with the British government than most previous writers have suggested and that the disenchantment of some extended even beyond Parliament to the King. More fully than any previous scholar, Maier also demonstrates the "central role" of events in Britain—including refusal of the British to defend Corsica against France, furor over Wilkes, the decision to use troops against the black Caribs of St. Vincent, and the failure of the petition movement of 1769-1776—in gradually converting the colonists "from loyalty to active revolution."

The most important contribution is in the first two chapters: the author's cogent analysis of the colonial tradition of popular resistance and the Anglo-American ideology of resistance and restraint, subjects that have unaccountably been almost ignored by earlier historians. Maier argues that popular colonial uprisings were more often "*extra-institutional*" than "anti-institutional," undertaken to defend "the urgent interests

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of their communities" only "after the normal channels of redress had proven inadequate." They "served the community where no law existed, or intervened beyond what magistrates thought they could do officially to cope with a local problem." Far from being evidence of the volatility or capriciousness of the people, popular disorders were seen by many colonists as "*prima facié* indictments . . . of authority," indicating some "scandalous abuse of Power" or a flagrant violation of community norms or interests. This deeply rooted tradition of popular intervention "to support local interests . . . by extra-legal means," the author argues in an important new conclusion, both "shaped the forms of popular force during the revolutionary era" and meant that the "people entered the struggle with Britain as an established social force, not as an agency newly invented to serve the ends of radical leadership." Equally significant, Maier describes more fully than any previous writer the intellectual background of the American leaders' insistence on restraint. Following the arguments of the Real Whigs in Britain, the colonists believed resistance at the earliest appearance of oppression and in preventing serious disorder by moderating resistance with restraint. These ideas, the author makes clear, informed the behavior of colonial opposition leaders at every point during the revolutionary controversy, as they repeatedly endeavored to confine resistance to particular grievances and to defer violence until all other strategies had been exhausted.

In certain respects, the volume may be somewhat misleading. Many readers will think the author underestimates the Stamp Act crisis in undermining colonial affection for Britain and that the American conversion to republicanism in 1775-76 was less a matter of choice than of social and political necessity. More important, the author's single-minded focus upon the "political conclusions and strategies individuals shared in a common trajectory toward revolution and independence" tends to obscure important variations in perceptions and response among groups and thereby much of the complexity and richness of the opposition movement. By stressing so heavily the colonists' insistence upon restraint, Maier may also distort the pathology of prerevolutionary violence, especially during the phase of rapid intensification of conflict following Lexington and Concord. As Merrill Jensen has recently suggested, in some places during that period popular tumult may well have been less controllable, less discriminating, and less single-minded than at earlier stages. The author's use of "radicals" as a distinct political category is not entirely satisfactory. She contends that the term is a "technically exact word for describing men who most thoroughly criticized British governing practices." As her interchangeable use of the terms *radicals* and *leaders* and her failure to identify by name more than a handful of

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people who might appropriately be assigned to such a group, it is by no means clear that it is either useful or possible to treat radicals as a separate analytic category; readers should not be misled by the title. What Maier has done quite well is to trace and analyze that slowly shifting political position on the cutting edge of the resistance movement that may accurately and usefully be designated radical.

JACK P. GREENE
*The Johns Hopkins University*

The Politics of Depression: Political Behavior in the Northeast, 1893-1896 *by Samuel T. McSeveney. New York, Oxford University Press, 1972.—xii, 333 pp. $9.75.*

In the last decade, quantitative political historians have developed a particularly close and visible college. They are united by a common body of data and an institution, the Inter-university Consortium for Political Research, by a newsletter and by bonds of friendship and mutual assistance. Within the college, the major arguments of promising doctoral dissertations are shared even before completion. Once finished, though only available on microfilm, they are reported upon and analyzed by prestigious senior members.

The first impact of this organization of historical scholarship is to encourage a convergent attack on what had been taken as canonical knowledge. This attack may be so devastating that it becomes hard to understand how anyone ever seriously believed the old accounts. Three recent books by charter members of the college, Paul Kleppner, *The Cross of Culture: A Social Analysis of Midwestern Politics, 1850-1900* (1970), Richard Jensen, *The Winning of the Midwest: Social and Political Conflict, 1888-1896* (1971) and now Samuel T. McSeveney, *The Politics of Depression* have firmly established the dominant influence of ethnic and religious identifications upon voting behavior prior to 1893. For a brief moment after 1889 it appeared that the Democratic party might end the long stalemate of the seventies and eighties by creating a new majority of cultural allies. Instead, the depression of the nineties encouraged Republican managers, threatened by defeat, to soften their cultural stance and to accentuate their positive response to economic plight. This self-conscious strategy of political unification succeeded in creating a dominant Republican majority which persisted until 1932, interrupted only by an internal feud which allowed Democratic victories in the Wilson years.

I am only a peripheral member of this college and so can afford to de-

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scribe the limitations of its first efforts and my hopes for its future with a benign irresponsibility. Reading Kleppner, Jensen and McSeveney together, it's apparent that their attention is dominated by the issues of the paradigm they are rejecting. McSeveney's detailed description of the politics of Connecticut, New York and New Jersey, for example, sweeps away the old piety that the American "people" rose against the "interests" in the eighties and nineties but were cheated of their rightful victory in 1896. Good riddance. His book is, however, still about the determinants of voting behavior and the correct designation of critical elections. I would hope that in the next round of inquiry the college will move beyond voting. The single-minded focus on elections encourages—while it tries paradoxically to criticize—the fantasy of a political system so plastic and responsive that it can be freely shaped by electoral choice. Correcting this fantasy requires an examination of both the entire process of governance and of the special web of social connections created out of the imperatives of party competition. I am particularly fascinated by the possibility that the integrative Republican strategy (and the imitative Democratic strategy which followed) softened the edge of social conflict within a series of mediating settings, such as churches, schools and neighborhoods. It will be difficult to track this possibility so long as elections themselves occupy the center of the scholarly stage.

It will be similarly difficult to follow party strategy in mediating groups so long as scholarship remains convergent but not cooperative. The three books under review have shattered one image, but it would be an arduous task to list all of the political environments they describe and to compare them using a consistent and powerful set of measures. Several historians of social mobility, troubled by the plethora of suggestive but noncomparable studies, have responded by linking their work tightly with a net of shared coding categories and algorithms. I hope that quantitative political historians will similarly be able to move beyond convergence.

SEYMOUR J. MANDELBAUM
*University of Pennsylvania*

Albert J. Beveridge: American Nationalist *by John Braeman. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1971.—xii, 370 pp. $12.50.*

The shattering depression of the mid-1890's permitted the Republican party to recover from electoral disaster. It shortly established itself for the next fifteen years as the more dominant, energetic, and nationalistic of the two parties. Under the skillful political talents of McKinley and

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T. Roosevelt it extended the responsibilities and power of the federal government so as to channel and moderate the ever-growing complexity of American industrial capitalism and thus (as progressives would have said) protect it from the worse challenge of those who would cripple it. This was the task to which Albert J. Beveridge, Indiana senator, politician, and historical biographer, devoted his career. In a thoroughly competent but straightforward narrative biography, John Braeman demonstrates the value of that career for understanding the currents of change at work in American party politics during the essentially Republican era from the 1890's through the 1920's.

Beveridge grew up in a devout but impoverished rural midwest family, worked hard to put himself through school and DePauw University, where he won prizes for public speaking, and trained himself for law in Indianapolis by clerking for the Republican-controlled state legislature. A quick, tenacious mind, driving ambition, and a fortunate marriage, combined with a ready eloquence on behalf of business enterprise, a protective tariff, sound money, a Hamiltonian government, and the G.O.P., brought him prominently into the world of young Hoosier lawyer-politicians and, in 1899 at age 37, to the United States Senate. From this point his life embodied the kinds of paradoxes which have made the Progressive era in American politics so hard to characterize. In the wake of the war with Spain he orated on behalf of America's imperial mission abroad; yet by 1915, admiring the Germans and distrusting the British, he opposed Wilson's defense of neutral rights and later fought hard against the League. He believed in big business and temperamentally was no reformer, yet he made his mark in history as a vigorous champion of national progressivism: he backed the Hepburn railroad bill, pressed for a national child labor law, and authored the Federal Meat Inspection Act of 1906, which, Braeman declares, was a "precedent-shattering expansion of Federal authority over business." Beveridge's ambition for high office, his political astuteness, and an apparently genuine fear of social upheaval against the abuses of unregulated capitalism led him to move leftward with Theodore Roosevelt to the "new nationalism" and then to the Progressive party, and in this there was a kind of consistency of principle; yet it also cost him ultimate success in every political contest after 1904, except for his party's nominations for senator. He supported labor's aspirations for the right to unionize, denounced the Klan and the red-baiting of the 1920's and the bigotry which led to efforts to unseat Senator Smoot, a Mormon; yet by 1920 he had turned bitterly against the legislative aspirations of organized labor. The fact is, from 1906 through 1916 the Democratic party, at first in states like Indiana and then in the nation, steadily increased its strength on the basis of progressive principles and some attention to the interests

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of ethnic and labor voters in the large industrial cities. After 1911, the last year Beveridge held office (he was only 48), his classic progressivism proved too rich for the dominant interests in his own party but too narrow to compete with the programs of their rivals.

In accounting for Beveridge's slow decline in influence within his own state, Braeman has clarified the puzzling failure of Republican progressives to survive the war even while their principles flourished. He has also made clear something more important. Central to the legacy of Republican progressivism has been a political refurbishing of the traditions of American nationalism, and no progressive politician contributed more to shaping the image which a later generation had of those traditions than did the author of the immensely influential four-volume biography of Chief Justice John Marshall and the unfinished study of Abraham Lincoln. Braeman shows (though less clearly than he might have) how much Beveridge's political experience and self-image helped to shape his view of Marshall and the first national period of American history. Out of a conviction concerning the need of the national government to balance and control the energies of private interests, the two-term senator who hungered to be President may have etched a deeper imprint after political defeat left him free to write history than he could ever have achieved in political victory. That was possibly the most significant paradox of Beveridge's career.

OTIS A. PEASE
*University of Washington*

Privilege and Creative Destruction: The Charles River Bridge Case *by Stanley I. Kutler, Philadelphia, J. B. Lippincott, 1971.—191 pp. $5.95.*

This new study of the Charles River Bridge case serves as a useful introduction to American legal history. Kutler sees the famous 1837 decision as one that reflected "a pervasive value of the age . . . which regarded private property as a dynamic and not a static institution." Much of his book offers an analysis that is significant more for its usefulness than its originality. In fact, Kutler has provided some specifics that well illustrate the value of Willard Hurst's insights set forth seventeen years ago in *Law and the Conditions of Freedom in the Nineteenth Century United States*. In the last third of his discussion, Kutler places the decision in historical perspective and explores what he calls the course of "privilege and creative destruction," referring to "a continuous process whereby new inventions and enterprises create new goods and services,

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and . . . destroy existing old ones, all under the often empty banner of progress, improvement and need." Ultimately the decision was "a landmark involving the interrelationship of public policy, technological change, capital developments, competition, and law." Kutler's book suffers from a lack of footnotes. For a work laden with quotations, many unacknowledged, drawing heavily upon existing scholarship, such an omission is unfortunate if not inexcusable. Indeed, it can only detract from the otherwise considerable value of the book as a whole.

JONATHAN LURIE
*Rutgers, The State University, Newark*

The Iroquois in the American Revolution *by Barbara Graymont. Syracuse, N.Y., Syracuse University Press, 1972.—xii, 359 pp. $11.50.*

This book is a curious amalgam of the new and the very old in American Indian history. Although the work is the first modern full-length study of the Iroquois in the American Revolution, it resembles its nineteenth-century predecessors on the subject in several ways. The author's loving attention to details of battles and "massacres," of treaty conferences and white diplomacy, and even of some anecdotes of the period remind the reader more of William L. Stone's lives of Joseph Brant and Red Jacket than of Anthony F. C. Wallace's *Death and Rebirth of the Seneca.* At one point, the author even copies her illustrious predecessors by reproducing the brigade officers of the Sullivan expedition of 1779 (pp. 206-7). The majority of chapters are more chronicle than analysis, and Graymont's often astute appraisals of men and events, rather than shaping the narrative, lie buried amidst the minutiae of her story.

Unlike authors of the past century however, she is aware of the need to tell the Indian side of the story. She explicitly espouses in her preface the new Indian-centered history demanded by minorities today. Thus her book begins with a chapter on "The People of the Longhouse," describing briefly Iroquois cultural values, political organization, and military affairs. In this opening chapter, she wisely stresses the great significance of the local political situation within tribes as opposed to the overall League of the Iroquois. Unfortunately, the author does not build upon this important insight in the rest of the book. She treats the Iroquois mainly as whole nations or tribes rather than as local political units composing tribes and constituting the League. Although she mentions various Native American leaders by name, she fails to show the dynamics of the internal tribal politics and clan affiliations in determining the real story

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of Iroquois participation in the American Revolution. Just as Graymont provides too much detail on white diplomacy and the military aspects of the war for this reviewer's taste, so she offers too little detail on the internal politics and life of the various nations of the League to explain the Iroquois side of the story. What factions existed within tribes as well as among tribes and what did their existence mean for entering the white war? What happened to the League after the war? Actually the reader learns much about the coming of hostilities but little about the implications of the war for the League in general and the various tribes and their constituent political parts specifically. Graymont spends several chapters detailing the whites' diplomacy and pressures for the Iroquois to take up the tomahawk, but she devotes only a summary chapter to the outcome of the war for the breakup of the League and subsequent Iroquois life. In the end, the reader learns more about the Revolution strictly considered as military hostilities than in the larger sense of a period of history involving the Longhouse peoples. The book is, then, about the Iroquois *in* the American Revolution, as the title states, rather than about the Iroquois *during* the war; Graymont focuses more on the history of white-Indian relations during the Revolution than on history of the Five Nations during the internecine struggle of England and her thirteen colonies. For this reason, *The Iroquois in the American Revolution* must be viewed as the old rather than the new Indian history.

Omission of internal tribal politics seems to mar the story. The author's extensive research encompassed English, American, and Iroquois sources, and her assessments of specific people and strategies seem to this reader generally judicious and perceptive. However, when she deals with the larger picture of the interaction of English, American and Iroquois aims and activities, the author rarely seems to probe beneath the surface. One leaves the book wondering who manipulated whom. My reading of the same sources for the period after the war revealed greater manipulation by the British Indian agents than Graymont found during the war. Did the war chiefs present their own arguments or did they act as the voices of the British agents as well? How did the whites use the cleavages within tribes as well as among tribes for their own ends? What of Joseph Brant's and his sister's manipulation of whites for their own political advancement within the Iroquois Confederacy as well as for the presumed Native American cause? Now and then the reader glimpses hints of answers to these questions, but the book is not sufficiently Indian-centered to provide the essential focus or basis for the detailed study still needed on this aspect of the Iroquois in the Revolution.

ROBERT F. BERKHOFER, JR.
*University of Michigan*

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Pointing the Way, 1959-1961 *by Harold Macmillan. New York, Harper & Row, 1972.—viii, 504 pp. $15.00.*

There may be complaints that Harold Macmillan's memoirs are becoming overextended: a 504-page volume covers just twenty-eight months of his prime ministership. But there is little padding in this volume, beyond some minor obeisances to convention. The centerpiece is the Summit meeting with Eisenhower, de Gaulle, Adenauer and Khrushchev, aborted by the notorious U-2 episode; also covered are the problems in the Congo, the crisis over South African membership in the Commonwealth, fruitless wrestling with economic problems at home, and the foreshadowings of both de Gaulle's exclusion of Britain from the Common Market and the disastrous American involvement in Southeast Asia.

Through it all, Macmillan strides, if not as "unflappable" as the folklore of those days would have it, still remarkably cool and detached most of the time. His frequent quotations from contemporary memoranda and diary entries testify to this quality even better than the gentle ironies and sustained urbanity of his writing now from the tranquility of retirement.

Macmillan recognizes the difficulty of maintaining proportion about recent events. Of the trade deficits that caused such perturbation in 1960 he comments acidly that "these puny figures seem ludicrously irrelevant compared to the gigantic deficits which we have enjoyed under Administrations with more enlarged views" (p. 223). The cold war remains very chilly in these pages. It is somewhat startling to be reminded of the widespread and acute worries over possible Soviet exploitation of the Congo crisis; the difficulties of *any* great power profiting from that chaotic situation seem so clear given hindsight. On the other hand, it is valuable to be reminded that Western statesmen can find themselves perilously entangled in other parts of the world than Southeast Asia.

Macmillian continues in this volume to reveal himself as much (and as little) as before: shrewdness, a talent for cool appraisal of men's motives and of options open to statemanship in any given situation, a pervasive undertone of worldweariness is relieved by irony and a keen sense of the ridiculous. The weariness foreshadows his retirement, not only by direct references, but also indirectly through such people and problems as younger members of his party in Parliament "whose knowledge of history did not go back beyond the fateful date of their selection as Parliamentary candidates" (p. 231). Macmillan's frequent sense of the ridiculous is most notable in a hilarious account of the de Gaulles' visit to the Macmillans' private home in Surrey.

Macmillan's estimates of his colleagues at home and abroad are generally acute and are seldom marred by the kind of personal pettiness that so often disfigures works of this kind. Towards de Gaulle, who caused

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him so much woe, he is fair and even generous. So is he towards the president of the United States, even when he feels that he carries the heavy burden of protecting Kennedy against the impracticality and impetuousness of the latter's advisers. No doubt Macmillan cherished illusions about the nature of the "special relationship" between Britain and the United States. David Nunnerly in *President Kennedy and Britain* (London, Bodley Head, 1972) shows how tenuous were those bonds, how dependent upon the particular qualities and preferences of the two men.

Yet this volume, like its predecessors, should increase Macmillan's stature. He retains a sense of great events, and he takes them seriously but without pomposity. If he is sometimes a bit stuffy, this is more than offset by the perceptiveness with which he sees the possibilities and limits of political action. He neatly sums up Khrushchev's limitations, pointing out how, in his handling of the U-2 affair, he yielded to self-indulgent anger and invective, thereby missing the opportunity for longer range advantage to the Soviet Union and to the world (pp. 215–16). The autobiography contains no startling "revelations." Harold Macmillan was a force to be reckoned with. This he manages to convey without the superficial self-promotion that is the common failing of political memoirs.

RICHARD W. LYMAN
*Stanford University*

Nuclear Politics: The British Experience with an Independent Strategic Force, 1939-1970 *by Andrew J. Pierre. New York, Oxford University Press, 1972.—xiii, 378 pp. $18.75.*

Barring the historian's subsequent access to presently unavailable sources, it is hard to imagine anyone writing about the domestic and international politics of Britain's nuclear weapons development in a more complete, careful, and balanced manner than has Andrew J. Pierre. He brings formidable advantages to the task of assessing the first three decades of that development. Not only is he able to use effectively the documentary material ordinarily explored by political scientists working in this area, but Pierre also interviewed many of the relevant participants and observed, with insight, the British decisionmaking process from a position in the American Embassy in London, 1962-64, and from the only somewhat more removed research staffs of the Brookings Institution, Hudson Institute, and (currently) the Council on Foreign Relations. While thus an insider, or very close to it, with respect to American policy, Pierre remains as reasonably objective about British policy as any of us is likely to be.

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He is knowledgeable in the broad field of British party politics as he is in nuclear policy itself, and his knowledge leads him to understand, rather than to identify with, particular party leaders and factions.

The story that Pierre tells is of the process by which Britain became the first of the non-Superpowers to acquire nuclear weapons, the first of all nations seriously to debate the abandonment of those weapons, and, having decided against abandonment, the first nation to exhibit publicly the difficulty of maintaining nuclear force as a credible deterrent. At each stage, the author tries to explain why the crucial decisions were made. More than that, however, he presents the several decisionmaking stages in the context of mid-twentieth-century history and so tries to explain how Britain happens to have, in the 1970s, a nuclear-weapons capability of doubtful significance for the role the nation now plays in the world. This explanation requires an understanding of the preceding decades during which Britain's status, and eventually its perception of its status, changed from that of Superpower to middle power (or, as the author puts it when speaking only of the shift from late World War II until the 1960s, from small Superpower to strong middle power). The point is that Britain conceived its nuclear policy as a Superpower, but carried out the policy and achieved its results when the nation could no longer maintain, financially and otherwise, the full burdens of Superpower status.

It seems a reasonable assumption during World War II and soon afterward that the retention, or reestablishment, of independent great-power status required Britain to develop its own nuclear weapons. What turned out to be wrong was the inarticulated part of the assumption that Britain could, with or without nuclear weapons, be an independent great power at any time after World War II—whether ten, twenty, or thirty years later. Once launched on the development, there was no turning back even when Britain's objective situation had manifestly changed. Partly, Pierre indicates, this was a matter of technological momentum. Having the scientific knowledge, from its own early research and from its wartime collaboration with the United States, Britain found it easier to start its postwar effort and then, given considerable progress, to continue the development rather than to liquidate its investment. Nonmilitary work in the nuclear field, to produce new energy resources, was going forward in any case.

Much of the book recounts the various reasons given by British political leaders, after producing their own nuclear bombs, for attempting to establish an independent nuclear force. There is ample analysis of the difficulties these leaders encountered in making their case when they found it too expensive financially to manufacture a British missile delivery system and too expensive politically to acknowledge their de-

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pendence on an American system. Finally Pierre brings us to the point where Britain, possessing four *Polaris* submarines capable of launching British nuclear warheads from an American-made delivery system, must ponder how the future of this and subsequent nuclear force is affected by the nation's new European identification.

LEON D. EPSTEIN
*University of Wisconsin, Madison*

Competition and the Corporate Society. British Conservatives, the State and Industry, 1945-1964 *by Nigel Harris. London, Methuen & Co., 1972.—384 pp. $12.75.*

British Conservatism presents a problem to serious political scientists, scholars of the last forty years or so. What Conservatives are doing and what they think they are doing are often far apart. When that is pointed out, Conservatives defend themselves by talking of pragmatism and flexibility. When they are pressed, ideas themselves seem to melt away, to use Mr. Harris' words, "in the symbols, in the rituals, the stylized phrases, in the pageantry which adorns action" (p. 256). So the stock-in-trade of political analysts—the relationship of ideas to action and the connections of policies to what is determined are objective problems—somehow does not seem to persuade. You simply can't tell what the Conservatives will do in the future, if you base your analysis on what has gone before. On the other hand, you can be sure that the party represents a unique and a durable strand of the British political tradition.

Mr. Harris recognizes this special quality of Conservatism (perhaps most brilliantly demonstrated in the writings of Samuel H. Beer). But by locating his analysis of Conservative policies within broader ideological trends characteristic of Western Europe after World War II, Harris raises important questions about the role of parties in fundamentally affecting national policies, and about the special problem facing the Conservatives as Britain moves toward integration with Western Europe.

However, Harris' study is not about these general matters, although he implies that we cannot fully understand Conservative politics in the way we have approached these matters in the past. Students (including Harris) ask questions such as, Do ideas matter? To what extent does electioneering influence policy? What difference does responsibility for government make in policy? What connections exist between policy development in the opposition and policymaking in government? The resulting studies concentrate on party documents, government reports, parliamentary debates, party conference speeches and newspaper accounts

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of speeches, interviews and so on. In the context of knowledge of history and "setting," and informed by comparative political theory, it is possible to transcend the superficial impression that British Conservatism is simply a process of defending the reforms of a previous generation.

Yet Harris sheds little light on the emergence of Conservative ideas in the years since World War II or on the process of setting priorities for Conservative leadership. In somewhat the same approach as that adopted by Rogow and Shore in their study of the Labour government and industry in the early 1950's, Harris discovers precious little remaining of principle when the Conservatives do anything about matters with which they dealt in policy statements. Even more interesting is the debunking of "the New Conservatism," as Harris finds the Industrial Charter—supposedly a new departure for modernized Conservatism—marking the end of the "*étatist*" strand reformist Conservative politics. While continuing as an important Conservative response to the problems of the postwar world, "*étatisme*" consistently lost out to "neoliberal" practices of the party in the twenty-year period explored by Harris.

Although the author sticks rather closely to the realm of "public" politics—reports, statements, and so on—he makes a persuasive case for the emptiness of the most highly publicized Conservative slogans. A "Property-Owning Democracy" came to be a description of what existed rather than a guide to future policy; "Partnership" with labor in industry came to mean little more than good industrial relations under managerial leadership; the mixed economy came to mean cutting back on the nationalized industries so that profitmaking might return to the private sector.

Every study of Conservatism must face the question of explaining the party's good fortune. Here Harris is most convincing. "The party exists as a means of unifying the political opinions. "The party exists as a means of unifying the political opinions of different groups within the ruling class . . . The political—as opposed to electoral—success of the party turns upon its ability to continue to recruit rising groups within society and represent them politically, at the same time resisting complete identification with declining groups . . . The party also provides a rationale for leadership throughout society. It offers a case designed to show the necessity and position of a ruling class as a key element in its own social role . . ." (pp. 263, 264).

On the basis of this explanation, but not on the basis of Harris' investigation and its narrower implications, it is possible to see the Conservatives turning their present problems to their eventual advantage. The very trends Harris identifies as most significant in the past and most challenging in the future, economic multinationalism and economic regional-

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ism, can provide vehicles for rising technocrats to demonstrate the necessity for tested leadership. The decline of the formal role of the national state may undermine the corporatist traditions of Conservatism. But it would be natural to expect that the "ceremonial" residues remain as functional as the "efficient" mechanisms that take over. And, in so doing, the pattern plays into the hands of the Conservative party. In other words, the inferences the author draws from this well-researched and suggestive study may be wrong, but for the right reasons.

HARVEY GLICKMAN
*Haverford College*

The Land Question and the Irish Economy, 1870–1903, *by Barbara Lewis Solow. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press (Harvard Economic Studies, Vol. 139) 1971.—ix, 247 pp. $8.50.*

This book presents a reevaluation of the Irish Land Acts, from 1870 to the early 1900s. The author's thesis is that the Irish land reform—fixation of tenure, lowering of rents, assisting land purchase by the tenant farmers—was of little economic significance to Ireland; rather, she thinks the reform retarded economic progress, especially in the 1870s when it might have deterred landlords from investing in agriculture. Instead, she suggests the reforms had their real significance as preparation for independence. "If the Irish sacrificed economic progress on the altar of Irish nationalism, who can say it was the wrong choice?" (p. 204).

The investigation is painstakingly made and bears all the hallmarks of being trustworthy in its details; the style is sometimes too much influenced by that of the nineteenth-century sources to be easy for a modern reader to follow. This reviewer's objections to the book concern less the detailed investigation than the general frame of reasoning in which the results are presented.

The sharp distinction between economics and politics is doubtful, to say the least. It overlooks, first, that much of Ireland's economic backwardness in the nineteenth century can be laid to the political integration with England. The analogous problem in southern Italy after 1860 is widely enough discussed these days to suggest where the roots of the Irish problem are to be sought: As a rural hinterland of England, Ireland was directly linked with the English economy without any active partnership role.

The distinction between economics and politics also underplays the economic significance of a landlord class which is resented as an alien element. Commenting upon the apparent lack of enterprise among Irish

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tenant farmers, the author appears to echo the seeming rationalism of the landlord class, without noticing the effect upon economic incentive which may result from the psychological aspects of a political situation—to say nothing of the backlog in education which is mentioned casually toward the end of the book, and which was created on purpose.

The main line of the author's economic reasoning runs like this: the Land Act of 1870 deprived the landlord class of any incentive to invest, and when the crises came in the late 70s and mid-80s, there was less economic strength; tenant farmers, even with lower rents, would not invest, despite fixity of tenure. But what reason do we have to think that the landlords of Ireland—many of them English—would have invested more in the 1870s? This was the time when agriculture in England itself began to stagnate, as cheap imported food made investment in industry and overseas countries more attractive than investment in England's land. The author's conclusion that without the Land Acts, Ireland would have been better off, therefore does not hold.

The references to landlords' investment fall in line with traditional English-inspired reasoning as to the sources of capital in agriculture: relatively high rents would have been desirable! In this form, the argument is the classical English argument against land reform. It is squarely contradicted by the experience of the European continent. The author makes some passing references to the successes of Danish farming, but never to the sources of these successes which are in a chain of events similar to the Irish land reform—although much earlier. This reform in Denmark created the predominantly owner-operated farms in a country of relative distributive equity where the cooperative movement could thrive. Farmer cooperation was late to develop in England, and its earlier success in Ireland could hardly be thought of without the Irish land reform. This point is where the circle closes and the political motive becomes also an economic one.

FOLKE DOVRING
*University of Illinois*

The Rise of a Third Party, A Study in Crisis Politics *by Maurice Pinard. Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1971.—xxiii, 285 pp. Hardcover, $7.95; Paperback, $5.95.*

In an apparent effort to tap an interest in Canada's prime minister, Pierre Elliot Trudeau, the publishers of Maurice Pinard's book have embellished the cover with an eye-catching reference to him. The book has nothing to do with Mr. Trudeau and it would be unfortunate if this zeal in at-

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tracting readers were to actually dissuade those with perhaps a modest interest in Canadian politics who would otherwise profit from reading it. The contributions the book makes to understanding the emergence of political movements have a generality that is not confined to any single state.

In a highly original approach to the rise of successful political movements, building on Neil Smelser's theory of social movements, Pinard attributes primary importance to the nature of existing social structures, and in particular, to the conduciveness of the party system. Put in its simplest terms, his thesis is that where there is one-party dominance, with the opposition not able to obtain more than one-third of the popular vote, then when widespread discontent emerges, it has no effective channels for expression. While there may be a temporary reliance on the traditional opposition party, there is now a readiness for new approaches and new movements. This thesis is explored in most detail with respect to the success of Social Credit in Quebec, but it is also tested elsewhere in Canada, and at least illustrated by the experiences of other countries. It is a probabilistic model, and as such, does not totally account for all instances of party success, but the evidence is sufficiently strong to argue for further testing, particularly in comparative contexts.

Within Quebec politics Pinard is able to substantiate the relation between social strains and the appearance of new social movements. As others have theorized or demonstrated, it is not the poorest who are the main recruits to new movements, but those who have experienced deterioration in their economic circumstances. This confirmation is coupled with new insights into why the economically discontented may find an outlet in movements that do not deal with essentials of their grievances. Pinard relates this phenomenon to a lack of clear class-consciousness, leading the disgruntled to available movements which, while conveying a message of opposition to existing social and political arrangements, do not advocate measures that come to grips with class-related issues. But there are some weaknesses in this argument, since it tends to underestimate the specific appeals of Social Credit, including those of the leader, Réal Caouette, and the strength of French Canadian identification, which has historically detracted the disadvantaged from their class interests. While Pinard's data show a lack of particularly strong ethnic consciousness on the part of Social Credit supporters, this is not to say that the nationalist content of the movement's appeal was unimportant. Social Credit mobilized grievances in ways congruent with previous beliefs and patterns of social interaction.

Pinard offers a useful critique of theories of mass society, in which he is able to demonstrate that integration into both primary and secondary

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groups may, under selected conditions, actually facilitate attraction to mass movements, rather than always impede it. The weak contribution of personality factors in recruitment to such movements is also further confirmed.

An obvious strength of this book lies in the new understanding it gives us of Quebec politics. Certainly some criticisms could be made, but they are relatively minor. I have already referred to the lack of emphasis on the strength of Caouette's appeal and the force of French Canadian nationalism. For the more historically minded, additional discussion would be useful on the early roots of Social Credit in the *Union des Electeurs* and on the experiences of other third party movements in Quebec. More irritating than anything else is Pinard's obsessive footnoting. No matter—this is a richly textured work, based on skillful interweaving of original survey data with demographic and electoral data. The results are a model of empirical analysis and a major contribution to the theory of political movements.

MILDRED A. SCHWARTZ
*University of Illinois at Chicago Circle*

The French Communists: Profile of a People *by Annie Kriegel, translated by Elaine P. Halperin. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1972.—xxiv, 408 pp. $12.50.*

The French Communist Party versus the Students: Revolutionary Politics in May-June 1968 *by Richard Johnson. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1972.—xix, 215 pp. $8.00.*

The appearance in English translation of Annie Kriegel's "ethnographic essay" (to use the French subtitle) is a happy event. It will make available to a wider public a sophisticated and penetrating analysis of that strange phenomenon, a massive Communist party operating within a liberal society. Although communism in the world has attracted many authors, I know of no other book quite like this one. Professor Kriegel combines direct experience as a onetime member of the party with vast erudition of its history and an intuitive grasp that illuminates her work with provocative insights. Unlike so many ex-Communists, she is not engaged in an obsessive burning of idols; her concern is to understand and to explain in the finest tradition of fair-minded scholarship. Her book is essential both for students of modern France and for specialists on communism anywhere in Europe.

Borrowing from Dante, Mrs. Kriegel structures her analysis in a series

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of concentric circles: first the voters and readers of the party press, then the rank-and-file militants, and finally "the apparatus," which "is to militant communists what the clergy are to the Christian people" (p. 187). The difference between party functionaries and rank-and-file members she sees as "more spiritual than material" (p. 196); *apparatchiks* are required to abandon that last small measure of privacy and freedom of decision to which ordinary militants may still cling. The chapters on the inner circle are the most novel of all; such information is least accessible to outsiders. But those about the rank-and-file are almost as rich: e.g., the analysis of generational differences separating those who joined in 1924-34, those of Popular Front vintage, and those from the wartime Resistance; the party's attitude toward youth and women; the roles of workers and intellectuals.

Kriegel describes the party as "a minority countersociety" and finds in that fact the source of the contradictions in its behavior: "It struggles to demolish the old society while at the same time hoping to become heir to that society. The drama that is lacerating the entire communist world is concentrated between those two poles: radical destruction on the one hand, preservation for the sake of a radically new order on the other" (p. xxi).

In her concluding chapter, she grapples with the problem of the party's response to *les événements* of May-June 1968 (the book was completed in the immediate aftermath of the crisis). On balance, she defends the party against the charge that it betrayed the revolution or sowed social-democratic leanings when it refused to support the ultraleftists. Instead, the Communists refused to give up their Leninist strategy of operating both within and outside the bourgeois system—a choice that was most sensible and least costly to them. Finally, the author confronts the question: Has the party undergone a fundamental change in recent years? Her answer is a paradoxical yes-and-no: change in the sense of continuing adaptation to the world in which it exists, nonchange in the sense of a persistent "basic strangeness," "something absolute" (pp. 362-63) that distinguishes the party from all other parties and gives it a quasireligious cast.

Occasionally the analysis loses its usual clarity and leaves the reader (this reader, at least) baffled: for example, on the allegedly crucial difference between the two concepts of "a workers' party" and "a party of the working class" (pp. 95-97) and on the heavily stressed contrast between "extremism" and "leftism" (pp. 335-43). At times, too, the translator seems to have nodded; occasional words or phrases are misleadingly rendered, and at least twice the original meaning has actually been reversed. It is unfortunate, also, that the revised and expanded version of the book (Paris, 1971) did not appear in time to be used for the translated edition.

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Mr. Johnson's book is an expanded version of a Yale undergraduate essay, begun in 1968 when he witnessed part of the student upheaval in Paris. For the most part, however, it is not based on direct observation or interviews but on more standard printed documentation. Most of the study deals with the background to the May crisis rather than the event itself: the Communists' attitude toward intellectuals, the recurrent conflict between the party and its youth group, the influence of existentialist thought, the rise of leftist factions among the students. This volume is a skillful and lucid account, one that would do credit to a much older and more mature author. It is marred slightly by occasional infelicities of expression and spelling errors that careful editing should have caught, but it is notably well informed and shrewd in its judgments. I am not fully persuaded, however, by Mr. Johnson's conclusion that the party's conduct in 1968 cost it "much of the sympathy it once enjoyed in the university" (p. 186) or that the party ought to have captured and harnessed the dynamism of the student Left. That dynamism has not been very productive since 1968, and as for influence on the campuses, it would seem that no group has gained more than the Communists since then.

GORDON WRIGHT
*Stanford University*

To the Maginot Line: the Politics of French Military Preparation *by Judith M. Hughes. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1971.—296 pp. $12.00.*

In 1918, the French army covered itself in dearly bought glory by participating in a great victory; twenty-two years later, in 1940, that glory was totally expunged by an ignominious collapse. In seeking explanations for this dramatic reversal of fortune, historians have not walked lightly upon military toes. It is little wonder: the unimaginative and costly tactics of the military command in the great war, the apparent arrogance and hauteur of French policy in the 1920's, the generally stagnant and backward-looking nature of military planning between the wars, and the obvious defeatism of many officers in the last months of the Third Republic—not to mention the career of Pétain and his military colleagues at Vichy—have done much to damage the reputation of the French army and to leave it with few, generally ineffectual, defenders. Moreover, any attempt at greater distance to reassess the role of the French army between the wars has been plagued by a shortage of official source material and a lingering inclination to search for villains.

Although French determination to protect their archival chastity can-

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not be overturned by independent historians, Professor Hughes, in her admirable little monograph, has demonstrated what can be done to overcome obstacles of official secrecy through resourcefulness in collecting evidence and ingenuity in interpretation. Moreover, instead of working backward from 1940, seeking causes and culprits of collapse in the 1930s, Ms. Hughes has wisely chosen to begin in 1918 and to focus upon the 1920s. This chronology has given her a fresher perspective and a wider scope for sympathy than other commentators of the period. It is the great merit of this book that it passes judgments with compassion and restraint. Indeed, Professor Hughes insists upon viewing French military policy in the broadest possible context of international developments, domestic politics, economic problems, and intellectual moods; from these elements, she weaves a dilemma of tragic dimensions in which the confusions and mistakes of individuals are reviewed with kindness and realism.

The study revolves around two issues: how the French used their victory in the First World War and how they envisaged and planned for the Second World War. Although it would appear logical that the advantages gained from the First would be utilized in planning the Second, Ms. Hughes argues that this was not the case. For if "the prime concern of all was security narrowly understood—not a desire for hegemony or a position of dominance" (p. 22), the French never figured out how to translate their short-term superiority, resulting from an allied victory and the Treaty of Versailles, into long-term security. The difficulty lay in the weakness of France beside a neighbor far superior to her in manpower resources and industrial potential. During the 1920s, the powerful position France enjoyed without joy was essentially artificial. A renewed war with Germany implied a complete German recovery, which in turn presupposed a reversal of the situation existing under the Versailles Treaty. In casting a gloomy eye to the long-term future, French military planners understood that the next struggle with Germany would be total, requiring the fullest mobilization of French resources in order merely to survive. Planning almost automatically took on a defensive hue. The keynote to successive mobilization and operational plans was to use the standing army as a covering force, to hold a line until full mobilization could be completed; this strategy would allow France to hold out in a stalemate until massive allied assistance opened up possibilities for victory. Although the demilitarized Rhineland figured in all of these plans during the 1920s, the main value the French saw in this region was the opportunity to establish a defensive line on German soil, and thus to avoid fighting over the northeastern departments of France once again. When the Rhineland was evacuated, beginning in 1930, these de-

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fensive plans were pulled back to the frontiers of France where they emerged in the form of fixed fortifications. Once built, the very existence of the Maginot line confirmed the defensive mainsprings that had led to its construction without, at the same time, eliminating the anxiety over long-term weakness that had made defensive planning seem prudent.

As Professor Hughes argues, however, the gloomy prognostications of military planners bore little relationship to the coercive policies that France employed during the 1920s to enforce the peace treaty. Since few Frenchmen believed the treaty could give them long-term guarantees of security, they tended to look upon the treaty as offering a "breathing space" before the grimmer realities of long-term inferiority had to be faced. Not only did strict enforcement enable the French to pile up excuses for prolonging the Rhineland occupation, it also provided a temporary wall behind which politicians could pursue the popular course of reducing the military burdens of the nation (particularly, the term of service) and through which they could collect reparations to aid in reconstruction. There was also a psychological dimension to coercion: the French sought to hide their anxiety over long-term weaknesses behind demonstrations of strength, which in turn, could be passed off as increments in security. But in fact, strict enforcement did not alter the long-term realities. Indeed, Ms. Hughes argues that coercion was really a luxury which the French could indulge only so long as Germany remained disarmed and passive, and only on condition that the economic, political, and diplomatic price to France remained low. By 1924, the latter condition could no longer be met, and the luxury of coercion was abandoned.

Professor Hughes regards the period between 1920 and 1924 as the "era of illusions"; French aggressiveness in enforcing the treaty increased the pressure for international settlements and reconciliation. One by one, the Dawes plan, the opening of serious discussions on general disarmament, and the removal of the Allied Control Commission from Germany deprived France of the excuses she needed to prolong her Rhineland stay. As the date for evacuation was pushed forward, the "breathing space" became shorter and the vista of long-term insecurity lengthened. The Maginot line represented an attempt to prolong the "breathing space" by other means. To be sure, the French did try to cover the erosion of their short-term superiority by diplomatic measures. At Locarno, Briand sought, within the limits of diplomatic possibility, to secure allied guarantees, while insuring the continued demilitarized status of the Rhineland after eventual evacuation. As Ms. Hughes observes, it was not Briand's fault that his successors failed to use that insurance in 1936. Yet, ultimately, the weight of her argument suggests that the basic fault lay, not

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in the decisions of this or that individual, but rather in the fundamental weakness of France and her inability to turn the short-term superiority, won from an incomplete victory, to good use in covering the long-term weaknesses. The inability of French leaders to resolve this dilemma produced the defensive thinking and the "malaise militaire" which was to dog them until defeat finally fulfilled the prophecy.

CHARLES C. BRIGHT
*University of Michigan*

Richelieu and Reason of State *by William F. Church. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1972.—582 pp. $20.00.*

The idea of "reason of state" has had a long and largely dishonorable history. It has been associated with the immoral counsels of Machiavelli and his commentators, including the famous study of Friedrich Meinecke published almost half a century ago. But the notion, or cluster of notions, sheltered by this term transcends "Machiavellianism" historically and philosophically. Historically, it is related at least collaterally with the Ciceronian "ratio republicae" and with the medieval "ratio status," whose career has been so illuminatingly discussed by Gaines Post. Commonly "reason of state" has had more to do with the idea of a higher public good than with political naturalism or amorality. According to Vico, "ragion di stato" was simply a more elegant phrase for the juridical concept of "civil equity" (*aequitas civilis*). One of Professor Church's achievements is to help restore "raison d'état" to its original moral context.

Yet the purpose of this book is not to extend the legal or philosophical dimension of this idea or to probe for remote sources in *ideengeschichtlich* terms. Rather it is to examine closely its fortunes and transmutations in one concrete and particularly crucial situation which coincided with the fabled career of Cardinal Richelieu. The political activities he focuses upon are the familiar ones of foreign policy, beginning with the Valtelline episode, and of "state-building"; but it is public and official opinion, rather than political behavior or even policymaking, which is the object of analysis. "Cardinal Richelieu was the first notable royal minister to mount a massive publishing campaign on his own behalf," the author reminds us (p. 111). It is this body of propaganda, pro and con, which furnishes the substance of Professor Church's account of the role of "reason of state" and of the moral dilemma which it conceals. Much of the value of the book derives from the many insights into the genesis, conceptualization, and expression of political attitudes under particular

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pressures. What we are offered, in short, is not merely a description of political theories but an investigation into what may be regarded as the archeology of political ideas. Our reward is an understanding, in terms of a particular set of circumstances, of that matrix of political experience where ideas and events converge and interact, the penumbral area of ideology which political scientists as well as historians may both, perhaps even mutually, profitably explore, though they seldom do.

The most useful parts of the book are taken up with summaries and analyses, often extended, of dozens of pamphlets. Many of them previously have been unappreciated or even untouched, published over two decades of tumultuous and soul-searching political and social conflict. What Professor Church shows in particular is that Richelieu viewed the art of politics in largely conventional Christian and moral terms. There were certainly shockingly radical characterizations of *raison d'état*, such as Balzac's notorious declaration that "Necessity . . . excuses and justifies all that it creates"; but no responsible spokesmen would express such an opinion except to attribute it to an enemy. Richelieu himself remained attached to notions of the just war, the unity of Christendom, and to traditional values. So his apologists argued against his various critics, and the author argues against the anachronistic and overly abstract interpretations of Meinecke and others.

This masterly work, the product of many years of research and reflection, is much richer and more rewarding than I can suggest here (or, no doubt, than I can appreciate on first reading). My reservations are largely peripheral. Though it may undercut the revisionist claims of the book, it should be said that Richelieu's position is quite in keeping with traditional Gallican habits of thought, especially assumptions about the indissolubility of religion and politics (e.g., vain efforts of the previous century to separate the *question de religion* from the *question politique*) and about the immorality of politics "Italian style." At the same time, it seems to me, much of Richelieu's self-proclaimed righteousness depends for its support upon a somewhat rationalistic, if not uncritical, construction of his pronouncements and those of his apologists. Finally, I would recall more emphatically the juristic element in the history of "reason of state," including the age-old conflicts between private and public spheres and the force of "Natural necessity" in these problems. To be sure the latter invites an even wider ranging sort of "archeological" investigation. But such obiter dicta in no way detract from the excellence of this book, which should afford enlightenment to political theorists even more than to historians.

DONALD R. KELLEY
*Harvard University*

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Deutsche Geschichte Seit Dem Ersten Weltkrieg. Band 1. *Veröffentlichung des Instituts für Zeitgeschichte. Stuttgart, Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1971. 844 pp.*

The Institute for Contemporary History in Munich has become famous for the contributions of its members to our knowledge of the recent past. This stout volume is a good example of the nature and quality of their work, for it includes three separate studies, each of which is marked by freshness of approach, rigorous examination of accepted views, and analytical incisiveness.

Helmut Heiber's "The Weimar Republic" is a political history which concentrates almost exclusively upon internal affairs. For its length the study is remarkably thorough in its treatment of complicated technical questions, such as the origins and growth of inflation where Heiber corrects some historical stereotypes; in contrast to most texts on this period, it does not focus completely on Berlin, but treats Bavarian politics, for example, with satisfying detail. It is particularly good on the great crises —the Ruhr invasion, November 1923, the fall of the Mueller cabinet, and the failure of the Bruening experiment. Heiber reproaches Bruening for not having exhausted the possibilities of parliamentary government and for undermining German democracy by his reliance upon presidential powers. This judgment is not entirely original, but it is expressed effectively and in a way that makes the defensive arguments advanced in the chancellor's memoirs look pretty flimsy, not to say disingenuous. Heiber's verdicts on other gravediggers of the republic are even more harsh. Of the Nationalist leader Hugenberg, he writes tartly, "[He] was a fool, whose role in German politics was successfully to destroy everything that he undertook to support."

The foreign political aspects of the Weimar period and the age of Hitler that succeeded it are discussed in the second study, Heinrich Graml's "Europe between the Wars." When this history deals with the Peace Conference, the League of Nations, the evolution of Mussolini's foreign policy and events in eastern Europe, it is useful but wholly conventional. Graml's real interest is in the course of German policy; his most important work concerns the efforts of those charged with planning and administering it to regain freedom of action and to establish a line of continuity with pre-1914 German policy. Graml is less interested in Rathenau than in Maltzan, who emerges in these pages as the real force of German political strategy in the early 1920's; he is less interested in Stresemann than in the officials in Stresemann's Foreign Ministry, of whom he writes, "the men in the Wilhelmstrasse regarded the treaty

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system of Locarno exclusively as an instrumentarium for a useful revisionist adjustment of power in Europe and as a means of isolating Poland." The importance of the Polish question is constantly stressed, in sections on Weimar and the Hitler period. Other aspects of the Nazi regime are treated less effectively, and, apart from an interesting section on Hitler as Social Darwinian, the last chapters are pedestrian.

The most original of these three works is Martin Broszat's "Hitler's State." It is at once a descriptive analysis of the Nazi regime and an explanation of how it got that way. In its first aspect, it presents a fascinating picture of the medieval-anarchic character of Hitler's governmental structure between 1934 and 1938, a jungle of competing state and party instances, a *Nebeneinander* of centralist and particularist agencies. In its second phase, it demonstrates how Hitler's government was the result partly of the Nazi movement before 1933, and partly because Hitler was brought to power, not by the Nazi movement alone, but aided by conservative and reactionary groups that had opposed democracy since 1918. Broszat explains that, once the *Gleichschaltung* of 1933-34 was complete, Hitler found it expedient to maintain that collaboration, even at the cost of administrative incoherence.

It was only after the Fuehrer inaugurated the aggressive phase of his foreign policy in 1938 that he reverted to revolutionary ways. In the sequel all of the conservative-elitist agencies, institutions and norms, which had been the stabilizing element between 1934 and 1938, were set aside by the regime or, as was especially true after 20 July 1944, were brutally liquidated. Since this return to the revolutionary dynamic destroyed the Nazi regime as well, Broszat believes that good came out of evil; the shattered Germany of 1945 had a chance that its predecessor did not have in 1918, of becoming a modern democratic state. Hitler had destroyed all its enemies.

GORDON A. CRAIG
*Stanford University*

The Foreign Policy of Hitler's Germany: Diplomatic Revolution in Europe, 1933-36 *by Gerhard L. Weinberg. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1970.—xi, 397 pp. $12.75.*

Socialist, Anti-Semite, and Jew: German Social Democracy Confronts the Problems of Anti-Semitism, 1918-1933 *by Donald L.*

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*Niewyk. Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1971.—x, 254 pp. $8.95.*

West German Reparations to Israel *by Nicholas Balabkins. New Brunswick, Rutgers University Press, 1971.—384 pp. $12.50.*

Between 1933 and 1936 Germany rose from "barely accepted equal" to "dominant power" in Europe. It was Hitler, Weinberg argues, who was responsible for this "diplomatic revolution." Hitler's new methods and new goals allowed him to seize the initiative and subvert the order created at Versailles. Weinberg begins with an extensive *tour d'horizon* of the international scene in 1933. After canvassing the extent to which Germany had already escaped the restrictions of the peace treaty, he analyzes Hitler's initial moves for what they show of his conception of foreign policy. Turning to Hitler's policy in some detail, he traces what is essentially a familiar story of deteriorating relations with the West, relatively aimless posturing in the Far East and in the Western Hemisphere and the economic penetration of the Balkans. He quite rightly links Hitler's foreign policy to his domestic policy—though he says little about how Hitler used activity abroad to compensate for the stresses of *Gleichschaltung* at home, or about the impact of domestic developments on Hitler. Weinberg is at his most interesting when he recounts how Hitler defied traditional animosities to come to terms with Poland, and when he reconstructs motives and tactics in the subversion of Austria in 1933-34 and the intervention in the Spanish Civil War. The reoccupation of the Rhineland in 1936, followed promptly by alliances with Japan and Italy, says Weinberg, marked the end of the first phase of Hitler's foreign policy. Hitler had destroyed the treaty, broken the French alliance system, restored Germany's power; the road to war is now open. Weinberg's account is well informed, sharp in focus, and based on a wealth of archival documentation.

For Weinberg, "the foreign policy of Hitler's Germany" is really Hitler's foreign policy. Hitler's "program" therefore assumes prime importance. The author belongs to the school that attributes to Hitler a deliberate and immutable design, though he concedes that tactical opportunism and flexibility must have been elements of this design. His interpretation is based primarily on *Hitlers Zweites Buch*, in which Hitler distilled his thinking on foreign affairs in 1928. It falls short, however, of the latest German scholarship on Hitler's purposes and plans (e.g., Hildebrand, Hillgruber, Kuhn). On another level, the emphasis on Hitler leads Weinberg to make little of the continuity of traditional goals and methods. Recovery of status as a great power—or, to take specific instances, German rearmament and merger with Austria—was not Hitler's goal alone. It was shared by diplomats and generals (and millions of Germans);

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both diplomats and generals continued for some time to contribute to shaping German foreign policy.

National Socialism turned anti-Semitism into highly successful propaganda. Contemporaries underestimated the attractiveness and implications of this propaganda; German socialists were no exception. They regarded such propaganda primarily as a weapon of reactionary parties bent on destroying the socialist party and undermining the republic. The socialists fought the propaganda with ridicule, rational argument, and only rarely with the police and the courts. Niewyk analyzes the socialists' attitudes and describes their opposition on the basis of a close (and perhaps a bit narrow) study of the party press between 1918 and 1933. His book is competent, clearly organized, and clearly written. Its conclusions are at times somewhat indirect. Thus Niewyk merely hints at the pervasiveness of anti-Semitism (and the party's susceptibility to it) when he recounts the socialists' willingness to make concessions to the anti-Semitic agitation of the right-wing parties after 1930. He never suggests that a party seeking acceptance in a society where anti-Semitism is traditional may be constitutionally incapable of separating itself from the prevailing attitude.

After the war, West Germany made material amends for Nazi outrages. Balabkins recounts how Germans and Israelis negotiated and then implemented the Luxembourg treaty of 1952, which set the sum total and method of payment of reparations to Israel. He brings out the moral qualms which attended the decision to claim restitution, explores the German reaction and mixed motives of Adenauer's government, and assesses the impact of reparations on the German and Israeli economies. Greater rigor was necessary in the production of this book. The narrative is diffuse and repetitive: some material is poorly integrated, much of it only vaguely relevant; not infrequently the analysis is simplistic and prose, pedestrian. Parts of the historical introduction are dated; the book does credit to no one, least of all to an interesting subject.

C. M. KIMMICH
*Columbia University*

Die Münchener Ministerpräsidentenkonferenz, 1947: Anlass und Scheitern eines gesamtdeutschen Unternehmens *by Wilhard Grünewald. Meisenheim am Glan, Verlag Anton Hain, 1971.— xvi, 555 pp. DM 85. (Marburger Abhandlungen zur Politischen Wissenschaft, Band 21. Wolfgang Abendroth, ed.).*

Cold warriors, historians, and Germans generally see the postwar division of Germany as a cold-war phenomenon. Russians and Americans

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disagreed on reparations, boundaries, nationalization, land reform, currency reform, the level of the postwar German economy, the nature of a future German government, and on other matters. Russian-American disputes polarized the Allied Control Council in Berlin, and it failed to agree on German unity. The four occupation powers drifted apart, taking "their" Germans with them in the process. The Americans (and their western partners) eventually formed the Federal Republic; the Russians formed the German Democratic Republic. Were Germans mere pawns; the victims of a world-wide power struggle fought partially on their soil, as this interpretation implies? Few have asked, and fewer have answered. Grünewald has and does.

Hans Ehard, the Minister-President of Bavaria, invited the minister-presidents of the four zones to meet in Munich on June 5, 1947. Wilhelm Kaisen's similar invitation to Bremen for October, 1946, had failed to gain acceptance in the French and Russian zones. Ehard succeeded where Kaisen failed, but the French-zone minister-presidents were apparently restricted by their military government, and the Russian-zone minister-presidents delayed their acceptance until the last moment. The conference never got beyond the session of June 5th to discuss the agenda. Disagreements over an item the Russian-zone minister-presidents wanted to place first on the agenda eventually led to the departure of the Russian-zone minister-presidents. The conference continued in rump session. It eventually submitted resolutions to the Allied Control Council, but after disagreements there (some procedural, some substantive) the item was removed from the agenda.

Grünewald's book, which contains an appendix of 18 documents, is a thoroughly researched study of the Munich minister-presidents' conference. Grünewald describes Ehard's invitation and the early planning for the conference. He examines the preconference discussions and their context. He analyzes the disagreements that led to the Soviet-zone minister-presidents' departure. He interprets the meaning of the conference, mainly by summarizing and commenting upon the extensive public discussion that occurred both during and after the meeting. Grünewald concentrates on the *internal* German political, social, constitutional, and personal differences that manifested themselves. He assigns primary responsibility for the failure of this first, and only, attempt at an all-German effort at unity to the rigidity of Hans Ehard's federalism and the uncompromising position of Kurt Schumacher and the Social Democratic party. Grünewald focuses on some of the fundamental internal forces that contributed to the division of Germany, and he thus illuminates many of the long-standing issues on which Germans must negotiate to achieve the better relations and the eventual unity envisioned by Willy Brandt's *Ostpolitik*.

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Grünewald is overly critical of Hans Ehard. He accepts the Soviet-zone minister-presidents' explanations of things more readily than other writers have. Furthermore, he is extremely critical of Kurt Schumacher and the Social Democratic party for the position they took on Ehard's invitation, on the conference, and on the concept of "national representation." The book should therefore be read along with two recent articles on the subject by Elmar Krautkrämer (*Vierteljahrshefte fur Zeitgeschichte*, Heft 2/72, pp. 154-74 and Heft 4/72, pp. 418-21), an article by Theodore Eschenburg (*VfZ*, Heft 4/72, pp. 411-17), and this reviewer's article in *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* (B31/71, pp. 3-28).

Grünewald's book also interestingly reveals how West German minister-presidents, their official and unofficial spokesmen, and the press have successfully (deliberately?) obfuscated the full meaning of the Munich conference by assigning ultimate responsibility for the collapse of the conference to the military governments. Thanks to Grünewald, and to the other studies mentioned above, we know that General Lucius D. Clay's approval and restriction of the agenda even before Ehard sent out the invitations is a myth. We know that the restrictions on the French-zone minister-presidents were, in themselves, much less decisive than the literature since 1947 would have them be. We know that the Soviet-zone minister-presidents' "march orders," supposedly issued by the Russians or the SED, and their alleged decision to come to Munich for the purpose of "exploding" the conference, no longer seem to be the overriding determinant of the conference's collapse. We may even suspect that there were no such orders or decisions at all, but we do not as yet know it for a fact.

JOHN GIMBEL
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Jesuits and Jacobins: Enlightenment and Enlightened Despotism in Austria, *by Paul P. Bernard. Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1971.—ix, 185 pp. $7.50.*

Historians have conducted a relentless search for links between reformist ideas of the Enlightenment and particular reforms "from above" effected by late eighteenth-century rulers. The influences of the church, alienated artistocrats, censorship, and intelligentsias are explored, categories which relate ideas to political action are created, and Enlightened Despotism and Josephenism are born. Professor Bernard's work belongs to this search, in this instance in Austria.

The impetus which led historians to make this journey, perhaps to establish the importance of ideas and of intellectuals in political reform,

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has almost disappeared from eighteenth-century studies. Professor Bernard seems not to be motivated by this original impetus. There is, however, a desire on his part to find in Austrian history an Enlightenment worthy of the name; hence at points where the writers he discusses let him down, he expresses his disappointment. That the Austrian Cameralists, for example, failed to develop a uniquely "distinguishing" body of ideas for Austria (p. 7) disturbs him. But these offhand observations give the work no more than a nationalist flavor; they do not become part of the analysis.

Reformist ideas in every corner, pale and unoriginal as they might be, are presented in a fresh narrative, mainly because they were part of the Austrian experience. There is little discussion of how many readers might have read the works of these authors or seen their plays, except, of course, evidence that Kaunitz, Maria Theresa, or Joseph himself paid attention. Professor Bernard has a vision of "modern" reformism that is anticlerical, antiaristocratic, and even antimonarchical, if not sympathetically democratic thought, with which he weighs the work he discusses. When these elements are discerned, no matter how crudely they are stated, they become part of the Enlightenment, and the author an *Aufklarer*. When the works and ideas do not conform to this vision they are dismissed as "dull trash" (p. 65). This mode of analysis has, of course, been completely explored and is now being rejected by scholars of the eighteenth-century. To apply it again to the Austrian experience, and to go once more through Josephenism, merits reasons which Professor Bernard does not give.

Might it not have been better to admit that there was no Austrian David Hume, Montesquieu, Beccaria, Voltaire, and Lessing in the first place, and then go on to analyze the careers and thought of Sonnenfels, Richter, and others as part of a "grub-street" Enlightenment? The similarities between what Bernard defines as the Austrian *Aufklarer*, and R. Darnton's "grub-street" writers ("Reading, Writing, and Publishing in Eighteenth-Century France: A Case Study in the Sociology of Literature," *Daedalus*, winter, 1971) are striking and deserve to be explored. Darnton's methods and questions should prove to be immensely more useful to understanding Austrian literary and political culture than the old model of Enlightened Despotism established by Fritz Hartung and others. The problems of social and ethnic origins of Austrian writers, which clearly intrigue Professor Bernard but for which the old Hartung mode of analysis leaves no place at all, could be brought into significant relief through the application of Darnton's mode of analysis. Similarly, the ideas and works described by Bernard as "dull trash" might take on new interest when defined as part of popular literary culture. In these

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works what could perhaps be defined as more uniquely Austrian elements of social criticism and "collective mentalities" might be discerned.

Professor Bernard also has some misperceptions of Enlightenment thought outside of Austria, which inhibit clarification of the Austrian experience. For example, there is the implication that universities should have played a role in the Enlightenment in Austria, almost as if they had elsewhere; yet from what we know about the Enlightenment elsewhere in Europe, it was generally not flourishing in universities. On a more serious matter, the relationship between Cameralism and Enlightenment in Austria, Professor Bernard is disappointingly vague; many elements of Sonnenfels' thought (such as the desire to reduce religious holidays, p. 34) could have been derived from earlier cameralist writers and similarly von Blanc's ideas also seem to be more a part of cameralist thought than indebted either to foreign philosophes or to Sonnenfels. Here there is a lack of definition; in the last chapters of the book, where the terms "moderate," "liberal," and "radical" are thrown about almost without definition, the impression is left that a different, less anachronistic mode of analysis might yield the description of a richer, more coherent and uniquely Austrian political-literary culture.

OREST RANUM
*The Johns Hopkins University*

Bulgarian Communism: the Road to Power, 1934-1944 *by Nissan Oren. New York, Columbia University Press, 1971.—xii, 288 pp. $12.50.*

To paraphrase Sir Trevelyan, *Bulgarian Communism* might be politics with the political analysis omitted. Dr. Oren has worked through a maze of material, identified key individuals and issues, and traced the tangled history of a divided, suppressed party in a confusing political situation. The subtitle is misleading; Dr. Oren convinces the reader that only the Red Army could have propelled the Bulgarian Communist party to power. But the author has probably presented the facts free of rewritten "party truth." This method is a basis for sophisticated political analysis. Most of the audience will be disappointed that slim political sociology (pp. 108-109) exists in an almost exclusively structural analysis of the party (pp. 103 seq).

Dr. Oren has written a highly competent, carefully documented but extremely narrow political narrative. His volume is a sequel to Joseph Rothschild's *Communist Party of Bulgaria: Origins and Development*

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(1959). Oren's task is more difficult, covering party history from the military coup of 19 May 1934 to the Fatherland Front on 9 September 1944 (ostensibly a coalition, in fact rule of the Bulgarian Communist party backed by the victorious Red Army.) Oren understands the basic Bulgarian political problem very well. The last emerging Balkan state, "tribal" or national concerns dominated politics from 1870 through World War II. Axis partnership was attractive because it gave Bulgaria Yugoslavian Macedonia and Greek Thrace. The Germans understood this and refused to permit formal annexation "until the peace treaties" at the end of the war. Bulgaria lost Macedonia to Tito, Thrace to Greece, and the Bulgarians were forced to magnify their role in "resistance" to salvage some vestige of reputation. Dr. Oren does particularly well in segregating myth and fact (chapter VII) on this touchy point.

Not only did Bulgaria pick losers in both world wars, albeit not for reasons entirely under her control, she also had limited, somewhat tumultuous free institutions. The Trankov coup of June 1923 overthrew the peasant populism which emerged from the defeat of 1918. This gave way to the more moderate Liapchev government in January 1926. Essentially free elections in 1931 returned the People's Bloc Coalition. The more conservative elements saw political freedom becoming political license. A preposterously easy putsch dissolved the Subranie (the Bulgarian parliament), suspended the constitution, banned political meetings, controlled the press, and instituted a state-controlled syndicate to supercede the former trade unions. King Boris, by a judicious mixture of conciliation, coercion, and the expert manipulation of interest groups, asserted a qualified personal rule, subduing both the military victors of 1934 and the residual democratic opposition. Token institutions remained. Totalitarian suppression was never complete, but Boris ruled effectively until his death in 1943. His timing was excellent, for from then until the Red Army swept through, Bulgaria waited for outside forces to determine her political history.

Given this context, the author's principal difficulty was his subject. The Communist party was a small, divided, ineffective force in Bulgarian political life until catapulted into power by the conquering Russians. Smashed after an ill-fated rising in September 1923, banned in 1924, the leadership fled creating yet another split in an already divided party. Cadres continued to indulge in unprofitable terrorist outbursts which were invariably met by harsh countermeasures. A brief taste of freedom in 1931-33 gave the party fleeting encouragement (which Dr. Oren does not really explain), but the coup of 1934 brought renewed suppression, ill-judged activism, more exile. Unfortunately Russia proved more dangerous than Bulgaria. First the left exiles, then the party regulars were

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victims of Stalin's purges. Dr. Oren estimates between 400 and 600 fell victim.

Bulgaria needed great power support to secure its national objectives, and the author traces efforts to maintain freedom of maneuver between Germany and the Soviet Union while securing some slight advantages. He concedes the relative lack of party influence and discusses the ease with which the first limited efforts to support the USSR in Bulgaria were suppressed in 1941-42. Since the party, as such, played such a small role from 1934 to 1944, Dr. Oren discusses the activities of Bulgarian Communists abroad in some detail. He cites several who rose to high positions in the USSR and in other parties (pp. 36-39). He deals with the approximately 400 volunteers to the Spanish Civil War, although he admits that event did little to build the Popular Front in Bulgaria (pp. 133-138). Here, as elsewhere, Dr. Oren moves somewhat uneasily between a history of the party, the saga of some party members, and a rather sketchy political history of Bulgaria.

Dr. Oren's book lacks that rigorous political analysis which would have made stimulating reading and provocative comparison. Few scholars possess Dr. Oren's linguistic resources; none has been more patiently through the available material. Let us hope that Dr. Oren will bring his considerable talents to bear on Bulgaria's history, politics, unique modern problems and related issues. He is always clear, obviously in command, and has written a useful volume for specialists.

EUGENE C. BLACK
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The Foreign Policy System of Israel: Setting, Images, Process *by Michael Brecher. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1972.—x, 693 pp. $17.50.*

In the constant underlying debate between social scientists and humanists, the lines are often drawn between those who wish to draw general ("over-arching") conclusions and those who attempt painstakingly to research a specific, delineated subject. Professor Brecher has made a valuable contribution toward bridging the two approaches.

His large work presents a rigorous research design which uses input-output systemic analysis. In the input, however, are the "psychological-environmental" or perceived global and regional interplay of relations. The stress on perceived reality is combined with carefully detailed attention both to the internal strength of society as well as the historical, psychological and personality variables of the specific Israeli context. Thus

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Israel's foreign policy system is seen from the inside, and the systematization is so solidly based that it creates a book which is a key to Israeli politics, attitudes, dominant personalities and elites. The study is a *sine qua non* for any scholar who is involved in Israeli politics and institutions, and for Middle East specialists in international relations.

Brecher's comprehensive analysis of Israel's High Policy Elite is followed by an encompassing analysis of their "Attitudinal Prism," which he calls a "pivotal concept." This idea is shaped, he writes, "by three interacting variables—political culture, historical legacy and the personality traits of decision makers" (pp. 228-229). The dominant prism is Israel's Jewishness. The late Ya'cov Herzog, principal advisor to the Israeli Prime Minister, in 1966, framed this aspect (p. 232): "The Israeli elite looks upon Israel as the bastion of the collective Jewish group and, as such, it takes into account the interest of its parts. But it places primary value on the whole and to that end, the survival and enhancement of the bastion."

The dominant Jewish theme is cross-fertilized by the vague socialistic idealism of its Eastern European heritage, mitigated by the historical legacy of the mandatory period. Brecher perceptively reviews the personality traits of the key decisionmakers. He give full weight (p. 248) to the "one person [who] held a leadership position of towering dimensions," David Ben Gurion. The latter stamped onto the elite a predisposition to deeds rather than words. However Brecher does not allow sufficiently for Ben Gurion's pragmatism, and epitomizes him as possessing "decisiveness, extremism and rigidity." There are detailed comparisons of the leading figures in the policymaking elite: Ben Gurion and Sharett; Eshkol, Meir and Sapir; and the "younger" men: Allon, Dayan, Eban and Peres.

In analysing Israeli perceptions of the Arabs, Brecher (pp. 280-282) creates three categories: *Buberism*, "reconciliation through compromise;" *Ben Gurionism*, "reconciliation resulting from superior strength;" and *Weizmannism*, "reconciliation through rational search for moderate solutions." Golda Meir is now predisposed "to view 'the Arabs' through the 'Ben Gurionist' lens and respond with *'raison d'etat'* " (p. 311).

Foreign policy decision (p. 374—". . . the selection, among perceived alternatives, of one option leading to a course of action . . .") opens the section on implementation. It is viewed (p. 374) along "a *time continuum*, a *spectrum of initiation-reaction*, and a *scale of importance*," (i.e., strategic, tactical and implementing). The investigative framework is carefully balanced by detailed treatment both of foreign policy issues such as arms export to West Germany, (and of internal, structural institutional-personal relations, as between the Prime Minister and the

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Foreign Minister or the Defence Minister, the Cabinet and its committees and party bodies. The Foreign Policy Technical Elite and competing or parallel elites, i.e., the defence establishment and other ministerial bodies, are described by formal position and informal influence and power.

Brecher's conclusions are pessimistic and chilling. The "operational environment" (what actually happens) is mirrored in the "psychological environment" (what happens as perceived by the Israelis). "If reality," he writes (p. 556), "is harsh, rigid and forbidding over a long period, perception of reality will be harsh, rigid and forbidding." This perception is then fed back into the operative level—a closed-circuit interaction. "The result is that conflict resolution becomes increasingly improbable . . . *change is possible only by a qualitative jump within one or other of the Environments.*"

Brecher concludes with a brief, humanistic "evaluation" of Israel's foreign policy record (p. 556): "There have been notable achievements and notable failures. And the latter . . . are too important to be explained solely in terms of deterministic interaction of the two Environments; for decisions are made by men, not by environments."

The book, long and detailed, has become the cornerstone of scholarship in this field. One anticipates eagerly the forthcoming volume, *Decisions in Israel's Foreign Policy* (Oxford and Yale), which will analyse seven major policy-decision areas.

AVRAHAM AVI-HAI
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The Cultural Revolution in China *edited by Thomas W. Robinson. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1971.—xiv, 509 pp. $13.50.*

Communications and National Integration in Communist China *by Alan P.L. Liu. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1971. —xviii, 225 pp. $8.50.*

Mao's Revolution and the Chinese Political Culture *by Richard H. Solomon. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1971.—xix, 604 pp. $16.75.*

Years will pass before serious China specialists and social scientists write with confidence about the inner workings of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. What began as a controlled attack against "revisionism" turned into a series of spontaneous eruptions which cannot be sat-

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isfactorily explained in terms of contending power cliques or major issues of policy. Though Mao and his followers claim that they sought to "overthrow the handful of party people in authority taking the capitalist road," by the time the three-year turmoil ended in the spring of 1969, some leftist "hard-liners" of the earlier phase had been purged, while some "soft-liners" had survived or even gained rehabilitation. The mystery surrounding Lin Piao, the man who had seemed to gain the most during those three years, complicates matters further. (Lin's disappearance in September 1971 happened too late to be covered here.) Yet the authors prove that intelligent attempts at analysis are not fruitless, despite the lack of verifiable data and a gap between words and actions that distinguishes this past decade.

The Robinson volume is particularly thought provoking and enlightening. Contributions by William F. Dorrill on "Power, Policy and Ideology in the Making of the Chinese Cultural Revolution," Harry Harding Jr. on "Maoist Theories of Policy-making and Organization," Richard Baum on "The Cultural Revolution in the Countryside," Melvin Gurtov on "The Foreign Ministry and Foreign Affairs in the Chinese Cultural Revolution" and the editor's study of "Chou En-lai and the Cultural Revolution" justify the case-study method of tackling this elusive subject. The authors' collective effort focuses on the mainsprings and parameters of the Cultural Revolution in its crucial phase and sets a high standard for future research. The lack of an analysis of the army's role, however, is a serious fault.

In a brilliant essay, marked by sober awareness of the limitations of his data and scrupulous avoidance of "Aesopian translations" of Chinese pronouncements, Dorrill concentrates on the center of the storm: Chairman Mao's perception of a slackening of ideological fervor and his insistence that all other national goals, including economic and military development, must be subordinated to the attainment of doctrinal purity. Like his Confucian ancestors, Mao gives priority to men's minds. Turning Marx on his head, Mao fears that a bourgeois-tainted ideological superstructure can undermine the socialist economic base that has been built since 1949. Dorrill carefully suggests that this fear is Mao's perception. It goes back to the troubled period of 1956, when disenchantment with the Soviet economic model precipitated a debate concerning modernization. Mao's way, the Great Leap Forward and the communes of 1958, brought economic disaster. Though his sharpest critic, Defense Minister P'eng Teh-huai, was dismissed—and it is interesting to note that internal, not external, policies have been the main sources of dispute—subsequent economic policy became moderate, even liberal, in providing material incentives for peasants and foregoing grandiose schemes for rapid indus-

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trialization. While so-called rightist policies prevailed, by 1962 Mao began pressing for more "Maoist" radicalism rather than Marxism-Leninism. Seemingly innocuous philosophical debates such as whether "two combine into one" or whether, as Mao insists, "one divides into two" created uproars; major party leaders went along with Mao as he launched ideological campaigns, but Mao became increasingly suspicious and felt that they did not share his fear of a capitalist revival. By 1965-66, Mao had a conflict on his hands. His opponents were not necessarily revisionists, but advocates of the status quo who refused to divert the mental and physical energies of the Chinese people in quest of spiritual revival. As the Chairman turned to outsiders—especially the youth—and let loose the floodgates of criticism, power struggles, disputes over specific issues, and motives of self-interest which became interwoven with the ideological issue. The consequences were almost anarchic; when the army tried to restore order, as Baum points out, its intervention did not always strengthen the "leftists."

According to Baum's fascinating analysis, the Cultural Revolution was primarily an urban phenomenon. Only in its later stages did it reach the countryside, hitting suburban communes or those with easier access to major lines of communication. In the power struggle between Red Guards, who came from the outside, and the local establishment, it was Mao's fanatic supporters, no less than their "conservative" opponents, who sought to recruit peasant support based on a "conservative" appeal to self-interest: more pigs, private plots and material incentives. Farm production suffered relatively little damage, suggesting that rational, stabilizing forces still existed. Gurtov's account of the foreign ministry likewise shows an attempt to limit rampant Red Guards, but, as in the countryside, it was not possible to prevent some injurious disruptions, which hurt Peking's relations with foreign countries.

Robinson's own contribution deals with the man to whom these restraining influences are attributed. In more ways than one, Chou En-lai kept his head during the Cultural Revolution. This is a valuable insight into Chou's behavior under stress and pinpoints the skills which have subsequently afforded him even more prominence. In his introduction, Robinson quite rightly describes Chou as a "fascinating political figure" and "one of modern China's outstanding politicians and statesmen." But he confuses me in his summary. After "testing" Chou for charisma, he rates him, at best, only "near-charismatic." Then he consigns him to the bureaucratic politician category. And in a final thought—fortunately hidden in a footnote—Robinson suggests a similarity between Chou and other bureaucratic politicians, such as J. Edgar Hoover!

Harding's interesting contrast between Mao's dogmatic mass-line and

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Liu Shao-ch'i's more pragmatic and elitist approach reveals another dimension to the rift in Peking leadership. In his book on communications, Alan Liu finds that though China has made great strides toward integration since 1949, there are still serious obstacles. These include regionalism—reinforced by local dialects—lack of involvement of peasants in the Communist media system, peasant-worker antagonism, and, finally, Mao's ambivalent attitude toward the intellectuals needed to solve these problems. These factors explain why Mao saw the need for a Cultural Revolution, and why he had difficulties.

Mao gets full treatment in Solomon's book. It examines the interaction between his political style and the traditional political culture from the very beginning of Mao's career through the later stages of the Cultural Revolution. Providing a wealth of information as well as provocative ideas, the volume deserves scholarly attention, though I found it a bit too long and sometimes repetitious. Mao's style is characterized here by a firm belief that "controlled disorder" is the only way China can sustain social change and throw off the centuries-old burden of tradition. Mao is seen as an aging guerrilla fighter who fears that his comrades are getting soft and peasants will revert to traditional deference to authority. By institutionalizing conflict, he hopes to save the revolution from the degeneration that afflicted Russians. But Mao has problems. Twenty years of Communist rule has eliminated some of the harsher sources of social discontent. How long can Mao keep excoriating landlords when they have already been dispossessed? More important, how can he ensure that when conflict does erupt, it will now spawn the deviations that afflicted both the Hundred Flowers episode of 1957 and the Cultural Revolution? We can understand the dilemma of Liu Shao-ch'i, who, Solomon tells us, could not manage conflict to Mao's satisfaction. Unfortunately, Solomon does not tell us enough about Chou En-lai. Solomon's treatment of the Chinese political culture is less convincing than his analysis of Mao's style. He seems to have underestimated revolutionary changes and should have more on nationalism and modernization.

The traditional attitude toward authority, emphasized in the first third of the book, devoted to a psychological analysis of the Chinese personality, is described as passive and fearful of conflict. When first introduced, this theme strikes a responsive chord. Students of Chinese history and society have long recognized the authoritarian nature of both family and state in traditional China, and the link between the two patterns. But after a few hundred pages of repetition, the thesis, or to be more exact, the author's use of it, became less credible. Were the Chinese people—both peasants and scholar-gentry—really so uniquely passive? Peasant rebellions and scholarly criticism of the throne—which was al-

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ways considered legitimate—strongly qualify the notion of an immobile, passive Chinese personality. Solomon tells us that the Chinese were orderly and passive "provided their material well-being and security were not endangered." They became hostile, he points out, when "they thought their dependency had been unreciprocated or abused." In other words, they accepted authority as long as they got something in return. In this respect, I see no great difference between the Chinese and other people. The author claims that "anxiety in the face of authority and fears of isolation and conflict" constituted "those aspects of personality which gave the Confucian pattern its durability." This may be one way of explaining the persistence of the Confucian tradition, but I see no reason for ignoring the positive features of the traditional Chinese mentality, such as rationalism, eclecticism, and humanism. The Chinese, we are told, "fear conflict before apparently superior forces." Who does not? Even when acknowledging the fact that Chinese peasants turned against the Japanese invaders, Solomon still clings to the passivity theme. Chiang Kai-shek's "passive resistance" and the collaborationist phenomenon ostensibly indicate that the "traditional attitude of accommodation to a superior power remained a durable political tactic even in the China of the 1940's." But the point is that this was not a successful tactic for winning the mind and heart of China. Here I think the author has done less than justice to the force of modern Chinese nationalism. After all, who accommodated more readily to superior power in 1940, the Chinese or the French?

Though Mao may see his party opponents "burdened with traditional political attitudes," Solomon himself reminds us that "Mao spoke for a generation that rejected the Confucian tradition." Yet it is his own generation that has been giving him so much trouble, suggesting that Mao's opponents may be motivated by alternative, but not necessarily more tradition-influenced, ideas about modernization.

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The South African Voter: Some Aspects of Voting Behaviour with Special Reference to the General Elections of 1966 & 1970 *by Henry Lever. Cape Town, Juta & Co. Ltd., 1972.—vii, 221 pp. R 7.50.*

This pioneering attempt to apply the methods of psephology (the study of

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elections and voting) to the South African political system forms a particularly interesting contrast to most studies of South African politics. There are many sociologists who would argue that a study based on the model of Lazarsfeld's *People's Choice* is a singularly inappropriate approach to the political realities of Southern Africa: the dialectic between African and Afrikaner nationalism and the polarization of the country and its northern neighbors into black and white power blocks makes the analysis of voting behavior among the white elite a largely irrelevant exercise. Lever's useful study shows why this is not the case. While voting in South Africa is an exclusively white activity, the pervasive influence of the nonwhite majority lurks behind all the major political issues and both of Lever's sample surveys demonstrate that "the race problem" is considered of paramount importance by the white electorate. Furthermore, those who view "white power" as firmly entrenched in South Africa, at least for the immediate future, must regard the dynamics of white politics as a specially fascinating and important phenomenon; it is the only possible, if highly unlikely, source of social change.

The first part of the book focuses on Dr. Verwoerd's 1966 election victory and, more narrowly, on the two marginal constituencies of Johannesburg West and Houghton. A second section contains a more general account of the 1970 election set against the background dispute between *verkramptes* and *verligtes* within, and later outside, the National party. The survey data at the later election concentrates on the constituencies of Jeppes and Johannesburg West which are used to consider the factors underlying the small swing (4.3%) back towards the United party. Various chapters analyse the social factors influencing party preferences, such as language, class, education, religion and age, and the election issues as pronounced by politicians, newspapers and voters. Attention is paid to the candidates, which is particularly important in the case of Helen Suzman, to party organization, and to nonvoting. A separate chapter is devoted to the Johannesburg Station explosion of 1964, if only to show that it had little impact on ethnic attitudes and, presumably, on voting behavior. Concluding chapters in each part of the book assess the reasons behind the Nationalist victories and the prospects for the opposition parties in future elections.

The portrait Lever draws of the major parties is one that emphasizes the remarkable stability and appeal of the National party, the indecisiveness of the United party, and the Progressive party dominated by the personality of Mrs. Suzman. Afrikaner solidarity behind the Nationalists contrasts with the changeability of the English-speaking voter. Even the 1970 election reflected a return of some English-speaking voters to the United party fold and former Nationalist abstentions, rather than a direct con-

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version of Nationalist voters. United party voters gave considerable support to Nationalist racial policies and some 25 per cent of Progressive voters favored greater racial separation.

Lever's cautious prediction of increasing support for the United party may exaggerate the real political fluidity of the white power structure. The solidity of the Afrikaans base of the National party, despite the *verligte-verkrampte* dispute, the lack of support of even Progressive voters for many of their party's race policies, and the seeming inability of the United party to present an attractive alternative make the so-called "swing to the left" in 1970 (which contradicts the earlier notion of the United party "to the right of the National party on the political spectrum"—pp. 166-69) a rather ephemeral development. Whatever the outcome proves to be, Lever's lucid and scholarly account of the South African voter will be an indispensable complement to the more general sociological studies of the politics of *apartheid.*

JOHN STONE
*Columbia University*

The Rise of African Nationalism in South Africa: The African National Congress 1912-1952 *by Peter Walshe. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1971.—xvi, 480 pp. $14.50.*

Formed in 1912, the African National Congress in South Africa was the oldest nationalist movement in the continent. It has also been the least effective. These two facts alone should have stimulated political scientists to research that was, in fact, never undertaken until the 1950s. By 1960 the ANC was outlawed. From that date inquiries, however academic, about the records of an unlawful organization were highly suspect in the police state.

It is the first merit of Professor Walshe's impressive study that he managed to burrow into all sorts of sources for his materials. In particular, he is the first to draw on the papers of A. B. Xuma. This medical man, who married a black American, was president of the ANC from 1940 until 1949. As previous books (there are only a couple of any consequence) did Xuma rather less than justice, it is good to have the balance redressed now. Balance is indeed hard to achieve in any assessment of the fortunes and fate of this ill-starred organization. Unmeasured praise or unfair criticism has been poured upon it. No doubt one reason lay in the expectations held in the 1950s when most observers believed (on very slender evidence) that revolution was just around the corner in South Africa. As it has turned out, the most notable nonevent of the recent period has been the

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missing revolution, which shows fewer signs than ever of occurring in the 1970s.

Professor Walshe takes his narrative only up to 1952, the year in which the campaign of passive resistance attracted world attention and encouraged the false belief in the strength and prospects of the ANC. He does well to give some figures shedding light on the pathetically meager financial resources Congress ever had. In the early 1940s "a national fund of one thousand pounds per annum based solely on subscriptions, would have required a membership of 24,000." But at the time formal membership was barely one-tenth of that figure; and so a donation from a white liberal trust fund was welcomed. Operating on such a small financial scale, it is no wonder that the ANC never really mustered nation-wide support in a vast country where two-thirds of the Africans lived in rural areas almost closed to propaganda. This was the situation in the good old days before the Afrikaner Nationalists came to power in 1948 and checked all campaigns, whether revolutionary or mildly reformist in their implications.

Professor Walshe, who teaches African studies at the University of Notre Dame, has produced a book whose substantial value his modesty should not obscure. He has no bees in his bonnet, no axe to grind, and no particular theory to spin—unless you consider the undefined liberalism implicit in most studies of this description.

JULIUS LEWIN
*Royal Commonwealth Society*

Revolutionary Change in Cuba *edited by Carmelo Mesa-Lago. Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1971.—xvi, 554 pp. $14.95.*

The Theory of Moral Incentives in Cuba *by Robert M. Bernardo. University, Ala., University of Alabama Press, 1971.—xix, 159 pp. $7.50.*

*Revolutionary Change in Cuba* contains eighteen essays by participants in the 1969-70 continuing seminar on the Cuban Revolution at the University of Pittsburgh. Divided into three major sections, with a concluding essay forming a fourth section, it is a rather massive and uneven contribution to scholarship on Cuba. The first (and weakest) section is on Cuban politics, with essays by Andrés Suárez, James Malloy, Cole Blasier, Edward Gonzalez, Ernesto Betancourt, and Irving Louis Horowitz. It constitutes—with a few honorable exceptions—the incapacity of main-

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stream American political science to come to grips with normative and empirical realities of the third world. The cold-war rhetoric, the crude geopolitical analyses of "crackpot realists," and the self-righteousness that is manifested when liberal democracy is openly rejected (rather than simply ignored) are all in evidence. Furthermore, with the exception of Gonzalez, the Rand Corporation's chief consultant on Cuban affairs, no author has been in Cuba for many years. This lack of eyewitness experience is a particularly serious shortcoming; many of the most interesting and significant aspects of the Cuban political scene can be grasped only at first hand.

The economists at least have some data, a condition that is always sobering. The macrostructure of the Cuban economy is easier to grasp from afar than is the political system. Mesa-Lago is author of an essay and coauthor of two others (with Luc Zephirin and Roberto E. Hernández). A fourth was written by Roberto Bernardo and a fifth by Eric N. Baklanoff. The Baklanoff essay on international economic relations evidences the anticommunism and tunnel vision which pervades the section on politics. But even here useful data can easily be expropriated by scholars who do not share Baklanoff's view. The latter sees the prerevolutionary period as one in which "critical contributions" were made by "United States firms operating in Cuba."

As Cubans admit, planning, management, and production have all suffered serious setbacks. Unfortunately the Cuban economic innovation —the infrastructural and human-resource investments that are so evident in every corner of the island—is not treated. What might all those schools, roads, tractors, fertilizer plants, and agricultural experiments eventually come to?

The third and strongest section on society includes articles on inequality by Nelson Amaro and Mesa-Lago, education by Rolland Paulston, the Church by Mateo Jover Marimón, theater and cinematography by Julio Matas, literature by Lourdes Casal, and value transformations by José A. Moreno. All authors except Paulston are Cubans by birth, and, interestingly, their articles show less inclination toward stereotyped interpretations and greater sensitivity to the complexities of social change than do the essays produced by their Yankee brethren. In particular, the relatively brief article on the Church exhibits a lively appreciation of normative and other issues raised in the context of a country undergoing revolutionary changes.

The collection closes with Mesa-Lago's essay comparing aspects of the total Cuban situation with the Chinese, Soviet, and Yugoslav cases, and then speculates briefly about the future of the Cuban model. As the author realizes, it is a limited and flawed effort at comparison and pre-

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diction, but he is to be commended for the attempt. *Revolutionary Change in Cuba* is very weak in comparative materials, limited largely to "describing" (and sometimes decrying) what has happened on the island. If the essays often misrepresent their material, fail to stretch our imaginations or to capture the full richness and vitality of the revolution, many nevertheless are useful and do make a positive contribution to Cuban studies. Others remind us how ill equipped most conventional political scientists and economists are to confront historic transformations that have shaken and will continue to shake Latin America.

Robert Bernardo usually has a sharp eye for interesting and important problems. However his slim book on *The Theory of Moral Incentives in Cuba* has two basic shortcomings, the first conceptual, the second both conceptual and presentational.

(1) There *is* no theory of moral incentives in Cuba, at least as Bernardo uses the word *theory:* combining elements of classic Marxist thought and Cuban "theorizing" about the allocation of labor. A body of *practice* exists involving the use of moral incentives; there are *ideological* explanations and justifications for their use; there are organizational and individual *consequences* that derive from this practice and ideology. In proper hands these factors taken together would undoubtedly tell us much about how the Cuban Revolution works and does not work, much about its grandeur and its shortcomings. However, theory is not of first-order importance in the real world of the revolution, for an outsider to try to "construct" it and to make it the base of a monograph results in an exercise that is stiff, incomplete, and ultimately misleading. (There is even a technical appendix on "Moral Incentives, the Market, and Ethical Choice.") Can one discuss moral incentives in Cuba without discussing culture change, education, mass organizations, the "guerrilla complex," imperialism, scarcity, and similar factors? No! Yet Bernardo attempts nothing less. The result is a sterile and formalistic discussion that should bubble with vitality.

(2) Words may be hedgehogs in certain environments (at times this is charming), but hedgehogism in scholarly monographs does not further understanding. Again and again Bernardo adopts vocabulary and conceptual postures that only confuse the main issues. For example, on page ix, he says "A claim I shall be making is that Cuba has become the first country in the world to have achieved communism under conditions of relative peace." No Cuban (or serious student of Cuba) would use the concept of "communism" in this fashion. The *construction* of communism (defined as an idealized set of social relations), while using certain strategies, assuming certain costs and risks, and guided by a set of beliefs, not always fully shared and not always consistent, is the Cuban

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revolutionary process. Bernardo has no basis for making his claim that Cuba has "achieved communism."

So goes Bernardo's *Theory of Moral Incentives in Cuba*—compounded by clumsy prose, disorganization, and all to frequently, outdated and incomplete sources. It is unfortunate that the book is so badly done, because the author is *right* in trying to compare the Cuban and Chinese cases, *right* in recognizing that Cuba is a test of some critical ideas and controversies in Marxism and revolutionary theorizing, and also *right* in suggesting that an analysis of the labor market (in the several meanings of "market") would provide an important piece needed for understanding the Cuban puzzle. But unhappily the author makes few substantial empirical or conceptual contributions in these areas; frequently he sows more confusion. It seems that the Cuban Revolution is as elusive when pursued by Yankee scholars as Fidel Castro was when hunted in the Sierra by Batista's troops.

RICHARD R. FAGEN
*Stanford University*

Patterns of Foreign Influence in the Caribbean, *edited by Emanuel de Kadt. New York, Oxford University Press, 1972.—viii, 196 pp. $12.00.*

This book, published for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, is based on a set of papers prepared for the Chatham House Latin American seminar of 1967-68. In this published version, a number of the papers have been updated to 1969-70.

Six of the nine chapters deal with individual Caribbean territories. Of these, the chapters on Jamaica by Douglas Hall; on Guyana by Colin V. F. Henfrey; on the French Antilles by Guy Lasserre and Albert Mabileau; and on the Dutch Caribbean by Harry Hoetink provide excellent accounts and interpretative commentaries on recent political and economic history. It is not always easy to find similar compact statements on these territories. Although the stress is on relations with the colonial power or metropole from which independence or partial autonomy has been won, purely domestic developments are not neglected. Robin Blackburn's paper on Cuba and Bryan Robert's paper on Guatemala have to compete with a large body of up-to-date literature and there is less that is new in these two papers.

The remaining three chapters deal with the entire Caribbean. Peter R. Odell provides a geopolitical overview of Caribbean relations with the

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outside world. His paper bears virtually the entire burden of providing unity to the individual topics, although Lincoln Gordon's paper assists by viewing the Caribbean region from the standpoint of United States policy. Emanuel de Kadt, editor of the collection, provides an introduction that might have given more overall comparative analysis than a description of the volume's contents.

*Patterns of Foreign Influence in the Caribbean* is a helpful work for anyone interested in recent developments and the contemporary status of a number of Caribbean states and dependencies; this approach is especially relevant for readers concerned with efforts to free themselves from constraints and impulses stemming from foreign powers. "Dependence," "influence," and "hegemony" are terms that, naturally enough, enter frequently into these discussions, but in too many instances analysis ends, rather than begins, with their employment. Such a lack of analytical finesse limits the interest of the book, but it hardly detracts from the service of several papers in giving an intelligible account of a recent past of considerable complexity.

HERBERT GOLDHAMER
*The Rand Corporation*

Brazil in the Sixties *edited by Riordan Roett. Nashville, Tenn., Vanderbilt University Press, 1972.—xvii, 434 pp. $15.00.*

This scholarly anthology of twelve essays sets out to explain a dramatic decade during which Brazil plunged from an exhilarating democracy into one of the dreariest of the world's present-day military dictatorships (the words "exhilarating" and "dreariest" are the reviewer's; no author in this collection was so imprudent as to use strong adjectives). The essays treat the army, political groups, Brazilian-American relations, economics, agriculture, the public sector, industry, education, the rural middle class, the church, and literature. All are well researched; most are well written. Facts, statistics, and theories abound. Indeed, the preoccupation with statistics and institutions may prompt the reader to ask, as the title of a popular contemporary song, "Where have all the people gone?" The social scientists here have succeeded in dehumanizing Brazil's recent past so that the reader has no opportunity (except for the two short essays on literature) to meet any Brazilians.

Professor Douglas Hume Graham's lengthy essay on education typifies the book's dehumanization. There is absolutely no intellectual freedom (since the mid-1960s); some of the best teachers (including many with international reputations) have been retired, dismissed, or imprisoned;

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the military repeatedly invade the universities which frequently are administered by governmental satraps barely alluded to in sentences buried within fifty prolix pages. Apparently what really matters about Brazilian education is enrollment figures; these most definitely are not lacking. The essays ignore the contemporary plight of most Brazilians, something which even the present dictator, Emílio Médici, could not do in 1971 when he concluded that "The economy is going very well, the people not so well."

Like the Brazilian people, history also has been ignored in this collection (perhaps with better reason). The decade of the 1960s is in need of some explanation to anchor it to Brazil's past. Historical treatment might remedy such vague and questionable statements as "The military government represents in a very real sense a logical extension of major trends and characteristics of Brazilian politics" (p. 75). The Brazilian specialist, of course, will have no difficulty in fitting the rich data into a broader conception and framework, but for those without such specialization, the army of statistics may march by silently.

E. Bradford Burns
*University of California, Los Angeles*

Word Politics: Verbal Strategy Among Superpowers *by Thomas M. Franck and Edward Weisband. Oxford University Press, 1971.—vii, 176 pp. $5.95.*

So accustomed have we become to expecting, and then discounting, the moralizing, self-exonerating rhetoric of diplomatic "explanations" that we tend to take these verbal aspects of international interaction less than seriously. This is a mistake, Thomas Franck and Edward Weisband say, because how statesmen rationalize their actions has significance for world order and *Word Politics* illuminates this significance.

The major theme of the book is straightforward: when states justify their aggressions and embellish their self-interested commissions with "cover stories," concocted of moral-sounding principles, they also set precedents which open miscreant opportunities to others. When a state commits aggression and rationalizes by citing principles, that state has little basis for acting against, or even convincingly protesting, aggression committed by others and justified by the same principles. Most important, when superpowers expound principles and doctrines to whitewash their self-interested power plays, they at the same time establish "rules of the game" for the international system. By their after-the-fact words, voiced as principles of superpower prerogative, the United States

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and the Soviet Union have tended to formalize and legitimize patterns of intrabloc and interbloc interaction which then become norms of world politics.

A major virtue of the Franck and Weisband book is that they concretize their theoretical notions by displaying them in a set of case studies. These studies juxtapose the behavior of the United States in the Western Hemisphere to that of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe. Here the autors show (rather shockingly) how explanations, rationalizations, and justifications voiced by the Soviet Union regarding actions in Hungary and even more in Czechoslovakia matched almost exactly those voiced by the United States after successive interventions in Guatemala, Cuba and the Dominican Republic. When subjected to word-by-word comparison, the Brezhnev Doctrine expounded to legitimize the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 is essentially identical to the Johnson Doctrine to legitimize American intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965. Rather than trying to show that the superpowers take their cues directly from each other, Franck and Weisband contend only that both justify their acts in similar ways, i.e., by citing similar high-sounding principles which buttress and cloak short-run self-interests. What the authors also show is that because both superpowers identify with principles of interventionism, neither can credibly deter the other from acting arbitrarily vis-à-vis its own "satellites." More important, in a world of Johnson and Brezhnev doctrines, unilateral, arbitrary, and violent superpower interventionism becomes a norm of the international system. This, Franck and Weisband point out, is tragic for small states and a threat to world order, not least because the superpowers have adorned their high-handed behavior in cloaks of normality.

*Word Politics* clearly has many more strengths than shortcomings. The authors may be criticized for being too convinced concerning the efficacy and seriousness of principled explanations in world affairs. Moreover, they might be somewhat oversighted in discarding the relationship between recognized "spheres of influence" and world stability. Then, too, we might wish that they had gone a bit more deeply into the roots of superpower paranoia in the bipolar world. Nevertheless, their study is unquestionably useful, well researched, theoretically well grounded, and concisely written. The book rather strikingly reveals the significance of a little-studied aspect of international behavior; it ultimately shows why this significance should be a policy concern of the United States government where our statesmen should think through their verbal strategies more clearly.

DONALD J. PUCHALA
*Columbia University*

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Communication in International Politics, *edited by Richard L. Merritt. Urbana, Ill., University of Illinois Press, 1972,—x +, 461 pp. $15.00.*

Based on eighteen papers presented at the 1970 meetings of the American Political Science Association, this volume embodies the strengths and weaknesses of symposia and communication as a subject for academic research. As the editor remarks (p. x): "It is perhaps in the nature of symposia that they do not tie together as neatly as their organizers hope." Yet symposia offer a forum for ideas that might not surface in a more rigid format. Thus subject matter is broad, with useful insights and observations for many specialists. Such diversity emphasizes that communication is a field still lacking structure or boundaries. Does one gain new perspectives by viewing economic and technological interchange as communication processes, or is the net effect to expand the concept of communication to the point of meaninglessness?

Richard Merritt in "Transmission of Values Across National Boundaries," applies Lasswell's categories of values to the communication process, seeing the latter as a device for redistributing values between the source and the recipient of a message. He also proposes a nine-box matrix for classifying types of international political communication flows. One can reconstruct the nine boxes by establishing three categories of actors who may be either originators or receivers of messages: governmental actors, nongovernmental actors, and cultures. Cultures as transmitters, Merritt notes, have often been overlooked in studies of international political communication: we accept the ideas that cultures receive influences from abroad but ignore the possibility that they can also serve as transmitters.

"Transfer of Meaning Across National Boundaries," by Davis B. Bobrow directly attacks the problem of theory building in communication. Bobrow examines the utility of using three frameworks borrowed from other fields as organizing concepts for international political communication, and finds them all wanting: mediated stimulus-response, cognitive balance, and cybernetics. In an all-too-brief concluding section, he suggests finally that useful theory is more likely to emerge if one defines social communication narrowly as "the transfer of meaning between persons and groups"; the author then outlines propositions about meaning transfer.

One of Bobrow's major contributions is to question the utility of international relations as an appropriate universe for theory or theories. "We should move more rapidly toward treating phenomena that cross national lines as instances of phenomena that occur in several types of socal units" (p. 55). To go beyond the author's own formulation, students

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of international communication should look for social and psychological propositions to apply to international situations, rather than attempting to formulate propositions applying only to communications among national states.

Having perused these two general chapters, the reader is on his own and will want to skip around according to his interests. The remainder of the volume is organized in four broad communication categories: People to People, People at Home and Events Abroad, Influencing Foreign Cultures, Government to Government.

To this reviewer, Herbert C. Kelman on "The Problem-Solving Workshop in Conflict Resolution," is particularly outstanding. Kelman presents a perceptive analysis of experiments in international conflict-resolution carried out by Doob and Burton using small group techniques. He summarizes their similarities and differences, points out their strengths and weaknesses, and concludes with constructive suggestions for adapting these techniques to varieties of international problems. "Consistency in Foreign Policy Views" by Robert Jervis and "Effects of International Student Exchange" by Richard L. Merritt also deserve mention. Jervis examines the utility and danger of applying attitudinal balance theories to decision-makers' perceptions of international situations. Consistency of belief can help the decision-maker to avoid difficult choices. He also discusses the conditions under which closed-mindedness may be a virtual necessity and open-mindedness a hazard. Instructors using examples from small group experiments to illustrate nonperception of dissonant messages might try using some of Jervis's. For example, on June 22, 1941, when the Nazis attacked, a Soviet front line unit signaled its headquarters: "We are being fired on. What shall we do?" Headquarters replied: "You must be insane. And why is your signal not in code?" (p. 283). Merritt presents a compact, lucid summary and analysis of the effects of international student exchange. He suggests a number of propositions that can be culled from existing research and relates the changing patterns of cross-national student exchanges to other political and economic developments.

Other chapters deal with such subjects as American press treatment of Indochina from 1950 to 1956; Soviet-American exchange of persons; the influence of educational level on foreign affairs attitudes; relationships between elite and mass attitudes on international matters; nuclear desalting in the Middle East; the spread of the *ombudsman* from Sweden to other countries; German attitudes toward postwar denazification; increasing activity of U.S. advertising agencies in foreign markets; the concept of economic boundaries; and political aspects of international currency exchange-rate systems. Some of these chapters deal with the global; others are narrowly focused. Some are theoretical in character; others are

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based on secondary analysis of polls, content analysis, or mail questionnaires. Some are a valuable addition to the literature; others appear to be based on flimsy evidence or unexamined assumptions. The reviewer apologizes to those authors who have done an outstanding job for not giving them adequate attention; in the case of those authors whose performance was less outstanding, apologies are due to the reader.

PHILLIPS W. DAVISON
*Columbia University*

Transnational Law in a Changing Society: Essays in Honor of Philip C. Jessup, *edited by Wolfgang Friedmann, Louis Henkin, Oliver Lissitzyn. New York, Columbia University Press, 1972.—xiii, 324 pp. Hardback: $8.00, Paperback: $2.95.*

This volume is a fitting tribute to one who has made an important contribution to the interpretation and development of international law. The eighteen contributors—including the world's most eminent international jurists, scholars, and diplomats—investigate issues on which Judge Jessup has left his mark. Their range and continuing importance for contemporary transnational law is testimony to Jessup's imagination and depth. (The tragic death of Professor Wolfgang Friedmann shortly after this volume went to press makes the book something of a memorial to him also.)

These essays should make enlightening reading for those political scientists and historians who are still inclined to denigrate international law as largely irrelevant to the mainstream of the international political process. Not only do the contributors reveal a healthy sensitivity to the intimate interrelationships between world law and politics, they show in addition, an acute awareness of the impact of social and political change on the authority of international normative standards. Moreover, most of the essays deal with subjects currently undergoing radical and rapid change, so that in the best of these (e.g., Louis Henkin's "The Once and the Future Law of the Sea") the author examines current challenges to traditional standards and projects systematically likely outlines of future normative developments. Such an approach often raises as many questions as it provides answers.

Recent belief that legal obligations can be created through general consensus rather than the traditional, specific consent of every actor, receives treatment here. The newer view arose when the number of sovereign states had proliferated vastly and quasi-legislative institutions have come into being at the international level that operate on at least a modi-

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fied majoritarian basis. As the attorney general of Nigeria, T. Olawale Elias, writes: "Most rules of customary international law were established in the last four centuries by only a handful of European states; the advocates of consent as the only basis of obligation for sovereign states are also the first to insist that the three-fourths of the world that took no part in its formation must be regarded as bound by it, consent or no consent" (p. 49).

Of more general interest to social scientists should be the suggestions for further research into new problem areas implicit throughout this volume. For example, C. Wilfred Jenks makes a strong case for the need to acquire more information about the operations of private multinational foundations and corporations if these novel entities are to be regulated effectively. The late Francis Deák argues that while recent developments have not made the traditional doctrine of neutrality obsolete, the laws of war and neutrality need to be reformulated and updated in the light of current practice and the needs of the international community. Professor Friedmann's essay, on the developing international law of welfare, acknowledges the author's debt to Mitrany and other contributors to the functionalist approach. In so doing, it serves to remind us that many of the current challenges to human welfare—in the form of overpopulation, environmental pollution, and other serious problems—are issues that should be susceptible to functionalist solutions at the international level. To provide them will continue to require dedicated effort, not only from those trained in the law, but from all manner of social scientists, working, one would hope, hand in hand.

LYNN H. MILLER
*Temple University*

Magna Carta: The Heritage of Liberty *by Anne Pallister. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1971.—133 pp. $6.50.*

Whether or not Chief Justice Coke, as Maitland said, "invented" Magna Carta, no man did more to make this statute, that had no "fellow," central in political thought of whatever complexion. That its reputation warrants as much attention as the document itself justifies publication of Ms. Pallister's book. Her account of the charter's vicissitudes through three centuries illumines, though it does not fully explore, much legal and political history. To say that "during the last twenty-eight years of his long and eventful career Coke was the champion of the common law" (p. 9) is to overlook that Coke was a politician who championed what interest dictated. He pronounced Magna Carta declaratory of the fundamental law;

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he pronounced the power of Parliament transcendant and absolute, not so absolute, however, as to be capable of binding a successor; he put the common law fourth on his list of fifteen categories of English law. Because the same variety appeared time and again in the use of Magna Carta, the historian readily concludes that the charter meant exactly what the user wanted it to mean. It could obstruct as well as promote democratic demands, "tying one sort of people to be slaves to another," as Winstanley the Digger saw clearly. Its triumph at the Restoration was primarily the triumph of those interests that would exploit it to their advantage. Throughout the 1688 period, as earlier and later, men of all political persuasion, including the Jacobites, invoked Magna Carta in their own behalf, though the triumphant party made the law that Parliament made the supreme law. Toward the end of the eighteenth century, Magna Carta as fundamental law retreated before natural law, though some proponents of the latter identified the charter with it. Then revolutionary excesses brought repudiation of natural law and restoration of Magna Carta as declaratory of English law. Such circumstances make clear that its major importance lies in its survival and its sanctions, not in its specific articles, in its declarations of intent rather than its definitions of right. Whatever else the historian must constantly distinguish between the charter as law and the charter as rhetoric. By now virtually all its articles have been repealed and what remains is of no legal importance. Repeal has come by spurts. In describing the early nineteenth-century activity, Pallister would have profited from the masterly *History of English Criminal Law* by Leon Radzinowicz. Despite its brevity, even sparseness (little more than one hundred pages of text), her narrative does convey the political importance of the most chameleon-like document, not excluding the American Constitution, in Anglo-American legal history.

CHARLES F. MULLETT
*University of Missouri*

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

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